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Abstract
Quantum information theory is an area of physics which studies both fun-
damental and applied issues in quantum mechanics from an information-
theoretic viewpoint. The underlying techniques are, however, often re-
stricted to the analysis of systems which satisfy a certain independence con-
dition. For example, it is assumed that an experiment can be repeated
independently many times or that a large physical system consists of many
virtually independent parts. Unfortunately, such assumptions are not al-
ways justified. This is particularly the case for practical applications—e.g.,
in (quantum) cryptography—where parts of a system might have an arbi-
trary and unknown behavior.
We propose an approach which allows to study general physical systems
for which the above mentioned independence condition does not necessarily
hold. It is based on an extension of various information-theoretic notions.
For example, we introduce new uncertainty measures, called smooth min-
and max-entropy, which are generalizations of the von Neumann entropy.
Furthermore, we develop a quantum version of de Finetti’s representation
theorem, as described below.
Consider a physical system consisting of n parts. These might, for in-
stance, be the outcomes of n runs of a physical experiment. Moreover,
assume that the joint state of this n-partite system can be extended to an
(n + k)-partite state which is symmetric under permutations of its parts
(for some k ≫ 1). The de Finetti representation theorem then says that
the original n-partite state is, in a certain sense, close to a mixture of prod-
uct states. Independence thus follows (approximatively) from a symmetry
condition. This symmetry condition can easily be met in many natural situ-
ations. For example, it holds for the joint state of n parts which are chosen
at random from an arbitrary (n+ k)-partite system.
As an application of these techniques, we prove the security of quantum
key distribution (QKD), i.e., secret key agreement by communication over
a quantum channel. In particular, we show that, in order to analyze QKD
protocols, it is generally sufficient to consider so-called collective attacks,
where the adversary is restricted to applying the same operation to each
particle sent over the quantum channel separately. The proof is generic and
thus applies to known protocols such as BB84 and B92 (where better bounds
2
3on the secret-key rate and on the the maximum tolerated noise level of the
quantum channel are obtained) as well as to continuous variable schemes
(where no full security proof has been known). Furthermore, the security
holds with respect to a strong so-called universally composable definition.
This implies that the keys generated by a QKD protocol can safely be used
in any application, e.g., for one-time pad encryption—which, remarkably, is
not the case for most of the standard definitions.
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
What is needed to establish a secret key between two spatially separated
parties? Clearly, this question is of immediate interest for practical cryp-
tographic applications such as secure message transmission.1 More impor-
tantly, however, it is related to fundamental problems in (classical and quan-
tum) information theory. Is information physical? Is classical information
distinct from quantum information? In fact, it turns out that the possibility
of secret key agreement (over insecure channels) strongly depends on the
physical properties of information and that there is indeed a fundamental
difference between classical and quantum information.
In this thesis, we address several basic question of quantum information
theory: What does secrecy mean in a quantum world? (Chapter 2) How can
knowledge and uncertainty be quantified? (Chapter 3) What is the role of
symmetry? (Chapter 4) Can any type of randomness be transformed into
uniform randomness? (Chapter 5) As we shall see, the answers to these
questions allow us to treat the problem of secret key agreement in a very
natural way (Chapters 6 and 7).
1.2 Quantum key distribution: general facts
Cryptographic setting
We consider a setting where two distant parties, traditionally called Alice
and Bob, want to establish a common secret key , i.e., a string of random
bits which is unknown to an adversary, Eve. Throughout this thesis, we
focus on information-theoretic security , which is actually the strongest rea-
1For example, using one-time pad encryption [Ver26], the problem of secretly exchang-
ing ℓ message bits reduces to the problem of distributing a secret key consisting of ℓ
bits.
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sonable notion of security.2 It guarantees that an adversary does not get
any information correlated to the key, except with negligible probability.
For the following, we assume that Alice and Bob already have at hand
some means to exchange classical messages in an authentic way.3 In fact,
only relatively weak resources are needed to turn a completely insecure com-
munication channel into an authentic channel. For example, Alice and Bob
might invoke an authentication protocol (see, e.g., [Sti91, GN93]) for which
they need a short4 initial key. Actually, as shown in [RW03, RW04], it is
even sufficient for Alice and Bob to start with only weakly correlated and
partially secret information (instead of a short secret key).
Key agreement by quantum communication
Under the sole assumption that Alice and Bob are connected by a classical
authentic communication channel, secret communication—and thus also the
generation of a secret key—is impossible [Sha49, Mau93]. This changes
dramatically when quantum mechanics comes into the game. Bennett and
Brassard [BB84] (see also [Wie83]) were the first to propose a quantum key
distribution (QKD) scheme which uses communication over a (completely
insecure) quantum channel (in addition to the classical authentic channel).
The scheme is commonly known as the BB84 protocol .
Quantum key distribution is generally based on the impossibility to ob-
serve a quantum mechanical system without changing its state. An adver-
sary trying to wiretap the quantum communication between Alice and Bob
would thus inevitably leave traces which can be detected. A quantum key
distribution protocol thus achieves the following type of security: As long as
the adversary is passive, it generates an (arbitrarily long) secret key. On the
other hand, if the adversary tampers with the quantum channel, the pro-
tocol recognizes the attack and aborts the computation of the key.5 (Note
that this is actually the best one can hope for: As the quantum channel
is completely insecure, an adversary might always interrupt the quantum
communication between Alice and Bob, in which case it is impossible to
generate a secret key.)
2An example of a weaker level of security is computational security , where one only
requires that it is difficult (i.e., time-consuming, but not impossible) for an adversary to
compute information on the key.
3Authentic means that, upon receiving a message, Bob can verify whether the message
was indeed sent by Alice, and vice-versa.
4The length of the key only grows logarithmically in the length of the message to be
authenticated.
5More precisely, it is guaranteed that the protocol does not abort as long as the ad-
versary is passive (this is called robustness). Moreover, for any attack on the quantum
channel, the probability that the protocol does not abort and the adversary gets informa-
tion on the generated key is negligible (see Section 6.1.3 for details).
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An example: the BB84 protocol
To illustrate the main principle of quantum key distribution, let us have a
closer look at the BB84 protocol. It uses an encoding of classical bits in
qubits, i.e., two-level quantum systems6. The encoding is with respect to
one of two different orthogonal bases, called the rectilinear and the diagonal
basis.7 These two bases are mutually unbiased , that is, a measurement in
one of the bases reveals no information on a bit encoded with respect to the
other basis.
In the first step of the protocol, Alice chooses N random bitsX1, . . . ,XN ,
encodes each of these bits into qubits using at random8 either the rectilinear
or the diagonal basis, and transmits them to Bob (using the quantum chan-
nel). Bob measures each of the qubits he receives with respect to—a random
choice of—either the rectilinear or the diagonal basis to obtain classical bits
Yi. The pair of classical bitstrings X = (X1, . . . ,XN ) and Y = (Y1, . . . , YN )
held by Alice and Bob after this step is called the raw key pair.
The remaining part of the protocol is purely classical (in particular,
Alice and Bob only communicate classically). First, Alice and Bob apply a
sifting step, where they announce their choices of bases used for the encoding
and the measurement, respectively. They discard all bits of their raw key
for which the encoding and measurement bases are not compatible. Then
Alice and Bob proceed with a parameter estimation step. They compare
some (small) randomly chosen set of bits of their raw key in order to get a
guess for the error rate, i.e., the fraction of positions i in which Xi and Yi
disagree. If the error rate is too large—which might indicate the presence
of an adversary—Alice and Bob abort the protocol.
Let X ′ and Y ′ be the remaining parts of the raw keys (i.e., the bits of
X and Y that have neither been discarded in the sifting step nor used for
parameter estimation). These strings are now used for the actual compu-
tation of the final key. In an information reconciliation step, Alice sends
certain error correcting information on X ′ to Bob.9 This, together with Y ′,
allows him to compute a guess for X ′. (Note that, because of the parameter
estimation step, it is guaranteed that X ′ and Y ′ only differ in a limited
number of positions.) In the final step of the protocol, called privacy ampli-
fication, Alice and Bob use two-universal hashing10 to turn the (generally
only partially secret) string X ′ into a shorter but secure key.
6For example, the classical bits might be encoded into the spin orientation of particles.
7See Section 7.2.1 for a definition.
8In the original proposal of the BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob choose the two bases
with equal probabilities. However, as pointed out in [LCA05], the efficiency of the protocol
is increased if they select one of the two bases with probability almost one. In this case,
the choices of Alice and Bob will coincide with high probability, which means that the
number of bits to be discarded in the sifting step is small.
9The information reconciliation step might also be interactive.
10See Section 5.4 for a definition of two-universality.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 10
The security of the BB84 protocol is based on the fact that an adversary,
ignorant of the actual encoding bases used by Alice, cannot gain information
about the encoded bits without disturbing the qubits sent over the quantum
channel. If the disturbance is too large, Alice and Bob will observe a high
error rate and abort the protocol in the parameter estimation step. On the
other hand, if the disturbance is below a certain threshold, then the strings
X ′ and Y ′ held by Alice and Bob are sufficiently correlated and secret in
order to distill a secret key.
In order to prove security, one thus needs to quantify the amount of
information that an adversary has on the raw key, given the disturbance
measured by Alice and Bob. It is a main goal of this thesis to develop the
information-theoretic techniques which are needed for this analysis. (See
also Section 1.6.3 for a sketch of the security proof.)
Alternative protocols
Since the invention of quantum cryptography, a considerable effort has been
taken to get a better understanding of its theoretical foundations as well
as to make it more practical. In the course of this research, a large variety
of alternative QKD protocols has been proposed. Some of them are very
efficient with respect to the secret-key rate, i.e., the number of key bits
generated per channel use [Bru98, BPG99]. Others are designed to cope
with high channel noise or noise in the detector, which makes them more
suitable for practical implementations [SARG04].
The structure of these protocols is mostly very similar to the BB84
protocol described above. For example, the six-state protocol proposed
in [Bru98, BPG99] uses three different bases for the encoding (i.e., six dif-
ferent states), but otherwise is identical to the BB84 protocol. On the other
hand, the B92 protocol [Ben92] is based on an encoding with respect to only
two non-orthogonal states.
QKD over noisy channels
Any realistic quantum channel is subject to intrinsic noise. Alice and Bob
will thus observe errors even if the adversary is passive. However, as these
errors are not distinguishable from errors caused by an attack, the distribu-
tion of a secret key can only be successful if the noise level of the channel is
sufficiently low.
As an example, consider the BB84 protocol described above. In the
parameter estimation step, Alice and Bob compute a guess for the error
rate and abort the protocol if it exceeds a certain threshold. Hence, the
scheme only generates a key if the noise level of the channel is below this
threshold.
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The amount of noise tolerated by a QKD scheme is an important mea-
sure for its practicability. In fact, in an implementation, the level of noise
inevitably depends on the distance between Alice and Bob (i.e., the length of
the optical fiber, for an implementation based on photons). To characterize
the efficiency of QKD schemes, one thus often considers the relation between
the channel noise and the secret-key rate (see plots in Chapter 7). Typically,
the secret-key rate decreases with increasing noise level and becomes zero
as soon as the noise reaches a certain bound, called the maximum tolerated
channel noise.
Quantum key distribution and distillation
Assume that Alice and Bob have access to some correlated quantum systems
(e.g., predistributed pairs of entangled particles). A quantum key distillation
protocol allows them to transform this correlation into a common secret key,
while using only classical authentic communication.
As explained below, a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol can
generally be transformed into a key distillation protocol in such a way that
security of the latter implies security of the first. This is very convenient for
security proofs, as key distillation only involves quantum states (instead of
quantum channels) which are easier to analyze (see [Eke91, BBM92]).
The connection between key distillation and key distribution protocols
is based on the following observation: Let X be a classical value chosen
according to a distribution PX and let |φx〉 be a quantum encoding of X.
This situation could now equivalently be obtained by the following two-step
process: (i) prepare a bipartite quantum state |Ψ〉 :=∑x√PX(x)|x〉⊗|φx〉,
where {|x〉}x is some orthonormal basis of the first subsystem; (ii) measure
the first part of |Ψ〉 with respect to the basis {|x〉}x. In fact, it is easy
to verify that the outcome X is distributed according to PX and that the
remaining quantum system contains the correct encoding of X.
To illustrate how this observation applies to QKD, consider a proto-
col where Alice uses the quantum channel to transmit an encoding |φx〉 of
some randomly chosen value X to Bob (as, e.g., in the first step of the
BB84 protocol described above). According to the above discussion, this
can equivalently be achieved as follows:11 First, Alice locally prepares the
bipartite state |Ψ〉 defined above, keeps the first half of it, and sends the
second half over the quantum channel to Bob. Second, Alice measures the
quantum system she kept to get the classical value X. (Such a protocol is
sometimes called an entanglement-based scheme.)
Note that, after the use of the quantum channel—but before the mea-
surement—Alice and Bob share some (generally entangled) quantum state.
11More generally, any arbitrary protocol step can be replaced by a coherent quantum
operation followed by some measurement.
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The remaining part of the key distribution protocol is thus actually a quan-
tum key distillation protocol. Hence, if this key distillation protocol is secure
(for any predistributed entanglement) then the original quantum key distri-
bution protocol is secure (for any arbitrary attack of Eve).
1.3 Contributions
This thesis makes two different types of contributions. First, we introduce
various concepts and prove results which are of general interest in quantum
information theory and cryptography.12 These contributions are summa-
rized in Section 1.3.1 below. Second, we apply our techniques to QKD in
order to derive a general security criterion. Some aspects and implications
of this result are discussed in Section 1.3.2.
1.3.1 New notions in quantum information theory
Smooth min- and max-entropies as generalizations of von Neu-
mann entropy
The von Neumann entropy, as a measure for the uncertainty on the state of
a quantum system, plays an important role in quantum information theory.
This is mainly due to the fact that it characterizes fundamental information-
theoretic tasks such as randomness extraction or data compression. For
example, the von Neumann entropy of a source emitting quantum states can
be interpreted as the minimum space needed to encode these states such that
they can later be reconstructed with arbitrarily small error. However, any
such interpretation of the von Neumann entropy only holds asymptotically
in situations where a certain underlying experiment is repeated many times
independently. For the above example, this means that the encoding is over
many (sufficiently independent) outputs of the source.
In the context of cryptography, where an adversary might corrupt parts
of a system in an arbitrary way, this independence can often not be guar-
anteed. The von Neumann entropy is thus usually not an appropriate mea-
sure—e.g., to quantify the uncertainty of an adversary—unless we put some
severe restrictions on her capabilities (e.g., that her attack consists of many
independent repetitions of the same action).
In this thesis, we introduce two entropy measures, called smooth min-
and max-entropy , which can be seen as generalizations of the von Neu-
mann entropy. While smooth min-entropy quantifies the amount of uniform
12For example, our result on privacy amplification against quantum adversaries is not
only useful to prove the security of QKD. It has also found interesting applications within
other fields of cryptography, as for instance in the context of multi-party computation
(see, e.g., [DFSS05] for a result on bit commitment).
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randomness that can be extracted from a quantum system, the smooth max-
entropy corresponds to the length of an optimal encoding of the system’s
state. Unlike the von Neumann entropy, however, this characterization ap-
plies to arbitrary situations—including those for which there is no underlying
independently repeated experiment.
In the special case of many independent repetitions (that is, if the sys-
tem’s state is described by a density operator which has product form),
smooth min- and max-entropy both reduce to the von Neumann entropy,
as expected. Moreover, smooth min- and max-entropy inherit most of the
properties known from the von Neumann entropy, as for example the strong
subadditivity. (We refer to Section 1.5 for a summary of these results.) On
the other hand, because the von Neumann entropy is a special case of smooth
min- and max-entropy, its properties follow directly from the corresponding
properties of the smooth min- or max-entropy. Interestingly, some of the
proofs are surprisingly easy in this general case. For example, the strong
subadditivity of the smooth min-entropy follows by a very short argument
(cf. Lemma 3.1.7 and Lemma 3.2.7). Note that this immediately gives a
simple proof for the strong subadditivity of the von Neumann entropy.
De Finetti representation theorem for finite symmetric quantum
states
An n-partite density operator ρn is said to be N -exchangeable, for N ≥ n,
if it is the partial state (i.e., ρn = trk(ρN )) of an N -partite density operator
ρN which is invariant under permutations of the subsystems. Moreover, ρn
is infinitely-exchangeable if it is N -exchangeable for all N ≥ n. The quantum
de Finetti representation theorem [HM76] (which is the quantum version of
a theorem in probability theory named after its inventor Bruno de Finetti13)
makes a fundamental statement on such symmetric operators.14 Namely, it
says that any infinitely-exchangeable operator ρn can be written as a convex
combination (i.e., a mixture) of product operators,
ρn =
∫
σ
σ⊗nν(σ) .
We generalize the quantum de Finetti representation theorem for in-
finitely exchangeable operators to the finite case.15 More precisely, we
show that the above formula still holds approximatively if ρn is only N -
exchangeable for, some finite N which is sufficiently larger than n. (We
refer to Section 1.5 below for a more detailed description of this statement.)
13See [MC93] for a collection of de Finetti’s original papers.
14See [CFS02] for a nice proof of the quantum de Finetti theorem based on its classical
analogue.
15The result presented in this thesis is different from the one proposed in a previous
paper [KR05] (see Section 1.5 for more details).
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The de Finetti representation theorem turns out to be a useful tool in
quantum information theory. In fact, symmetric (and exchangeable) states
play an important role in many applications. For example, the operator
describing the joint state of n particles selected at random from a set of N
particles is N -exchangeable. Hence, according to our finite version of the de
Finetti representation theorem, the analysis of such states can be reduced to
the analysis of product states—which is often much easier than the general
case. Following this idea, we will use the finite de Finetti representation
theorem to argue that, for proving the security of a QKD scheme against
arbitrary attacks, it suffices to consider attacks that have a certain product
structure (so-called collective attacks, cf. Section 1.3.2).
Universal security of keys in a quantum world
In quantum cryptography, the security of a secret key S is typically defined
with respect to the classical information W that an adversary might obtain
when measuring her quantum system HE. More precisely, S is said to be
secure if, for any measurement of the adversary’s system HE , the resulting
outcome W gives virtually no information on S. Although this definition
looks quite strong, we shall see that it is not sufficient for many applications,
e.g., if the key S is used for one-time pad encryption (see Section 2.2).
We propose a security definition which overcomes this problem. Roughly
speaking, we say that a key S is ε-secure if, except with probability ε,
S is equal to a perfect key which is uniformly distributed and completely
independent of the adversary’s quantum system. In particular, our security
definition is universal in the sense that an ε-secure key can safely be used
in any application, except with probability ε.16
Security of privacy amplification against quantum adversaries
Let X be a classical random variable on which an adversary has some par-
tial information. Privacy amplification is the art of transforming this par-
tially secure X into a fully secure key S, and has been studied extensively
for the case where the adversary’s information is purely classical. It has
been shown [BBR88, ILL89, BBCM95] that it is always possible to gener-
ate an ℓ-bit key S which is secure against any adversary whose uncertainty
on X—measured in terms of the collision entropy17—is sufficiently larger
than ℓ.
We generalize this classical privacy amplification theorem to include
quantum adversaries who might hold information on X encoded in the state
16Hence, our security definition fits into general frameworks concerned with the uni-
versal security of quantum protocols, as proposed by Ben-Or and Mayers [BOM04] and
Unruh [Unr04] (see Section 2.2 for more details).
17The collision entropy, also called Re´nyi entropy of order two, of a probability distri-
bution PX is the negative binary logarithm of its collision probability
∑
x PX(x)
2.
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of a quantum system. We show that, similar to the classical result, X can
be transformed into a key of length ℓ which is secure18 if the uncertainty
of the adversary on X—this time measured in terms of the smooth min-
entropy—is at least roughly ℓ. Because the smooth min-entropy is generally
larger than the collision entropy, this also implies the above classical result.
Our privacy amplification theorem is optimal with respect to the maxi-
mum length ℓ of the extractable secret key—i.e., smooth min-entropy com-
pletely characterizes the number of secret key bits that can be generated
from a partially secret string (up to some small constant). This also im-
proves our previous results [KMR05, RK05] which are only optimal in cer-
tain special cases.19
1.3.2 Properties and implications of the security result
We provide a simple and general20 criterion for the security of QKD against
any attack allowed by the laws of quantum physics. The following is a
summary of the most important properties and consequences of this result.
(For a more detailed description of the security criterion and a proof sketch,
we refer to Section 1.6 below.)
Coherent attacks are not stronger than collective attacks
An adversary might in principle apply an arbitrary operation on the quan-
tum states exchanged between Alice and Bob. In the case of the most gen-
eral, so-called coherent attacks, this operation could involve all subsystems
(particles) simultaneously, which makes it (seemingly) difficult to analyze.
One thus often considers a restricted class of attacks, called collective at-
tacks [BM97b, BM97a], where the adversary is assumed to apply the same
transformation to each of the subsystems that is sent over the channel.21 A
natural and long-standing open question in this context is whether security
against collective attacks implies full security (see, e.g., [BBB+02]). Our
18We prove security according to the strong definition proposed in Section 2.2—i.e., the
security is universal.
19The result proven in [RK05] is optimal if the density operator describing the initial
string together with the adversary’s quantum information has product form.
20The security criterion is general in the sense that it applies to virtually all known
protocols. Note that this stands in contrast to previous security proofs, which are mostly
designed for specific protocols.
21An even more restricted type of attacks are the so-called individual attacks where,
additionally, the adversary is supposed to apply some fixed measurement operation to
each of the subsystems sent through the channel. In particular, this measurement cannot
depend on the classical information that Alice and Bob exchange for error correction and
privacy amplification. As shown in [BMS96], such individual attacks are generally weaker
than collective attacks. Hence, security against individual attacks does not imply full
security.
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result immediately answers this question in the positive, that is, coherent
attacks cannot be more powerful than collective attacks.22
Security of practical implementations
Because of technical limitations, practical implementations of QKD are sub-
ject to many imperfections. In addition to noisy channels, these might
include faulty sources23 or detector losses. Because of its generality, our
security criterion can be used for the analysis of such practical settings.24
Keys generated by QKD can safely be used in applications
The security result holds with respect to a so-called universal security defini-
tion. This guarantees that the key generated by a QKD protocol can safely
be used in applications such as for one-time pad encryption. (As mentioned
above, this is not necessarily the case for many of the standard security
definitions.)
Improved bounds on the efficiency of concrete protocols
Our security result applies to protocols which could not be analyzed with
previously known techniques (e.g., a reduction to entanglement purification
schemes, as proposed in [SP00]). In particular, it allows to compute the key
rates for new variants of known protocols.25 For example, we propose an
improved version of the six-state protocol and show that it is more efficient
than previous variants. Moreover, we derive new bounds on the maximum
tolerated channel noise of the BB84 or the six-state protocol with one-way
post-processing.
Explicit bounds on the security of finite keys
The security criterion gives explicit (non-asymptotic) bounds on the secrecy
and the length of keys generated from any (finite) number of invocations
of the quantum channel. Moreover, it applies to schemes which use arbi-
trary (not necessarily optimal) subprotocols for information reconciliation.
This is in contrast to most known security results which—with a few excep-
tions26—only hold asymptotically for large key sizes and for asymptotically
22This statement holds for virtually any QKD protocol; the only requirement is that the
protocol is symmetric under permutations of the channel uses (see Section 1.6 for more
details).
23For example, it is difficult to design sources that emit perfect single-photon pulses.
24As there is no restriction on the structure of the underlying Hilbert space, the security
criterion applies to any modeling of the physical system which is used for the quantum
communication between Alice and Bob.
25E.g., we will analyze protocols that use an alternative method for the processing of
the raw key.
26See, e.g., [ILM01] for a nice and very careful explicit analysis of the BB84 protocol.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 17
optimal information reconciliation.
1.4 Related work
The techniques developed in this thesis are partly motivated by ideas known
from classical information theory and, in particular, cryptography (e.g., clas-
sical de Finetti-style theorems, privacy amplification against classical adver-
saries, or universally composable security). For a discussion of these notions
and their relation to our results we refer to Section 1.3. In the following, we
rather focus on work related to the security of QKD.
Since Bennett and Brassard proposed the first QKD protocol in 1984
[BB84], it took more than a decade until Mayers [May96] proved that the
scheme is secure against arbitrary attacks.27 This result was followed by
various alternative proofs (see, e.g., [CRE04] or [LCA05] for an overview).
One of the most popular proof techniques was proposed by Shor and
Preskill [SP00], based on ideas of Lo and Chau [LC99]. It uses a connection
between key distribution and entanglement purification [BBP+96] pointed
out by Ekert [Eke91] (see also [BBM92]). The proof technique of Shor and
Preskill was later refined and applied to other protocols (see, e.g., [GL03,
TKI03]).
In [CRE04], we have presented a general method for proving the secu-
rity of QKD which does not rely on entanglement purification. Instead, it
is based on a result on the security of privacy amplification in the context
of quantum adversaries [KMR05, RK05]. Later, this method has been ex-
tended and applied to prove the security of new variants of the BB84 and
the six-state protocol [RGK05, KGR05].28 The security proof given in this
thesis is based on ideas developed in these papers.
Our new approach for proving the security of QKD has already found
various applications. For example, it is used for the analysis of protocols
based on continuous systems as well as to improve the analysis of known
(practical) protocols exploiting the fact that an adversary cannot control
the noise in the physical devices owned by Alice and Bob (see, e.g., [Gro05,
NA05, Lo05]).
1.5 Outline of the thesis
The following is a brief summary of the main results obtained in each chap-
ter.
27See also [May01] for an improved version of Mayers’ proof.
28In [RGK05, KGR05] we use an alternative technique (different from the quantum de
Finetti theorem) to show that collective attacks are equivalent to coherent attacks for
certain QKD protocols.
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Chapter 2: Preliminaries
The first part of this chapter (Section 2.1) is concerned with the representa-
tion of physical (cryptographic) systems as mathematical objects. We briefly
review the density operator formalism which is used to describe quantum
mechanical systems. Moreover, we present some variant of this formalism
which is useful when dealing with physical systems that consist of both
classical and quantum parts.
The second part of Chapter 2 (Section 2.2) is devoted to the security
definition for secret keys. We first argue that many of the widely used
definitions are problematic—in the sense that they do not imply the security
of applications such as one-time pad encryption. Then, as a solution to this
problem, we introduce a so-called universal security definition for secret keys
and discuss its properties.
Chapter 3: Smooth min- and max-entropy
This chapter introduces and studies smooth min-entropy Hεmin and smooth
max-entropy Hεmax, which both are entropy measures for density operators.
We first discuss some basic properties (Sections 3.1 and 3.2) which are ac-
tually very similar to those of the von Neumann entropy (Theorem 3.2.12).
For example, the smooth min-entropy is strongly subadditive, that is,29
Hεmin(A|BC) ≤ Hεmin(A|B) , (1.1)
and it obeys an inequality which can be interpreted as a chain rule,
Hεmin(AB|C) ≤ Hεmin(A|BC) +Hmax(B) . (1.2)
Moreover, if the states in the subsystems HA and HC are independent con-
ditioned on a classical value Y then
Hεmin(AY |C) ≥ Hεmin(Y |C) +Hmin(A|Y ) . (1.3)
The second part of Chapter 3 (Section 3.3) treats the special case where
the density operators have product form. In this case, smooth min- and max-
entropy both reduce to the von Neumann entropy. Formally, the smooth
min-entropy Hεmin(A
n|Bn) of a product state ρAnBn = σ⊗nAB satisfies
lim
n→∞
1
n
Hεmin(A
n|Bn) = H(A|B) , (1.4)
where H(A|B) = H(σAB) − H(σB) is the (conditional) von Neumann en-
tropy evaluated for the operator σAB (cf. Theorem 3.3.6 and Corollary 3.3.7).
29We use a slightly simplified notation in this summary. For example, we write
Hεmin(A|B) to denote the smooth min-entropy of a state ρAB given the second subsys-
tem (instead of Hεmin(ρAB |B) which is used in the technical part).
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Chapter 4: Symmetric states
This chapter is concerned with symmetric states, that is, states on n-fold
product system H⊗n that are invariant under permutations of the subsys-
tems. We first show that any permutation-invariant density operator has
a symmetric purification, which allows us to restrict our attention to the
analysis of pure symmetric states (Section 4.2).
The main result of this section is a finite version of the quantum de Finetti
representation theorem (Section 4.3). It says that symmetric states can be
approximated by a convex combination of states which have “almost” prod-
uct form (cf. Theorem 4.3.2). Formally, if ρn+k is a permutation-invariant
operator on N = n + k subsystems H, then the partial state ρn on H⊗n
(obtained by tracing over k subsystems) is approximated by a mixture of
operators ρσn, i.e.,
ρn ≈
∫
σ
ρσnν(σ) , (1.5)
where the integral ranges over all density operators σ on one single sub-
system H and ν is some probability measure on these operators. Roughly
speaking, the states ρσn are superpositions of states which, on at least n− r
subsystems, for some small r, have product form σ⊗n−r. Moreover, the dis-
tance30 between the left and the right hand side of the approximation (1.5)
decreases exponentially fast in r and k.31
The properties of the states ρσn occurring in the convex combination (1.5)
are similar to those of perfect product states σ⊗n. The main result of Sec-
tion 4.4 can be seen as a generalization of (1.4). It states that, for a state
ρσABAnBn which has almost product form σ
⊗n
AB (in the sense defined above,
where σAB is a bipartite operator on HA ⊗HB) the smooth min-entropy is
given by
lim
n→∞
1
n
Hεmin(A
n|Bn) = H(A|B) (1.6)
(see Theorem 4.4.132).
Analogously, in Section 4.5, we show that states ρσn which have almost
product form σ⊗n lead to similar statistics as perfect product states σ⊗n if
they are measured with respect to a product measurement. Formally, let
PZ be the distribution of the outcomes when measuring σ with respect to
30The distance is measured with respect to the L1-distance, as defined in Section 2.1.4.
31Note that this version of the finite quantum de Finetti representation theo-
rem—although the same in spirit—is distinct from the the one proposed in [KR05]:
In [KR05], the decomposition is with respect to perfect n-fold product states σ⊗n—instead
of states ρσn which are products on only n− r subsystems—but the approximation is not
exponential.
32Note that Theorem 4.4.1 only implies one direction (≥). The other direction (≤)
follows from a similar argument for the smooth max-entropy, which is an upper bound on
the smooth min-entropy.
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a POVM M. Moreover, let λz be the statistics (i.e., the frequency distri-
bution) of the outcomes z = (z1, . . . , zn) of the product measurement M⊗n
applied to ρσn. Then
lim
n→∞λz = PZ (1.7)
(cf. Theorem 4.5.2).
Chapter 5: Privacy amplification
This chapter is on privacy amplification in the context of quantum adver-
saries. The main result is an explicit expression for the secrecy of a key S
which is computed from an only partially secure string X by two-universal
hashing33 (Theorem 5.5.1 and Corollary 5.6.1). The result implies that the
key S is secure under the sole condition that its length ℓ is bounded by
ℓ / Hεmin(X|E) (1.8)
where Hεmin(X|E) denotes the smooth min-entropy of X given the adver-
sary’s initial information.
Chapter 6: Security of QKD
This chapter is devoted to the statement and proof of our main result on
the security of QKD. In particular, it contains an expression for the key
rate for a general class of protocols in terms of simple entropic quantities
(Theorem 6.5.1 and Corollary 6.5.2). (We refer to Section 1.6 for an overview
on this result and its proof.)
Chapter 7: Examples
As an illustration, we apply the general result of Chapter 6 to specific types
of QKD protocols. The focus is on schemes which are based on two-level
systems. In particular, we analyze different versions of the six-state QKD
protocol and compute explicit values for their rates (see Plots 7.1–7.5).
1.6 Outline of the security analysis of QKD
The following is a summary of our main result on the security of quantum key
distillation which—according to the discussion in Section 1.2—also implies
the security of quantum key distribution. Moreover, we give a sketch of
the security proof, which is based on the technical results summarized in
Section 1.5 above. (For a complete description of the security result and the
full proof, we refer to Chapter 6.)
33That is, S is the output f(X) of a function f which is randomly chosen from a so-called
two-universal family of hash functions (see Section 5.4 for a definition).
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1.6.1 Protocol
We start with a brief characterization of the general type of quantum key
distillation protocols to which our security proof applies. For this, we assume
that Alice and Bob start with N bipartite quantum systems HA ⊗HB (de-
scribing, e.g., pairs of entangled particles). The protocol then runs through
the following steps in order to transform this initial entanglement between
Alice and Bob into a common secret key.
• Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob sacrifice some small number, say
m, subsystems HA ⊗ HB in order to estimate their average correla-
tion. For this, they both apply measurements with respect to different
bases and publicly announce the outcomes (using the authentic clas-
sical communication channel). Depending on the resulting statistics,
they either decide to proceed with the computation of the key or to
abort the protocol.
• Measurement: Alice and Bob both apply measurements to their parts
of the remaining subsystems HA ⊗ HB to obtain a pair of raw keys.
(Note that these raw keys are generally only weakly correlated and
partially secure.)
• Block-wise processing: Alice and Bob might34 further process their raw
key pair in order to improve its correlation or secrecy. We assume that
this processing acts on n blocks of size b individually. For example,
Alice and Bob might invoke a so-called advantage distillation protocol
(see Section 7.1.3) whose purpose is to single out blocks of the raw key
that are highly correlated. We denote by Xn and Y n the strings held
by Alice and Bob after this step.
• Information reconciliation: The purpose of this step is to transform
the (possibly only weakly correlated) pair of strings Xn and Y n into a
pair of identical strings. Typically, Alice sends certain error correcting
information on Xn to Bob which allows him to compute a guess Xˆn
of Xn.
• Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob use two-universal hashing to
transform their strings Xn and Xˆn into secret keys of length ℓ.
Additionally, we assume that the action of the protocol is invariant under
permutations of the N input systems. This does not restrict the generality
of our results, because any protocol can easily be turned into a permutation-
invariant one: Before starting with the parameter estimation, Alice and Bob
simply have to (publicly) agree on a random permutation which they use to
reorder their subsystems (see Section 1.6.3 below for more details).
34In many protocols, this step is omitted, i.e., Alice and Bob directly proceed with
information reconciliation.
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1.6.2 Security criterion
The security of a key distillation scheme depends on the actual choice of
various protocol parameters which we define in the following:
• Γ is the set of states on single subsystems which are not filtered by
the parameter estimation subprotocol: More precisely, Γ contains all
density operators σAB such that, when starting with the product state
ρANBN := σ
⊗N
AB , the protocol does not abort.
• EXY E¯←AbBbEb is the CPM35 on b subsystems which describes the mea-
surement together with the block-wise processing on blocks of size b.
• n is the number of blocks of size b that are used for the actual com-
putation of the key (i.e., the number of blocks of subsystems that are
left after the parameter estimation step).
• ℓ denotes the length of the final key generated in the privacy amplifi-
cation step.
In addition, the security of the scheme depends on the efficiency of the
information reconciliation subprotocol, i.e., the amount of information that
is leaked to Eve. However, for this summary, we assume that Alice and
Bob use an optimal36 information reconciliation protocol. In this case, the
leakage is roughly equal to the entropy of Xn given Y n.37
We are now ready to formulate a general security criterion for quantum
key distillation (cf. Theorem 6.5.1): The scheme described above is secure
(for any initial state) if38
ℓ
n
/ min
σAB∈Γ
H(X|E) −H(X|Y ) , (1.9)
where the minimum ranges over all states σAB contained in the set Γ defined
above and where H(X|E) and H(X|Y ) are the (conditional) von Neumann
entropies of
σXY E := EXY E¯←AbBbEb(σ⊗bABE)
where σABE is a purification of σAB. Note that, because the operators σAB
are on single subsystems, formula (1.9) is usually fairly easy to evaluate for
concrete protocols (cf. Chapter 7).
Typically, the number m of subsystem that are sacrificed for parameter
estimation is small compared to the total number N of initial subsystems.
35See Section 2.1.1 for a definition of completely positive maps (CPM).
36In Section 6.3, we show that optimal information reconciliation protocols exist.
37We refer to Chapter 6 for the general result which deals with arbitrary—not necessarily
optimal—information reconciliation schemes.
38The approximation / in (1.9) indicates that the criterion holds asymptotically for
increasing n. We refer to Chapter 6 for a non-asymptotic result.
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Hence, the number n of blocks of size b that can be used for the actual
computation of the key is roughly given by n ≈ Nb .39 The criterion (1.9)
can thus be turned into an expression for the key rate of the protocol (i.e.,
the number of key bits generated per channel use):
rate =
1
b
min
σAB∈Γ
H(X|E) −H(X|Y ) .
1.6.3 Security proof
We need to show that, for any initial state shared by Alice and Bob,
the probability that the protocol generates an insecure key is negligible.40
Roughly speaking, the proof consists of two parts. In the first (Steps 1–2)
we argue that we can restrict our analysis to a much smaller set of initial
states, namely those that have (almost) product form. In the second part
(Steps 3–5) we show that for each such state either of the following holds:
(i) there is not sufficient correlation between Alice and Bob in which case
the protocol aborts during the parameter estimation or (ii) a measurement
applied to the state generates an outcome with sufficient entropy such that
the key computed from it is secure.
Step 1: Restriction to permutation-invariant initial states
As we assumed that the protocol is invariant under permutations of the
input systems, we can equivalently think of a protocol which starts with
the following symmetrization step: Alice chooses a permutation π at ran-
dom and announces it to Bob, using the (insecure) classical communication
channel. Then Alice and Bob both permute the order of their N subsystems
according to π. Obviously, the state ρANBN of Alice and Bob’s system after
this symmetrization step (averaged over all choices of π) is invariant under
permutations.
Because the state ρANBN is invariant under permutations, it has a pu-
rification ρANBNEN (with an auxiliary system H⊗NE ) which is symmetric as
well (cf. Lemma 4.2.2). As the pure state ρANBNEN cannot be correlated
with anything else (cf. Section 2.1.2) we can assume without loss of gener-
ality that the knowledge of a potential adversary is fully described by the
auxiliary system.
39This is also true for QKD protocols with a sifting step (where Alice and Bob discard
the subsystems for which they have used incompatible encoding and decoding bases). In
fact, as mentioned in Section 1.2, if Alice and Bob choose one of the bases with probability
close to one, the fraction of positions lost in the sifting step is small.
40Note that the protocol might abort if the initial state held by Alice and Bob is not
sufficiently correlated.
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Step 2: Restriction to (almost) product states
Because ρANBNEN is invariant under permutations, it is, according to our
finite version of the de Finetti representation theorem approximated by a
mixture of states which have “almost” product form σ⊗NABE—in the sense
described by formula (1.5).
Step 3: Smooth min-entropy of Alice and Bob’s raw keys
Assume for the moment that the joint initial state ρANBNEN held by Alice,
Bob, and Eve has perfect product form σ⊗NABE . As Alice and Bob’s mea-
surement operation (including the block-wise processing) EXY←AB acts on
n blocks of size b individually, the density operator ρXnY nEn which describes
the situation before the information reconciliation step is given by
ρXnY nEn = (EXY←AB ⊗ idE)⊗n(ρAbnBbnEbn) ,
where Xn and Y n is Alice and Bob’s raw key, respectively. Consequently,
ρXnY nEn is the product of operators of the form
σXY E = (EXY←AB ⊗ idE)(σ⊗bABE) . (1.10)
By (1.4), the smooth min-entropy of ρXnEn is approximated in terms of the
von Neumann entropy of σXE , i.e.,
Hεmin(X
n|En) ' nH(X|E) . (1.11)
Using (1.6), this argument can easily be generalized to states ρANBNEN
which have almost product form.
Step 4: Smooth min-entropy after information reconciliation
In the information reconciliation step, Alice sends error correcting infor-
mation C about Xn to Bob, using the authentic classical communication
channel. Eve might wiretap this communication which generally decreases
the smooth min-entropy of Xn from her point of view.
As mentioned above, we assume for this summary that the information
reconciliation subprotocol is optimal with respect to the amount of informa-
tion leaked to Eve. It follows from classical coding theory that the number of
bits that Alice has to send to Bob in order to allow him to compute her value
Xn is given by the Shannon entropy of Xn conditioned on Bob’s knowledge
Y n. Formally, if ρXnY n has product form σ
⊗n
XY then the communication C
satisfies
Hmax(C)−Hmin(C|Xn) ≈ nH(X|Y ) , (1.12)
where H(X|Y ) is the Shannon entropy of X given Y , evaluated for the
probability distribution defined by σXY . (Note that the entropy difference
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on the left hand side can be interpreted as a measure for the information
that C gives on Xn.)
Let us now compute a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy of Xn
given Eve’s knowledge after the information reconciliation step. By the
chain rule (1.2), we have
Hεmin(X
n|CEn) ≥ Hεmin(XnC|En)−Hmax(C) .
Moreover, because C is computed from Xn, we can apply inequality (1.3),
i.e.,
Hεmin(X
nC|En) ≥ Hεmin(Xn|En) +Hmin(C|Xn) .
Combining this with (1.12) gives
Hεmin(X
n|CEn) ≥ Hεmin(Xn|En)−
(
Hmax(C)−Hmin(C|Xn)
)
≈ Hεmin(Xn|En)− nH(X|Y ) .
Finally, using the approximation (1.11) for Hεmin(X
n|En), we conclude
Hεmin(X
n|CEn) ' nH(X|E)− nH(X|Y ) . (1.13)
Step 5: Security of the key generated by privacy amplification
To argue that the key generated in the final privacy amplification step is
secure, we apply criterion (1.8). Because the adversary has access to both the
quantum system and the classical communication C, this security criterion
reads
ℓ / Hεmin(X
n|EnC) (1.14)
where ℓ is the length of the key.
As shown in Step 2, the state ρANBNEN has almost product form σ
⊗N
ABE.
Hence, according to (1.7), the statistics obtained by Alice and Bob in the
parameter estimation step corresponds to the statistics that they would
obtain if they started with a perfect product state σ⊗NAB . We conclude that,
by the definition of the set Γ, the protocol aborts whenever σAB /∈ Γ.
To bound the smooth min-entropy of the string held by Alice before
privacy amplification, it thus suffices to evaluate (1.13) for all states σAB
contained in Γ. Formally,
1
n
Hεmin(X
n|CEn) ' min
σABE
H(X|E) −H(X|Y ) .
where the minimum is over all (pure) states σABE such that σAB ∈ Γ and
where H(X|E) and H(X|Y ) are the entropies of the state σXY E given
by (1.10). Combining this with criterion (1.14) concludes the proof.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Representation of physical systems
2.1.1 Density operators, measurements, and operations
Quantum mechanics, like any other physical theory, allows us to make cer-
tain predictions about the behavior of physical systems. These are, however,
not deterministic—a system’s initial state merely determines a probability
distribution over all possible outcomes of an observation.1
Mathematically, the state of a quantum mechanical system with d de-
grees of freedom is represented by a normalized nonnegative2 operator ρ,
called density operator , on a d-dimensional Hilbert space H. The normal-
ization is with respect to the trace norm, i.e., ‖ρ‖1 = tr(ρ) = 1. In the
following, we denote by P(H) the set of nonnegative operators on H, i.e., ρ
is a density operator on H if and only if ρ ∈ P(H) and tr(ρ) = 1.
Any observation of a quantum system corresponds to a measurement
and is represented mathematically as a positive operator valued measure
(POVM), i.e., a family M = {Mw}w∈W of nonnegative operators such that∑
w∈WMw = idH. The theory of quantum mechanics postulates that the
probability distribution PW of the outcomes when measuring a system in
state ρ with respect to M is given by PW (w) := tr(Mwρ).
Consider a physical system whose state ρ¯z depends on the value z of a
classical random variable Z with distribution PZ . For an observer which is
ignorant of the value of Z, the state ρ of the system is given by the convex
1With his famous statement “Gott wu¨rfelt nicht,” Einstein expressed his doubts about
the completeness of such a non-deterministic theory.
2An operator ρ on H is nonnegative if it is hermitian and has nonnegative eigenvalues.
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combination3
ρ =
∑
z∈Z
PZ(z)ρ¯
z . (2.1)
The decomposition (2.1) of a density operator ρ is generally not unique.
Consider for example the fully mixed state defined by ρ := 1dim(H) idH. In
the case of a two-level system, ρ might represent a photon which is polarized
horizontally or vertically with equal probabilities; but the same operator ρ
might also represent a photon which is polarized according to one of the two
diagonal directions with equal probabilities. In fact, the two settings cannot
be distinguished by any measurement.
A physical process is most generally described by a linear mapping E ,
called a quantum operation, which takes the system’s initial state ρ to its
final state ρ′.4 Mathematically, a quantum operation E is a completely posi-
tive map (CPM)5 from the set of hermitian operators on a Hilbert space H
to the set of hermitian operators on another Hilbert space H′. Additionally,
in order to ensure that the image E(ρ) of a density operator ρ is again a
density operator, E must be trace-preserving , i.e., tr(E(ρ)) = tr(ρ), for any
ρ ∈ P(H). It can be shown that any CPM E can be written as
E(ρ) =
∑
w∈W
EwρE
†
w (2.2)
where {Ew}w∈W is a family of linear operators from H to H′. On the other
hand, any mapping of the form (2.2) is a CPM.6 Moreover, it is trace-
preserving if and only if
∑
w∈W E
†
wEw = idH.
As we have seen, the state of a quantum system might depend on some
classical event Ω (e.g., that Z takes a certain value z). In this context, it is
often convenient to represent both the probability Pr[Ω] of Ω and the state
ρ¯Ω of the system conditioned on Ω as one single mathematical object, namely
the nonnegative operator ρΩ := Pr[Ω] · ρ¯Ω.7 For this reason, we formulate
most statements on quantum states in terms of general (not necessarily
normalized) nonnegative operators. Similarly, we often consider general (not
necessarily trace-preserving) CPMs E . The quantity tr(E(ρ)) can then be
3Because a measurement is a linear mapping from the set of density operators to the set
of probability distributions, this is consistent with the above description. In particular, the
distribution of the outcomes resulting from a measurement of ρ is the convex combination
of the distributions obtained from measurements of ρ¯z.
4A measurement can be seen as a special case of a quantum operation where the
outcome is classical (see Section 2.1.3).
5Complete positivity means that any extension E ⊗ id of the map E , where id is the
identity map on the set of hermitian operators on some auxiliary Hilbert space H′′, maps
nonnegative operators to nonnegative operators. Formally, (E ⊗ id)(ρ) ∈ P(H′ ⊗H′′) for
any ρ ∈ P(H⊗H′′).
6This is in fact a direct consequence of Lemma B.5.1.
7The probability of the event Ω is then equal to the trace of ρ¯Ω, i.e., Pr[Ω] = tr(ρΩ),
and the system’s state conditioned on Ω is ρ¯Ω = 1
Pr[Ω]
ρΩ.
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interpreted as the probability that the process represented by E occurs when
starting with a system in state ρ.
2.1.2 Product systems and purifications
To analyze complex physical systems, it is often convenient to consider a
partitioning into a number of subsystems. This is particularly useful if
one is interested in the study of operations that act on the parts of the
system individually.8 Mathematically, the partition of a quantum system
into subsystems induces a product structure on the underlying Hilbert space.
For example, the state of a bipartite system is represented as a density
operator ρAB on a product space HA ⊗ HB . The state of one part of a
product system is then obtained by taking the corresponding partial trace
of the overall state, e.g., ρA = trB(ρAB) for the first part of a bipartite
system.
A density operator ρ on H is said to be pure if it has rank9 one, that
is, ρ = |θ〉〈θ|, for some |θ〉 ∈ H. If it is normalized, ρ is a projector10 onto
|θ〉. A pure density operator can only be decomposed trivially, i.e., for any
decomposition of the form (2.2), ρ¯z = ρ holds for all z ∈ Z. According to the
above interpretation, one could say that a pure state contains no classical
randomness, that is, it cannot be correlated with any other system.
The fact that a pure state cannot be correlated with the environment
plays a crucial role in cryptography. It implies, for example, that the ran-
domness obtained from the measurement of a pure state is independent of
any other system and thus guaranteed to be secret. More generally, let ρA be
an arbitrary operator on HA and let ρAE be a purification of ρA, i.e., ρAE is
a pure state on a product system HA⊗HE such that trE(ρAE) = ρA. Then,
because ρAE is uncorrelated with any other system, the partial system HE
comprises everything that might possibly be correlated with the system HA
(including the knowledge of a potential adversary).
2.1.3 Quantum and classical systems
Consider a classical random variable Z with distribution PZ on some set Z.
In a quantum world, it is useful to view Z as a special case of a quantum
system. For this, one might think of the classical values z ∈ Z as being
represented by orthogonal11 states |z〉 on some Hilbert space HZ . The state
8This is typically the case in the context of cryptography, where various parties control
separated subsystems.
9The rank of a hermitian operator S, denoted rank(S), is the dimension of the support
supp(S), i.e., the space spanned by the eigenvectors of S with nonzero eigenvalues.
10A hermitian operator P is said to be a projector if PP = P .
11The orthogonality of the states |z〉 guarantees that they can be distinguished perfectly,
as this is the case for classical values.
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ρZ of the quantum system is then defined by
ρZ =
∑
z∈Z
PZ(z)|z〉〈z| . (2.3)
We say that ρZ is the operator representation of the classical distribution
PZ (with respect to the basis {|z〉}z∈Z).12
On the other hand, any operator ρZ can be written in the form (2.3)
where PZ(z) are the eigenvalues of ρZ and |z〉 are the corresponding eigen-
vectors. The right hand side of (2.3) is called the spectral decomposition of
ρZ . Moreover, we say that PZ is the probability distribution defined by ρZ .
This notion can be extended to hybrid settings where the state ρ¯zA of a
quantum system HA depends on the value z of a classical random variable
Z (see, e.g., [DW05]). The joint state of the system is then given by
ρAZ =
∑
z∈Z
ρzA ⊗ |z〉〈z| , (2.4)
where ρzA := PZ(z)ρ¯
z
A.
We can also go in the other direction: If a density operator has the
form (2.4), for some basis {|z〉}z∈Z , then the first subsystem can be inter-
preted as the representation of a classical random variable Z. This motivates
the following definition: An operator ρAZ ∈ P(HA ⊗HZ) is said to be clas-
sical with respect to {|z〉}z∈Z if there exists a family {ρzA}z∈Z of operators
on HA, called (non-normalized) conditional operators, such that ρAZ can be
written in the form (2.4). Moreover, we say that ρAZ is classical on HZ if
there exists a basis {|z〉}z∈Z of HZ such that ρAZ is classical with respect
to {|z〉}z∈Z .13
A similar definition can be used to characterize quantum operations (i.e.,
CPMs) whose outcomes are partly classical: A CPM E from H to HA⊗HZ
is said to be classical with respect to {|z〉}z∈Z (or simply classical on HZ) if
it can be written as
E(σ) =
∑
z∈Z
Ez(σ)⊗ |z〉〈z| ,
where, for any z ∈ Z, Ez is a CPM from H to HA. Note that a measurement
on H with outcomes in Z can be seen as a CPM from H to HZ which is
classical on HZ .
12This definition can easily be generalized to multi-partite nonnegative (not necessarily
normalized) functions (e.g., PXY ∈ P(X × Y), where P(X × Y) denotes the set of non-
negative functions on X × Y) in which case one gets nonnegative operators on product
systems (e.g., ρXY ∈ P(HX ⊗HY )).
13The operators ρzA, for z ∈ Z, are uniquely defined by ρAZ and the basis {|z〉}z∈Z .
Moreover, because ρAZ is nonnegative, the operators ρ
z
A, for z ∈ Z, are also nonnegative.
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2.1.4 Distance between states
Intuitively, we say that two states of a physical system are similar if any
observation of them leads to identical results, except with small probability.
For two operators ρ, ρ′ ∈ P(H) representing the state of a quantum system,
this notion of similarity is captured by the L1-distance, i.e., the trace norm
14
‖ρ−ρ′‖1 of the difference between ρ and ρ′.15 The L1-distance for operators
can be seen as the quantum version of the L1-distance for probability distri-
butions 16 (or, more generally, nonnegative functions), which is defined by
‖P −P ′‖1 :=
∑
z |P (z)−P ′(z)|, for P,P ′ ∈ P(Z). In particular, if ρ and ρ′
are operator representations of probability distributions P and P ′, respec-
tively, then the L1-distance between ρ and ρ
′ is equal to the L1-distance
between P and P ′.
Under the action of a quantum operation, the L1-distance between two
density operators ρ and ρ′ cannot increase (cf. Lemma A.2.1). Because
any measurement can be seen as a quantum operation, this immediately
implies that the distance ‖P − P ′‖1 between the distributions P and P ′
obtained from (identical) measurements of two density operators ρ and ρ′,
respectively, is bounded by ‖ρ− ρ′‖1.
The following proposition provides a very simple interpretation of the
L1-distance: If two probability distributions P and P
′ have L1-distance at
most 2ε, then the two settings described by P and P ′, respectively, cannot
differ with probability more than ε.
Proposition 2.1.1. Let P,P ′ ∈ P(X ) be probability distributions. Then
there exists a joint distribution PXX′ such that P and P
′ are the marginals
of PXX′ (i.e., P = PX , P
′ = PX′) and, for (x, x′) chosen according to PXX′ ,
Pr
(x,x′)
[x 6= x′] ≤ 1
2
‖P − P ′‖1 .
In particular, if the L1-distance between two states is bounded by 2ε,
then they cannot be distinguished with probability more than ε.
2.2 Universal security of secret keys
Cryptographic primitives (e.g., a secret key or an authentic communication
channel) are often used as components within a more complex system. It is
thus natural to require that the security of a cryptographic scheme is not
compromised when it is employed as part of another system. This require-
ment is captured by the notion of universal security. Roughly speaking,
14The trace norm ‖S‖1 of a hermitian operator S on H is defined by ‖S‖1 := tr(|S|).
15The L1-distance between two operators is closely related to the trace distance, which
is usually defined with an additional factor 1
2
.
16The L1-distance between classical probability distributions is also known as variational
distance or statistical distance (which are often defined with an additional factor 1
2
).
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we say that a cryptographic primitive is universally secure if it is secure in
any arbitrary context. For example, the universal security of a secret key
S implies that any bit of S remains secret even if some other part of S is
given to an adversary.
In the past few years, universal security has attracted a lot of interest
and led to important new definitions and proofs (see, e.g., the so-called uni-
versal composability framework of Canetti [Can01] or Pfitzmann and Waid-
ner [PW00]). Recently, Ben-Or and Mayers [BOM04] and Unruh [Unr04]
have generalized Canetti’s notion of universal composability to the quantum
world.
Universal security definitions are usually based on the idea of charac-
terizing the security of a real cryptographic scheme by its distance to an
ideal system which (by definition) is perfectly secure. For instance, a secret
key S is said to be secure if it is close to a perfect key U , i.e., a uniformly
distributed string which is independent of the adversary’s information. As
we shall see, such a definition immediately implies that any cryptosystem
which is proven secure when using a perfect key U remains secure when U
is replaced by the (real) key S.
2.2.1 Standard security definitions are not universal
Unfortunately, many security definitions that are commonly used in quan-
tum cryptography are not universal. For instance, the security of the key S
generated by a QKD scheme is typically defined in terms of the mutual infor-
mation I(S;W ) between S and the classical outcome W of a measurement
of the adversary’s system (see, e.g., [LC99, SP00, NC00, GL03, LCA05] and
also the discussion in [BOHL+05] and [RK05]). Formally, S is said to be
secure if, for some small ε,
max
W
I(S;W ) ≤ ε , (2.5)
where the maximum ranges over all measurements on the adversary’s system
with output W . Such a definition—although it looks reasonable—does,
however, not guarantee that the key S can safely be used in applications.
Roughly speaking, the reason for this flaw is that criterion (2.5) does not
account for the fact that an adversary might wait with the measurement
of her system until she learns parts of the key. (We also refer to [RK05]
and [BOHL+05] for a more detailed discussion and an analysis of existing
security definitions with respect to this concern.17)
17Note that the conclusions in [BOHL+05] are somewhat different to ours: It is shown
that existing privacy conditions of the form (2.5) do imply universal security, which seems
to contradict the counterexample sketched below. However, the result of [BOHL+05] only
holds if the parameter ε in (2.5) is exponentially small in the key size, which is not the
case for most of the existing protocols. (In fact, the security parameter ε can only be
made exponentially small at the expense of decreasing the key rate substantially.)
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Let us illustrate this potential problem with a concrete example: Assume
that we would like to use an n-bit key S = (S1, . . . , Sn) as a one-time pad to
encrypt an n-bit message M = (M1, . . . ,Mn).
18 Furthermore, assume that
an adversary is interested in the nth bit Mn of the message, but already
knows the first n−1 bitsM1, . . . ,Mn−1. Upon observing the ciphertext, the
adversary can easily determine19 the first n − 1 bits of S. Hence, in order
to guarantee the secrecy of the nth message bit Mn, we need to ensure that
the adversary still has no information on the nth key bit Sn, even though
she already knows all previous key bits S1, . . . , Sn−1. This requirement,
however, is not implied by the above definition. Indeed, for any arbitrary
ε > 0 and n depending on ε, it is relatively easy to construct examples
which satisfy (2.5) whereas an adversary—once she knows the first n − 1
bits of the key—can determine the nth bit Sn with certainty. For an explicit
construction and analysis of such examples, we refer to [Bar05].20
2.2.2 A universal security definition
Consider a key S distributed according to PS and let ρ
s
E be the state of the
adversary’s system given that S takes the value s, for any element s of the
key space S. According to the discussion in Section 2.1.3, the joint state of
the classical key S and the adversary’s quantum system can be represented
by the density operator
ρSE :=
∑
s∈S
PS(s)|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρsE ,
where {|s〉}s∈S is an orthonormal basis of some Hilbert space HS. We say
that S is ε-secure with respect to HE if
1
2
∥∥ρSE − ρU ⊗ ρE∥∥1 ≤ ε , (2.6)
where ρU =
∑
s∈S
1
|S| |s〉〈s| is the fully mixed state on HS .
The universal security of a key S satisfying this definition follows from a
simple argument: Criterion (2.6) guarantees that the real situation described
by ρSE is ε-close—with respect to the L1-distance—to an ideal situation
where S is replaced by a perfect key U which is uniformly distributed and
independent of the state of the system HE . Moreover, since the L1-distance
cannot increase when applying a quantum operation (cf. Lemma A.2.1),
this also holds for any further evolution of the world (where, e.g., the key is
used as part of a larger cryptographic system). In fact, it follows from the
18That is, the ciphertext C = (C1, . . . , Cn) is the bit-wise XOR of S and M , i.e.,
Ci = Si ⊕Mi.
19Note that Si =Mi ⊕ Ci.
20This phenomenon has also been studied in other contexts (see, e.g., [DHL+04,
HLSW04]) where it is called as locking of classical correlation.
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discussion in Section 2.1.4 that an ε-secure key can be considered identical
to an ideal (perfect) key—except with probability ε.21 In particular, an
ε-secure key is secure within any reasonable framework providing universal
composability (e.g., [BOM04] or [Unr04]).22
The security of a key according to (2.6) also implies security with respect
to most of the standard security definitions in quantum cryptography. For
example, if S is ε-secure with respect to HE then the mutual information
between S and the outcome of any measurement applied to the adversary’s
system is small (whereas the converse is often not true, as discussed above).
In particular, if the adversary is purely classical, (2.6) reduces to a classical
security definition which has been proposed in the context of information-
theoretically secure key agreement (see, e,g., [DM04]).
21For this statement to hold, it is crucial that the criterion (2.6) is formulated in terms
of the L1-distance (instead of other distance measures such as the fidelity).
22These frameworks are usually based on the so-called simulatability paradigm. That is,
a real cryptosystem is said to be as secure as an ideal cryptosystem if any attack to the real
scheme can be simulated by an attack to the ideal scheme (see also [MRH04]). It is easy
to see that our security criterion is compatible with this paradigm: Consider a (real) key
agreement protocol and assume that, for any possible attack of the adversary, the final key
satisfies (2.6). The adversary’s quantum state after the attack is then almost independent
of the key, that is, the adversary could simulate virtually all her information without even
interacting with the cryptosystem. The real key agreement protocol is thus as secure as
an ideal key agreement scheme which, by definition, does not leak any information at all.
Chapter 3
(Smooth) Min- and
Max-Entropy
Entropy measures are indispensable tools in classical and quantum infor-
mation theory. They quantify randomness, that is, the uncertainty that an
observer has on the state of a (quantum) physical system. In this chap-
ter, we introduce two entropic quantities, called smooth min-entropy and
smooth max-entropy . As we shall see, these are useful to characterize ran-
domness with respect to fundamental information-theoretic tasks such as the
extraction of uniform randomness or data compression.1 Moreover, smooth
min- and max-entropies have natural properties which are similar to those
known from the von Neumann entropy and its classical special case, the
Shannon entropy2 (Sections 3.1 and 3.2). In fact, for product states, smooth
min- and max-entropy are asymptotically equal to the von Neumann entropy
(Section 3.3).
Smooth min- and max-entropies are actually families of entropy measures
parameterized by some nonnegative real number ε, called smoothness. In
applications, the smoothness is related to the error probability of certain
information-theoretic tasks and is thus typically chosen to be small. We
first consider the “non-smooth” special case where ε = 0 (Section 3.1). This
is the basis for the general definition where the smoothness ε is arbitrary
(Section 3.2).
We will introduce a conditional version of smooth min- and max-entropy.
It is defined for bipartite operators ρAB onHA⊗HB and measures the uncer-
tainty on the state of the subsystem HA given access to the subsystem HB.
Unlike the conditional von Neumann entropy H(A|B) := H(ρAB)−H(ρB),
1Randomness extraction is actually privacy amplification and is the topic of Chap-
ter 5. Data compression is closely related to information reconciliation which is treated
in Section 6.3.
2The Shannon entropy of a probability distribution P is defined by H(P ) :=
−
∑
x P (x) logP (x), where log denotes the binary logarithm. Similarly, the von Neumann
entropy of a density operator ρ is H(ρ) := −tr(ρ log ρ).
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however, it cannot be written as a difference between two “unconditional”
entropy measures.
To illustrate our definition of (conditional) min- and max-entropy, let
us, as an analogy, consider an alternative formulation of the conditional von
Neumann entropy H(A|B). Let
H(ρAB|σB) := −tr
(
ρAB(log ρAB − log idA ⊗ σB)
)
, (3.1)
for some state σB on HB. This quantity can be rewritten as
H(ρAB |σB) = H(ρAB)−H(ρB)−D(ρB‖σB) ,
where D(ρB‖σB) is the relative entropy3 of ρB to σB . Because D(ρB‖σB)
cannot be negative, this expression takes its maximum for σB = ρB, in which
case it is equal to H(A|B). We thus have
H(A|B) = sup
σB
H(ρAB |σB) , (3.2)
where the supremum ranges over all density operators σB on HB.
The definitions of (smooth) min- and max-entropies are inspired by this
approach. We first introduce a quantity which corresponds to (3.1) (cf. Def-
initions 3.1.1 and 3.2.1) and then define our entropy measures by a formula
of the form (3.2) (Definitions 3.1.2 and 3.2.2).
3.1 Min- and max-entropy
This section introduce a “non-smooth” version of min- and max-entropy. It
is the basis for the considerations in Section 3.2, where these entropy mea-
sures are generalized. The focus is on min-entropy, which is used extensively
in the remaining part of the thesis. However, most of the properties derived
in the following also hold for max-entropy.
3.1.1 Definition of min- and max-entropy
Definition 3.1.1. Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB) and σB ∈ P(HB). The min-
entropy of ρAB relative to σB is
Hmin(ρAB |σB) := − log λ
where λ is the minimum real number such that λ · idA ⊗ σB − ρAB is non-
negative. The max-entropy of ρAB relative to σB is
Hmax(ρAB |σB) := log tr
(
(idA ⊗ σB)ρ0AB
)
where ρ0AB denotes the projector onto the support of ρAB .
3The relative entropy D(ρ‖σ) is defined by D(ρ‖σ) := tr(ρ log ρ)− tr(ρ log σ).
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Definition 3.1.2. Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB). The min-entropy and the
max-entropy of ρAB given HB are
Hmin(ρAB |B) := sup
σB
Hmin(ρAB|σB)
Hmax(ρAB |B) := sup
σB
Hmax(ρAB |σB) ,
respectively, where the supremum ranges over all σB ∈ P(HB) with tr(σB) =
1.
Remark 3.1.3. It follows from Lemma B.5.3 that the min-entropy of ρAB
relative to σB , for σB invertible, can be written as
Hmin(ρAB |σB) = − log λmax
(
(idA ⊗ σ−1/2B )ρAB(idA ⊗ σ−1/2B )
)
,
where λmax(·) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of the argument.
If HB is the trivial space C, we simply write Hmin(ρA) and Hmax(ρA) to
denote the min- and the max-entropy of ρA, respectively. In particular,
Hmin(ρA) = − log λmax(ρA)
Hmax(ρA) = log rank(ρA) .
The classical analogue
The above definitions can be specialized canonically to classical probability
distributions.4 More precisely, for PXY ∈ P(X × Y) and QY ∈ P(Y), we
have
Hmin(PXY |QY ) := Hmin(ρXY |σY )
Hmax(PXY |QY ) := Hmax(ρXY |σY )
where ρXY and σY are the operator representations of PXY and QY , respec-
tively (cf. Section 2.1.3).
Remark 3.1.4. Let PXY ∈ P(X × Y) and QY ∈ P(Y). Then5
Hmin(PXY |QY ) = − log max
y∈supp(QY )
max
x∈X
PXY (x, y)
QY (y)
Hmax(PXY |QY ) = log
∑
y∈Y
QY (y) ·
∣∣supp(P yX)∣∣ ,
where P yX denotes the function P
y
X : x 7→ PXY (x, y). In particular,
Hmax(PXY |Y ) = logmax
y∈Y
∣∣supp(P yX)∣∣ .
4Similarly, the Shannon entropy can be seen as the classical special case of the von
Neumann entropy.
5The support of a nonnegative function f ∈ P(X ), denoted supp(f), is the set of values
x ∈ X such that f(x) > 0.
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3.1.2 Basic properties of min- and max-entropy
Min-entropy cannot be larger than max-entropy
The following lemma gives a relation between min- and max-entropy. It
implies that, for a density operator ρAB , the min-entropy cannot be larger
than the max-entropy.
Lemma 3.1.5. Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB) and σB ∈ P(HB). Then
Hmin(ρAB |σB) + log tr(ρAB) ≤ Hmax(ρAB |σB) .
Proof. Let ρ0AB be the projector onto the support of ρAB and let λ ≥ 0
such that Hmin(ρAB |σB) = − log λ, i.e., λ · idA ⊗ σB − ρAB is nonnegative.
Using the fact that the trace of the product of two nonnegative operators is
nonnegative (Lemma B.5.2), we have
tr
(
λ · (idA ⊗ σB)ρ0AB
)− tr(ρAB) = tr((λ · idA ⊗ σB − ρAB)ρ0AB) ≥ 0 .
Hence,
log tr
(
(idA ⊗ σB)ρ0AB
) ≥ log tr(ρAB)− log λ .
The assertion then follows by the definition of the max-entropy and the
choice of λ.
Additivity of min- and max-entropy
The von Neumann entropy of a state which consists of two independent
parts is equal to the sum of the entropies of each part, i.e., H(ρA ⊗ ρA′) =
H(ρA) +H(ρA′). This also holds for min- and max-entropy.
Lemma 3.1.6. Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB), σB ∈ P(HB) and, similarly,
ρA′B′ ∈ P(HA′ ⊗HB′), σB′ ∈ P(HB′). Then
Hmin(ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′ |σB ⊗ σB′) = Hmin(ρAB |σB) +Hmin(ρA′B′ |σB′)
Hmax(ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′ |σB ⊗ σB′) = Hmax(ρAB |σB) +Hmax(ρA′B′ |σB′) .
Proof. The statement follows immediately from Definition 3.1.1.
Strong subadditivity
The von Neumann entropy is subadditive, i.e., H(A|BC) ≤ H(A|B), which
means that the entropy cannot increase when conditioning on an additional
subsystem. This property can be generalized to min- and max-entropy.
Lemma 3.1.7. Let ρABC ∈ P(HA ⊗HB ⊗HC) and σBC ∈ P(HB ⊗ HC).
Then
Hmin(ρABC |σBC) ≤ Hmin(ρAB |σB)
Hmax(ρABC |σBC) ≤ Hmax(ρAB |σB) .
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Note that, for min-entropy, the statement follows directly from the more
general fact that the entropy cannot decrease under certain quantum oper-
ations (cf. Lemma 3.1.12).
Proof. Let λ ≥ 0 such that − log λ = Hmin(ρABC |σBC), i.e., λ · idA⊗ σBC −
ρABC is nonnegative. Because the operator obtained by taking the partial
trace of a nonnegative operator is nonnegative, λ · idA ⊗ σB − ρAB is also
nonnegative. This immediately implies − log λ ≤ Hmin(ρAB |σB) and thus
concludes the proof of the statement for min-entropy.
To show that the assertion also holds for max-entropy, let ρ0AB and ρ
0
ABC
be the projectors on the support of ρAB and ρABC , respectively. Because
the support of ρABC is contained in the tensor product of the support of ρAB
and HC (cf. Lemma B.4.1), the operator ρ0AB ⊗ idC − ρ0ABC is nonnegative.
Moreover, because the trace of the product of two nonnegative operators is
nonnegative (cf. Lemma B.5.2), we find
tr
(
(idA ⊗ σB)ρ0AB
)− tr((idA ⊗ σBC)ρ0ABC)
= tr
(
(idA ⊗ σBC)(ρ0AB ⊗ idC − ρ0ABC)
) ≥ 0 .
The assertion then follows by the definition of the max-entropy.
Note that the strong subadditivity of the max-entropy together with
Lemma 3.1.5 implies that Hmin(ρAB |σB) ≤ Hmax(ρA), for density operators
ρAB and σB .
Conditioning on classical information
The min- and max-entropies of states which are partially classical can be
expressed in terms of the min- and max-entropies of the corresponding con-
ditional operators (see Section 2.1.3).
Lemma 3.1.8. Let ρABZ ∈ P(HA⊗HB ⊗HZ) and σBZ ∈ P(HB ⊗HZ) be
classical with respect to an orthonormal basis {|z〉}z∈Z of HZ , and let ρzAB
and σzB be the corresponding (non-normalized) conditional operators. Then
Hmin(ρABZ |σBZ) = inf
z∈Z
Hmin(ρ
z
AB |σzB)
Hmax(ρABZ |σBZ) = log
∑
z∈Z
2Hmax(ρ
z
AB |σzB) .
Proof. Because the vectors |z〉 are mutually orthogonal, the equivalence
λ · idA ⊗ σBZ − ρABZ ∈ P(HA ⊗HB ⊗HZ)
⇐⇒ ∀z ∈ Z : λ · idA ⊗ σzB − ρzAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB) (3.3)
holds for any λ ≥ 0. The assertion for the min-entropy then follows from
the fact that the negative logarithm of the minimum λ satisfying the left
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hand side and the right hand side of (3.3) are equal to the quantities
Hmin(ρABZ |σBZ) and infz∈Z Hmin(ρzAB |σzB), respectively.
To prove the statement for the max-entropy, let ρ0ABZ and (ρ
z
AB)
0, for z ∈
Z, be projectors onto the support of ρABZ and ρzAB , respectively. Because
the vectors |z〉 are mutually orthogonal, we have
ρ0ABZ =
∑
z∈Z
(ρzAB)
0 ⊗ |z〉〈z| ,
and thus
tr
(
(idA ⊗ σBZ)ρ0ABZ
)
=
∑
z∈Z
tr
(
(idA ⊗ σzB)(ρzAB)0
)
.
The assertion then follows by the definition of the max-entropy.
Classical subsystems have nonnegative min-entropy
Similarly to the conditional von Neumann entropy, the min- and max-
entropies of entangled systems can generally be negative. This is, however,
not the case for the entropy of a classical subsystem. Lemma 3.1.9 below
implies that
Hmin(ρXC |ρC) ≥ 0 ,
for any density operator ρXC which is classical on the first subsystem
6. By
Lemma 3.1.5, the same holds for max-entropy.
Lemma 3.1.9. Let ρXBC ∈ P(HX ⊗HB ⊗HC) be classical on HX and let
σC ∈ P(HC). Then
Hmin(ρXBC |σC) ≥ Hmin(ρBC |σC) .
Proof. Let λ ≥ 0 such that − log λ = Hmin(ρBC |σC). Because ρXBC is
classical on HX , there exists an orthonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X and a family
{ρxBC}x∈X of operators on HB ⊗HC such that ρXBC =
∑
x∈X |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxBC .
By the definition of λ, the operator
λ · idB ⊗ σC −
∑
x∈X
ρxBC = λ · idB ⊗ σC − ρBC
is nonnegative. Hence, for any x ∈ X , the operator λ · idB ⊗σC − ρxBC must
also be nonnegative. This implies that the operator
λ · idXB ⊗ σC − ρXBC =
∑
x∈X
λ · |x〉〈x| ⊗ idB ⊗ σC − |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxBC
is nonnegative as well. We thus have − log λ ≤ Hmin(ρXBC |σC), from which
the assertion follows.
6To see this, let HB be the trivial space C and set σC = ρC .
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3.1.3 Chain rules for min-entropy
The chain rule for the von Neumann entropy reads H(AB|C) = H(A|BC)+
H(B|C). In particular, since H(B|C) cannot be larger than H(B), we have
H(AB|C) ≤ H(A|BC)+H(B). The following lemma implies that a similar
statement holds for min-entropy, namely,
Hmin(ρABC |C) ≤ Hmin(ρABC |BC) +Hmax(ρB) .
Lemma 3.1.10. Let ρABC ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC), σC ∈ P(HC), and let
σB ∈ P(HB) be the fully mixed state on the support of ρB. Then
Hmin(ρABC |σC) = Hmin(ρABC |σB ⊗ σC) +Hmax(ρB) .
Proof. Let HB′ := supp(ρB) be the support of ρB and let λ ≥ 0. The
operator σB can then be written as σB =
1
rank(ρB)
idB′ , where idB′ is the
identity on HB′ . Hence, because the support of ρABC is contained in HA ⊗
HB′ ⊗ HC (cf. Lemma B.4.1), the operator λ · idA ⊗ σB ⊗ σC − ρABC is
nonnegative if and only if the operator λ · 1rank(ρB) · idA ⊗ idB ⊗ σC − ρABC
is nonnegative. The assertion thus follows from the definition of the min-
entropy and the fact that Hmax(ρB) = log rank(ρB).
Data processing
Let A, Y , and C be random variables such that A ↔ Y ↔ C is a Markov
chain, i.e., the conditional probability distributions PAC|Y=y have product
form PA|Y=y × PC|Y=y. The uncertainty on A given Y is then equal to
the uncertainty on A given Y and C, that is, in terms of Shannon en-
tropy, H(A|Y ) = H(A|Y C). Hence, by the chain rule, we get the equality
H(AY |C) = H(Y |C) +H(A|Y ).
The same equality also holds for quantum states ρAY C on HA⊗HY ⊗HC
which are classical on HY and where, analogously to the Markov condition,
the conditional density operators ρ¯yAC have product form, i.e., ρ¯
y
AC = ρ¯
y
A ⊗
ρ¯yC . The following lemma generalizes this statement to min-entropy.
Lemma 3.1.11. Let ρAY C ∈ P(HA⊗HY ⊗HC) be classical with respect to
an orthonormal basis {|y〉}y∈Y of HY such that the corresponding conditional
operators ρyAC , for any y ∈ Y, have product form and let σC ∈ P(HC). Then
Hmin(ρAY C |σC) ≥ Hmin(ρY C |σC) +Hmin(ρAY |ρY ) .
Proof. For any y ∈ Y, let py := tr(ρyAC) and let ρ¯yAC := 1py ρ
y
AC be the
normalization of ρyAC . The operator ρAY C can then be written as
ρAY C =
∑
y∈Y
py · ρ¯yA ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρ¯yC .
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Let λ, λ′ ≥ 0 such that − log λ = Hmin(ρY C |σC), − log λ′ = Hmin(ρAY |ρY ).
Because the vectors |y〉 are mutually orthogonal, it follows immediately from
the definition of the min-entropy that the operators λ · σC − py · ρ¯yC and
λ′ · idA − ρ¯yA are nonnegative, for any y ∈ Y. Consequently, the operator
λ · λ′ · idA ⊗ idY ⊗ σC − ρAY C
=
∑
y∈Y
λ · λ′ · idA ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ σC − py · ρ¯yA ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρ¯yC
is nonnegative as well. This implies
Hmin(ρAY C |σC) ≥ − log(λ · λ′) = − log λ− log λ′
from which the assertion follows by the definition of λ and λ′.
3.1.4 Quantum operations can only increase min-entropy
The min-entropy can only increase when applying quantum operations. Be-
cause the partial trace is a quantum operation, this general statement also
implies the first assertion of Lemma 3.1.7 (strong subadditivity).
Lemma 3.1.12. Let ρAB ∈ P(HA⊗HB), σB ∈ P(HB), σ˜B′ ∈ P(HB′) and
let E be a CPM from HA⊗HB to HA′⊗HB′ such that idA′⊗σ˜B′−E(idA⊗σB)
is nonnegative. Then, for ρ˜A′B′ := E(ρAB),
Hmin(ρ˜A′B′ |σ˜B′) ≥ Hmin(ρAB |σB) .
Proof. Let λ ≥ 0 such that − log λ = Hmin(ρAB |σB), that is, the operator
λ · idA ⊗ σB − ρAB is nonnegative. Because E is a quantum operation, the
operator λ · E(idA⊗σB)−E(ρAB) is also nonnegative. Combining this with
the assumption that idA′ ⊗ σ˜B′ − E(idA ⊗ σB) is nonnegative, we conclude
that the operator
λ · idA′ ⊗ σ˜B′ − ρ˜A′B′
= λ
(
idA′ ⊗ σ˜B′ − E(idA ⊗ σB)
)
+ λ · E(idA ⊗ σB)− ρ˜A′B′
is also nonnegative. The assertion then follows by the definition of the min-
entropy.
3.1.5 Min-entropy of superpositions
Let {|x〉}x∈X be an orthonormal basis on HX , let {|ψx〉}x∈X be a family of
vectors on HA ⊗HB ⊗HE , and define
ρABE := |ψ〉〈ψ| where |ψ〉 :=
∑
x∈X
|ψx〉 (3.4)
ρ˜ABEX :=
∑
x∈X
|ψx〉〈ψx| ⊗ |x〉〈x| . (3.5)
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Note that, if the states |ψx〉 are orthogonal then ρ˜ABEX can be seen as the
state resulting from an orthogonal measurement of ρABE with respect to the
projectors along |ψx〉. While ρABE is a superposition (linear combination) of
vectors |ψx〉, ρ˜ABE is a mixture of vectors |ψx〉. The following lemma gives
a lower bound on the min-entropy of ρABE in terms of the min-entropy of
ρ˜ABE .
Lemma 3.1.13. Let ρABE and ρ˜ABEX be defined by (3.4) and (3.5), re-
spectively, and let σB ∈ P(HB). Then
Hmin(ρAB |σB) ≥ Hmin(ρ˜AB |σB)−Hmax(ρ˜X) .
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that, for all x ∈ X , |ψx〉 is not the
zero vector. This implies Hmax(ρ˜X) = log |X |. Moreover, let λ ≥ 0 such
that − log λ = Hmin(ρ˜AB |σB). It then suffices to show that the operator
λ · |X | · idA ⊗ σB − ρAB (3.6)
is nonnegative.
Let |θ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB. By linearity, we have
〈θ|ρAB |θ〉 = 〈θ|trE(|ψ〉〈ψ|)|θ〉 =
∑
x,x′∈X
〈θ|trE(|ψx〉〈ψx′ |)|θ〉 . (3.7)
Let {|z〉}z∈Z be an orthonormal basis of HE and define |θ, z〉 := |θ〉 ⊗ |z〉.
Then, by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, for any x, x′ ∈ X ,
|〈θ|trE(|ψx〉〈ψx′ |)|θ〉| =
∣∣∑
z∈Z
〈θ, z|ψx〉〈ψx′ |θ, z〉∣∣
≤
√∑
z∈Z
〈θ, z|ψx〉〈ψx|θ, z〉
√∑
z∈Z
〈θ, z|ψx′〉〈ψx′ |θ, z〉
=
√
〈θ|trE(|ψx〉〈ψx|)|θ〉〈θ|trE(|ψx′〉〈ψx′ |)|θ〉 .
Combining this with (3.7) and using Jensen’s inequality, we find
〈θ|ρAB |θ〉 ≤
∑
x,x′∈X
√
〈θ|trE(|ψx〉〈ψx|)|θ〉〈θ|trE(|ψx′〉〈ψx′ |)|θ〉
≤ |X |
√ ∑
x,x′∈X
〈θ|trE(|ψx〉〈ψx|)|θ〉〈θ|trE(|ψx′〉〈ψx′ |)|θ〉
= |X |
∑
x∈X
〈θ|trE(|ψx〉〈ψx|)|θ〉
= |X | · 〈θ|ρ˜AB|θ〉 .
By the choice of λ, the operator λ · idA ⊗ σB − ρ˜AB is nonnegative. Hence
〈θ|ρ˜AB|θ〉 ≤ λ〈θ|idA ⊗ σB|θ〉 and thus, by the above inequality, 〈θ|ρAB|θ〉 ≤
λ · |X | · 〈θ|idA ⊗ σB |θ〉. Because this is true for any vector |θ〉, we conclude
that the operator defined by (3.6) is nonnegative.
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Lemma 3.1.14. Let ρABE, ρ˜ABEX be defined by (3.4) and (3.5), respec-
tively, and let σBX ∈ P(HB ⊗HX ). Then
Hmin(ρAB |σB) ≥ Hmin(ρ˜ABX |σBX)−Hmax(ρ˜X) .
Proof. The assertion follows from Lemma 3.1.13 together with Lemma 3.1.7.
3.2 Smooth min- and max-entropy
The min-entropy and the max-entropy, as defined in the previous section,
are discontinuous in the sense that a slight modification of the system’s
state might have a large impact on its entropy. To illustrate this, consider
for example a classical random variable X on the set {0, . . . , n − 1} which
takes the values 0 and 1 with probability almost one half, i.e., PX(0) =
PX(1) =
1−ε
2 , for some small ε > 0, whereas the other values have equal
probabilities, i.e., PX(x) =
ε
n−2 , for all x > 1. Then, by the definition of the
max-entropy, Hmax(PX) = log n. On the other hand, if we slightly change
the probability distribution PX to some probability distribution P¯X such
that P¯X(x) = 0, for all x > 1, then Hmax(P¯X) = 1. In particular, for n
large, Hmax(PX)≫ Hmax(P¯X), while ‖PX − P¯X‖1 ≤ ε.
We will see later (cf. Section 6.3) that the max-entropy Hmax(PX) can
be interpreted as the minimum number of bits needed to encode X in such
a way that its value can be recovered from the encoding without errors. The
above example is consistent with this interpretation. Indeed, while we need
at least log n bits to store a value X distributed according to PX , one single
bit is sufficient to store a value distributed according to P¯X . However, for
most applications, we allow some small error probability. For example, we
might want to encode X in such a way that its value can be recovered with
probability 1− ε. Obviously, in this case, one single bit is sufficient to store
X even if it is distributed according to PX .
The example illustrates that, given some probability distribution PX ,
one might be interested in the maximum (or minimum) entropy of any dis-
tribution P¯X which is close to PX . This idea is captured by the notion of
smooth min- and max-entropy.
3.2.1 Definition of smooth min- and max-entropy
The definition of smooth min- and max-entropy is based on the “non-
smooth” version (Definition 3.1.1).
Definition 3.2.1. Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB), σB ∈ P(HB), and ε ≥ 0. The
ε-smooth min-entropy and the ε-smooth max-entropy of ρAB relative to σB
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are
Hεmin(ρAB |σB) := sup
ρ¯AB
Hmin(ρ¯AB |σB)
Hεmax(ρAB |σB) := infρ¯ABHmax(ρ¯AB |σB) ,
where the supremum and infimum ranges over the set Bε(ρAB) of all op-
erators ρ¯AB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB) such that ‖ρ¯AB − ρAB‖1 ≤ tr(ρAB) · ε and
tr(ρ¯AB) ≤ tr(ρAB).
Definition 3.2.2. Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB) and let ε ≥ 0. The ε-smooth
min-entropy and the ε-smooth max-entropy of ρAB given HB are
Hεmin(ρAB |B) := sup
σB
Hεmin(ρAB|σB)
Hεmax(ρAB |B) := sup
σB
Hεmax(ρAB |σB) ,
where the supremum ranges over all σB ∈ P(HB) with tr(σB) = 1.
Note that, similar to the description in Section 3.1, these definitions can
be specialized to classical probability distributions.
Evaluating the suprema and infima
Remark 3.2.3. If the Hilbert space HA ⊗ HB has finite dimension, then
the set of operators ρ¯AB ∈ Bε(HA ⊗ HB) as well as the set of operators
σB ∈ P(HB) with tr(σB) = 1 is compact. Hence, the infima and suprema in
the above definitions can be replaced by minima and maxima, respectively.
Remark 3.2.4. The supremum in the definition of the smooth min-entropy
Hεmin(ρAB |σB) (Definition 3.2.1) can be restricted to the set of operators
ρ¯AB ∈ Bε(ρAB) with supp(ρ¯AB) ⊆ supp(ρA)⊗ supp(σB).
Additionally, to compute Hεmin(ρABZ |σBZ) where ρABZ and σBZ are
classical with respect to an orthonormal basis {|z〉}z∈Z on a subsystem HZ ,
it is sufficient to take the supremum over operators ρ¯ABZ ∈ Bε(ρABZ) which
are classical with respect to {|z〉}z∈Z .
Similarly, to compute Hεmin(ρXAB |σB) where ρXAB is classical on a sub-
system HX , the supremum can be restricted to states ρ¯XAB ∈ Bε(ρXAB)
which are classical on HX .
Proof. For the first statement, we show that any operator ρ¯AB ∈ Bε(ρAB)
can be transformed to an operator E(ρ¯AB) ∈ Bε(ρAB) which has at least
the same amount of min-entropy as ρ¯AB and, additionally, has support on
supp(ρA)⊗ supp(σB).
Let E be the operation on HA ⊗HB defined by
E(ρ¯AB) := (ρ0A ⊗ idB)ρ¯AB(ρ0A ⊗ idB) .
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Because the operator idA⊗σB −E(idA⊗σB) is nonnegative, Lemma 3.1.12
implies that the min-entropy can only increase under the action of E . More-
over, supp(ρAB) ⊆ supp(ρA) ⊗ HB (cf. Lemma B.4.1) and thus E(ρAB) =
ρAB. Because E is a projection, the L1-distance cannot increase under the
action of E (cf. Lemma A.2.1), i.e.,∥∥E(ρ¯AB)− ρAB∥∥1 = ∥∥E(ρ¯AB − ρAB)∥∥1 ≤ ∥∥ρ¯AB − ρAB∥∥1 ≤ tr(ρAB) · ε .
We thus have ρ¯AB ∈ Bε(ρAB). The assertion then follows because we
can assume that supp(ρ¯AB) is contained in HA ⊗ supp(σB) (otherwise, the
min-entropy is arbitrarily negative and the statement is trivial) and thus
supp(E(ρ¯AB)) ⊆ supp(ρA)⊗ supp(σB).
The statements for ρABZ and ρXAB are proven similarly.
Remark 3.2.5. Let ρABZ ∈ P(HA⊗HB⊗HZ) be classical with respect to
an orthonormal basis {|z〉}z∈Z of HZ . Then the supremum in the definition
of the min-entropy Hεmin(ρABZ |BZ) can be restricted to operators σBZ ∈
P(HB ⊗HZ) which are classical with respect to {|z〉}z∈Z .
Proof. We show that for any ρ¯′ABZ ∈ Bε(ρABZ) and σ′BZ ∈ P(HB ⊗ HZ)
with tr(σ′BZ) = 1 there exists ρ¯ABZ ∈ Bε(ρABZ) and σBZ ∈ P(HB ⊗ HZ)
with tr(σBZ) = 1 such that σBZ is classical with respect to {|z〉}z∈Z and
Hmin(ρ¯ABZ |σBZ) ≥ Hmin(ρ¯′ABZ |σ′BZ).
Let thus ρ¯′ABZ ∈ Bε(ρABZ) and σ′BZ ∈ P(HB ⊗ HZ) be fixed. Define
ρ¯ABZ := (idAB ⊗ EZ)(ρ¯′ABZ) and σBZ := (idB ⊗ EZ)(σ′BZ) where EZ is the
projective measurement operation on HZ , i.e.,
EZ(ρ) :=
∑
z∈Z
|z〉〈z|ρ|z〉〈z| .
Note that σBZ is classical with respect to {|z〉}z∈Z and, because EZ is
trace-preserving, tr(σBZ) = tr(σ
′
BZ) = 1. Similarly, tr(ρ¯ABZ) = tr(ρ¯
′
ABZ).
Moreover, because (idAB⊗EZ)(ρABZ) = ρABZ and because the distance can
only decrease when applying idAB ⊗ EZ (cf. Lemma A.2.1), we have
‖ρ¯ABZ − ρABZ‖1 ≤ ‖ρ¯′ABZ − ρABZ‖1
which implies ρ¯ABZ ∈ Bε(ρABZ). Finally, using Lemma 3.1.12, we find
Hmin(ρ¯ABZ |σBZ) ≥ Hmin(ρ¯′ABZ |σ′BZ).
3.2.2 Basic properties of smooth min-entropy
Superadditivity
The following is a generalization of (one direction of) Lemma 3.1.6 to smooth
min-entropy.
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Lemma 3.2.6. Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB), σB ∈ P(HB) and, similarly,
ρA′B′ ∈ P(HA′ ⊗HB′), σB′ ∈ P(HB′), and let ε, ε′ ≥ 0. Then
Hε+ε
′
min (ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′ |σB ⊗ σB′) ≥ Hεmin(ρAB |σB) +Hε
′
min(ρA′B′ |σB′) .
Proof. For any ν > 0, there exist ρ¯AB ∈ Bε(ρAB) and ρ¯A′B′ ∈ Bε′(ρA′B′)
such that
Hmin(ρ¯AB |σB) > Hεmin(ρAB|σB)− ν
Hmin(ρ¯A′B′ |σB′) > Hε′min(ρA′B′ |σB′)− ν .
Hence, by Lemma 3.1.6,
Hmin(ρ¯AB ⊗ ρ¯A′B′ |σB ⊗ σB′) > Hεmin(ρAB |σB) +Hε
′
min(ρA′B′ |σB′)− 2ν .
Because this holds for any ν > 0, it remains to verify that ρ¯AB ⊗ ρ¯A′B′ ∈
Bε+ε′(ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′). This is however a direct consequence of the triangle
inequality, i.e.,∥∥ρ¯AB ⊗ ρ¯A′B′ − ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′∥∥1
≤ tr(ρ¯A′B′) ·
∥∥ρ¯AB − ρAB∥∥1 + tr(ρAB) · ∥∥ρ¯A′B′ − ρA′B′∥∥1
≤ tr(ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′)(ε+ ε′) .
Strong subadditivity
The following statement is a generalization of Lemma 3.1.7 to smooth min-
entropy.
Lemma 3.2.7. Let ρABC ∈ P(HA ⊗HB ⊗HC), σBC ∈ P(HB ⊗HC), and
let ε ≥ 0. Then
Hεmin(ρABC |σBC) ≤ Hεmin(ρAB |σB) .
Proof. For any ν > 0, there exists ρ¯ABC ∈ Bε(ρABC) such that
Hmin(ρ¯ABC |σBC) ≥ Hεmin(ρABC |σBC)− ν .
Hence, by Lemma 3.1.7, applied to the operator ρ¯ABC ,
Hmin(ρ¯AB |σB) ≥ Hεmin(ρABC |σBC)− ν .
Because this holds for any ν > 0, it remains to show that ρ¯AB ∈ Bε(ρAB).
This is however a direct consequence of the fact that the L1-distance cannot
increase when taking the partial trace (cf. Lemma A.2.1), i.e.,
‖ρ¯AB − ρAB‖1 ≤ ‖ρ¯ABC − ρABC‖1 ≤ tr(ρABC) · ε .
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Conditioning on classical information
The following lemma generalizes (one direction of) Lemma 3.1.8 to smooth
min-entropy.
Lemma 3.2.8. Let ρABZ ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HZ) and σBZ ∈ P(HB ⊗ HZ)
be classical with respect to an orthonormal basis {|z〉}z∈Z of HZ, let ρzAB
and σzB be the corresponding (non-normalized) conditional operators, and
let ε ≥ 0. Then
Hεmin(ρABZ |σBZ) ≥ inf
z∈Z
Hεmin(ρ
z
AB |σzB) .
Proof. For any ν > 0 and z ∈ Z, there exists ρ¯zAB ∈ Bε(ρzAB) such that
Hmin(ρ¯
z
AB |σzB) ≥ Hεmin(ρzAB|σzB)− ν .
Let
ρ¯ABZ :=
∑
z∈Z
ρ¯zAB ⊗ |z〉〈z| .
Using Lemma 3.1.8, we find
Hmin(ρ¯ABZ |σBZ) = inf
z∈Z
Hmin(ρ¯
z
AB |σzB) ≥ inf
z∈Z
Hεmin(ρ
z
AB |σzB)− ν . (3.8)
Because this holds for any value of ν > 0, it suffices to verify that ρ¯ABZ ∈
Bε(ρABZ). This is however a direct consequence of∥∥ρ¯ABZ − ρABZ∥∥1 =∑
z∈Z
∥∥ρ¯zAB − ρzAB∥∥1 ≤∑
z∈Z
tr(ρzAB) · ε = tr(ρABZ) · ε ,
where the first equality follows from Lemma A.2.2.
3.2.3 Chain rules for smooth min-entropy
The following lemma generalizes (one direction of) Lemma 3.1.10 to smooth
min-entropy.
Lemma 3.2.9. Let ρABC ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC), σC ∈ P(HC), let σB ∈
P(HB) be the fully mixed state on the support of ρB, and let ε ≥ 0. Then
Hεmin(ρABC |σC) ≤ Hεmin(ρABC |σB ⊗ σC) +Hmax(ρB) .
Proof. According to Remark 3.2.4, for any ν > 0, there exists ρ¯ABC ∈
Bε(ρABC) such that
Hmin(ρ¯ABC |σC) ≥ Hεmin(ρABC |σC)− ν (3.9)
and supp(ρ¯ABC) ⊆ supp(ρAB) ⊗ HC = supp(ρAB ⊗ idC). Hence, from
Lemma B.4.2, supp(ρ¯B) ⊆ supp(ρB). Consequently, the operator ρ¯B is
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arbitrarily close to an operator whose support is equal to the support of ρB.
By continuity, we can thus assume without loss of generality that supp(ρ¯B) =
supp(ρB), that is,
Hmax(ρ¯B) = Hmax(ρB) . (3.10)
Moreover, since ρ¯ABC ∈ Bε(ρABC), we have
Hεmin(ρABC |σB ⊗ σC) ≥ Hmin(ρ¯ABC |σB ⊗ σC) . (3.11)
Finally, because σB is the fully mixed state on supp(ρB) = supp(ρ¯B),
Lemma 3.1.10, applied to the state ρ¯ABC , gives
Hmin(ρ¯ABC |σC) = Hmin(ρ¯ABC |σB ⊗ σC) +Hmax(ρ¯B) .
Combining this with (3.9), (3.10), and (3.11) concludes the proof.
Data processing
The following lemma is a generalization of Lemma 3.1.11 to smooth min-
entropy.
Lemma 3.2.10. Let ρAY C ∈ P(HA⊗HY ⊗HC) be classical with respect to
an orthonormal basis {|y〉}y∈Y of HY such that the corresponding conditional
operators ρyAC , for any y ∈ Y, have product form, let σC ∈ P(HC), and let
ε ≥ 0. Then
Hεmin(ρAY C |σC) ≥ Hεmin(ρY C |σC) +Hmin(ρAY |ρY ) .
Proof. For any y ∈ Y, let py := tr(ρyAC) and define ρ˜yA := 1py ρ
y
A. Because
ρyAC has product form, we have
ρAY C =
∑
y∈Y
ρ˜yA ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyC .
According to Remark 3.2.4, for any ν > 0, there exists a nonnegative oper-
ator ρ¯Y C ∈ Bε(ρY C) such that
Hmin(ρ¯Y C |σC) ≥ Hεmin(ρY C |σC)− ν (3.12)
where ρ¯Y C is classical with respect to {|y〉}y∈Y , that is, ρ¯Y C =
∑
y∈Y |y〉〈y|⊗
ρ¯yC , for some family {ρ¯yC}y∈Y of conditional operators on HC . Let ρ¯AY C ∈
P(HA ⊗HY ⊗HC) be defined by
ρ¯AY C :=
∑
y∈Y
ρ˜yA ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρ¯yC .
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Because the operators ρ˜yA are normalized, we have∥∥ρ¯AY C − ρAY C∥∥1 =∑
y
∥∥ρ˜yA ⊗ ρ¯yC − ρ˜yA ⊗ ρyC∥∥1
=
∑
y
∥∥ρ¯yC − ρyC∥∥1
=
∥∥ρ¯Y C − ρY C∥∥1 ,
where the first and the last equality follow from Lemma A.2.2. Because
ρ¯Y C ∈ Bε(ρY C), this implies ρ¯AY C ∈ Bε(ρAY C) and thus
Hεmin(ρAY C |σC) ≥ Hmin(ρ¯AY C |σC) . (3.13)
Moreover, using Lemma 3.1.8 and the fact that, for any y ∈ Y, the operators
ρ˜yA and ρ
y
A only differ by a factor py, we have
Hmin(ρ¯AY |ρ¯Y ) = inf
y∈Y
Hmin(ρ˜
y
A|tr(ρ˜yA))
= inf
y∈Y
Hmin(ρ
y
A|tr(ρyA))
= Hmin(ρAY |ρY ) .
(3.14)
Finally, applying Lemma 3.1.11 to the state ρ¯AY C gives
Hmin(ρ¯AY C |σC) ≥ Hmin(ρ¯Y C |σC) +Hmin(ρ¯AY |ρ¯Y ) .
Combining this with (3.12), (3.13), and (3.14) concludes the proof.
3.2.4 Smooth min-entropy of superpositions
The following statement generalizes Lemma 3.1.14.
Lemma 3.2.11. Let ρABE, ρ˜ABEX be defined by (3.4) and (3.5), respec-
tively, for mutually orthogonal vectors |ψx〉, let σBX ∈ P(HB ⊗ HX ), and
let ε ≥ 0. Then
Hεmin(ρAB |σB) ≥ H ε˜min(ρ˜ABX |σBX)−Hmax(ρ˜X) ,
where ε˜ = ε
2
6|X | .
Proof. By Remark 3.2.4, for any ν > 0, there exists an operator ¯˜ρABX ∈
Bε˜(ρ˜ABX) which is classical with respect to the basis {|x〉}x∈X such that
Hmin(¯˜ρABX |σBX) ≥ H ε˜min(ρ˜ABX |σBX)− ν . (3.15)
Let { ¯˜ρxAB}x∈X be the family of conditional operators defined by ¯˜ρABX
and {|x〉}x∈X , i.e., ¯˜ρABX =
∑
x∈X ¯˜ρ
x
AB⊗|x〉〈x|. According to Lemma A.2.7,
for any x ∈ X , there exists a purification |ψ¯x〉〈ψ¯x| of ¯˜ρxAB such that
‖|ψx〉 − |ψ¯x〉‖ ≤
√∥∥ρ˜xAB − ¯˜ρxAB∥∥1 .
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Let |ψ¯〉 :=∑x∈X |ψ¯x〉 and define ρ¯ABE := |ψ¯〉〈ψ¯|. By the triangle inequality,
we find ∥∥|ψ〉 − |ψ¯〉∥∥ ≤∑
x∈X
∥∥|ψx〉 − |ψ¯x〉∥∥ ≤∑
x∈X
√∥∥ρ˜xAB − ¯˜ρxAB∥∥1 .
Hence, with Jensen’s inequality,
∥∥|ψ〉 − |ψ¯〉∥∥ ≤√|X |∑
x∈X
∥∥ρ˜xAB − ¯˜ρxAB∥∥1
=
√
|X | · ∥∥ρ˜ABX − ¯˜ρABX∥∥1 ,
where the equality follows from Lemma A.2.2. Because the vectors |ψx〉
are orthogonal, we have tr(ρ˜ABX ) = tr(ρAB). Consequently, since ¯˜ρABX ∈
Bε˜(ρ˜ABX), we obtain∥∥|ψ〉 − |ψ¯〉∥∥ ≤√|X | · ε˜ · tr(ρ˜ABX) =√|X | · ε˜ · tr(ρAB) . (3.16)
Assume without loss of generality that |X | · ε˜ ≤ 16 (otherwise, the asser-
tion is trivial). Then, because
√
tr(ρAB) = ‖|ψ〉‖, we have
‖|ψ〉‖ + ‖|ψ¯〉‖ ≤ 2‖|ψ〉‖ + ‖|ψ〉 − |ψ¯〉‖
≤ 2
√
tr(ρAB) +
√
1
6
tr(ρAB) <
√
6 tr(ρAB) .
and thus, by Lemma A.2.5,∥∥ρAB − ρ¯AB∥∥1 ≤√6 tr(ρAB) · ∥∥|ψ〉 − |ψ¯〉∥∥ ≤ tr(ρAB) · ε ,
where the last inequality follows from (3.16). This implies
Hεmin(ρAB |σB) ≥ Hmin(ρ¯AB |σB) . (3.17)
Note that ¯˜ρABX can be seen as the operator obtained by taking the
partial trace of
¯˜ρABEX :=
∑
x∈X
|ψ¯x〉〈ψ¯x| ⊗ |x〉〈x| .
We can thus apply Lemma 3.1.14 to the operators ρ¯ABE and ¯˜ρABEX , which
gives
Hmin(ρ¯AB |σB) ≥ Hmin(¯˜ρABX |σBX)−Hmax(¯˜ρX) .
Finally, because the support of ¯˜ρX is contained in the support of ρ˜X , we
have Hmax(¯˜ρX) ≤ Hmax(ρ˜X) and thus
Hmin(ρ¯AB |σB) ≥ Hmin(¯˜ρABX |σBX)−Hmax(ρ˜X) .
Combining this with (3.17) and (3.15) concludes the proof.
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3.2.5 Smooth min-entropy calculus
The properties proven so far are formulated in terms of the smooth min-
entropyH(ρAB |σB) relative to an operator σB (Definition 3.2.1). The follow-
ing theorem translates these statements to conditional smooth min-entropy
H(ρAB |B) (Definition 3.2.2).
Theorem 3.2.12. Let ε, ε′ ≥ 0. Then the following inequalities hold:
• (Super-)additivity:
Hε+ε
′
min (ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′ |BB′) ≥ Hεmin(ρAB |B) +Hε
′
min(ρA′B′ |B′) , (3.18)
for ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB) and ρA′B′ ∈ P(HA′ ⊗HB′).
• Strong subadditivity:
Hεmin(ρABC |BC) ≤ Hεmin(ρAB |B) , (3.19)
for ρABC ∈ P(HA ⊗HB ⊗HC).
• Conditioning on classical information:
Hεmin(ρABZ |BZ) ≥ inf
z∈Z
Hεmin(ρ¯
z
AB |B) , (3.20)
for ρABZ ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HZ) normalized and classical on HZ, and
for normalized conditional operators ρ¯zAB.
• Chain rule:
Hεmin(ρABC |C) ≤ Hεmin(ρABC |BC) +Hmax(ρB) , (3.21)
for ρABC ∈ P(HA ⊗HB ⊗HC).
• Data processing:
Hεmin(ρAY C |C) ≥ Hεmin(ρY C |C) +Hmin(ρAY |ρY ) , (3.22)
for ρAY C ∈ P(HA⊗HY⊗HC) classical on HY such that the conditional
operators ρyAC have product form.
Proof. The statements follow immediately from Lemmata 3.2.6, 3.2.7, 3.2.8,
3.2.9, and 3.2.10.
3.3 Smooth min- and max-entropy of products
In this section, we show that the smooth min- and max-entropies of product
states are asymptotically equal to the von Neumann entropy. In a first step,
we consider a purely classical situation, i.e., we prove that the smooth min-
and max-entropies of a sequence of independent and identically distributed
random variables can be expressed in terms of Shannon entropy (which is
the classical analogue of the von Neumann entropy). Then, in a second step,
we generalize this statement to quantum states (Section 3.3.2).
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3.3.1 The classical case
The proof of the main result of this section (Theorem 3.3.4) is based on
a Chernoff style bound (Theorem 3.3.3) which is actually a variant of the
asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) known from information theory
(see, e.g., [CT91]). It states that, with high probability, the negative loga-
rithm of the probability of an n-tuple of values chosen according to a product
distribution Pn is close to the Shannon entropy of Pn.
Typical sequences and their probabilities
Lemma 3.3.1. Let PXY ∈ P(X × Y) be a probability distribution. Then,
for any t ∈ R with |t| ≤ 1log(|X |+3) ,
log E
x,y
[
PX|Y (x, y)−t
] ≤ tH(X|Y ) + 1
2
t2 log(|X |+ 3)2 ,
where the expectation is taken over pairs (x, y) chosen according to PXY .
Proof. For any t ∈ R, let rt be the function on the open interval (0,∞)
defined by
rt(z) := z
t − t ln z − 1 . (3.23)
We will use several properties of this function proven in Appendix B.6.
For any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, let px,y := PX|Y (x, y). If px,y > 0 then
p−tx,y = rt
( 1
px,y
)
+ t ln
1
px,y
+ 1 ≤ rt
( 1
px,y
+ 3
)
+ t ln
1
px,y
+ 1 ,
where the inequality holds because rt is monotonically increasing on the
interval [1,∞) (Lemma B.6.1) and 1px,y =
PY (y)
PXY (x,y)
≥ 1. Because 1px,y + 3 ∈
[4,∞) and because rt is concave on this interval (Lemma B.6.3 which can
be applied because t ∈ [−12 , 12 ]), Jensen’s inequality leads to
E
x,y
[
p−tx,y
] ≤ E
x,y
[
rt
( 1
px,y
+ 3
)]
+ t E
x,y
[
ln
1
px,y
]
+ 1
≤ rt
(
E
x,y
[ 1
px,y
+ 3
])
+ t(ln 2) E
x,y
[
log
1
px,y
]
+ 1 ,
where Ex,y[·] denotes the expectation with respect to (x, y) chosen according
to the distribution PXY . Because Ex,y[
1
px,y
] =
∑
x,y PXY (x, y)
PY (y)
PXY (x,y)
= |X |
and Ex,y[log
1
px,y
] = H(X|Y ), we obtain
E
x,y
[
p−tx,y
] ≤ rt(|X |+ 3) + t(ln 2)H(X|Y ) + 1 .
Furthermore, because log a ≤ 1ln 2(a− 1),
log E
x,y
[
p−tx,y
] ≤ 1
ln 2
rt
(|X |+ 3) + tH(X|Y ) .
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Finally, together with Lemma B.6.4, since |t| ≤ 1log(|X |+3) , we conclude
log E
x,y
[
p−tx,y
] ≤ ( 1
ln 2
− 1)t2 log(|X |+ 3)2 + tH(X|Y ) .
The assertion follows because 1ln 2 − 1 ≤ 12 .
Lemma 3.3.2. Let PXY ∈ P(X ×Y) be a probability distribution and let γ
be the function on X × Y defined by
γ(x, y) := − logPX|Y (x, y)−H(X|Y ) .
Then, for any t ∈ R with |t| ≤ 1log(|X |+3) ,
E
x,y
[
2tγ(x,y)
] ≤ 2 12 t2 log(|X |+3)2 .
Proof. The assertion follows directly from Lemma 3.3.1, that is,
E
x,y
[
2tγ(x,y)
]
= 2−tH(X|Y ) E
x,y
[
PX|Y (x, y)−t
]
≤ 2−tH(X|Y ) · 2tH(X|Y )+ 12 t2 log(|X |+3)2 .
Theorem 3.3.3. Let PXY ∈ P(X × Y) be a probability distribution and
let n ∈ N. Then, for any δ ∈ [0, log |X |] and (x,y) chosen according to
PXnY n := (PXY )
n,
Pr
x,y
[− log PXn|Y n(x,y) ≥ n(H(X|Y ) + δ)] ≤ 2− nδ22 log(|X|+3)2 ,
and, similarly,
Pr
x,y
[− log PXn|Y n(x,y) ≤ n(H(X|Y )− δ)] ≤ 2− nδ22 log(|X|+3)2 .
Proof. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn), y = (y1, . . . , yn), and let γ be the function
defined in Lemma 3.3.2 for the probability distribution PXY . Then
n∑
i=1
γ(xi, yi) = − log PXn|Y n(x,y) − nH(X|Y ) . (3.24)
Using Markov’s inequality, for any t > 0,
Pr
x,y
[ n∑
i=1
γ(xi, yi) ≥ nδ
]
= Pr
x,y
[
2t
∑n
i=1 γ(xi,yi) ≥ 2tnδ]
≤ Ex,y
[
2t
∑n
i=1 γ(xi,yi)
]
2tnδ
.
(3.25)
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Moreover, because the pairs (xi, yi) are chosen independently,
E
x,y
[
2t
∑n
i=1 γ(xi,yi)
]
= E
x,y
[ n∏
i=1
2tγ(xi,yi)
]
=
n∏
i=1
E
xi,yi
[
2tγ(xi,yi)
]
≤ (2 12 t2 log(|X |+3)2)n ,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3.3.2, for any |t| ≤ 1log(|X |+3) .
Combining this with (3.25) gives
Pr
x,y
[ n∑
i=1
γ(xi, yi) ≥ nδ
] ≤ 2 12nt2 log(|X |+3)2−tnδ .
With t := δ
log(|X |+3)2 (note that t ≤ 1log(|X |+3) because δ ≤ log |X |), we
conclude
Pr
x,y
[ n∑
i=1
γ(xi, yi) ≥ nδ
] ≤ 2− nδ22 log(|X|+3)2 .
The first inequality of the lemma then follows from (3.24).
Similarly, if t < 0,
Pr
x,y
[ n∑
i=1
γ(xi, yi) ≤ −nδ
]
= Pr
x,y
[
2t
∑n
i=1 γ(xi,yi) ≥ 2−tnδ]
≤ Ex,y
[
2t
∑n
i=1 γ(xi,yi)
]
2−tnδ
,
and thus
Pr
x,y
[ n∑
i=1
γ(xi, yi) ≤ −nδ
] ≤ 2 12nt2 log(|X |+3)2+tnδ .
The second inequality follows with t := − δlog(|X |+3)2 .
Asymptotic equality of smooth entropy and Shannon entropy
Theorem 3.3.4. Let PXY ∈ P(X × Y) be a probability distribution and let
n ∈ N. Then, for any ε ≥ 0 and PXnY n := (PXY )n,
1
n
Hεmax(PXnY n |PY n) ≤ H(X|Y ) + δ
1
n
Hεmin(PXnY n |PY n) ≥ H(X|Y )− δ ,
where δ := log(|X | + 3)
√
2 log(1/ε)
n .
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Proof. We first prove the bound on the (classical) smooth max-entropy
Hεmax(PXnY n |PY n). For any y ∈ Yn with PY n(y) > 0, let X¯y be the set
of all n-tuples x ∈ X n such that
− log PXn|Y n(x,y) ≤ n
(
H(X|Y ) + δ) .
Furthermore, let PX¯nY¯ n be the nonnegative function on X n×Yn defined by
PX¯nY¯ n(x,y) =
{
PXnY n(x,y) if x ∈ X¯y
0 otherwise.
(3.26)
We can assume without loss of generality that δ ≤ log |X | (otherwise,
the statement is trivial). Hence, by the first inequality of Theorem 3.3.3,
Prx,y[x /∈ X¯y] ≤ ε. This implies ‖PXnY n − PX¯nY¯ n‖1 ≤ ε and thus
Hεmax(PXnY n |PY n) ≤ Hmax(PX¯nY¯ n |PY n) . (3.27)
For any fixed y := (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Yn with PY n(y) > 0,
1 ≥
∑
x∈X¯y
n∏
i=1
PX|Y (xi, yi) ≥ |X¯y|2−n(H(X|Y )+δ) ,
where the second inequality follows from the definition of the set X¯y. Conse-
quently, we have |X¯y| ≤ 2n(H(X|Y )+δ). Moreover, by the definition of PX¯nY¯ n ,
the support of the function x 7→ PX¯nY¯ n(x,y) is contained in X¯y. Hence,
using Remark 3.1.4,
Hmax(PX¯nY¯ n |PY n) ≤ log
( ∑
y∈Yn
PY n(y) · |X¯y|
) ≤ n(H(X|Y ) + δ) .
Combining this with (3.27) proves the first inequality of the lemma.
To prove the bound on the min-entropy Hεmin(PXnY n |PY n), let X¯y, for
any y ∈ Yn with PY n(y) > 0, be the set of n-tuples x ∈ X n such that
− log PXn|Y n(x,y) ≥ n
(
H(X|Y )− δ) ,
and let again PX¯nY¯ n be defined by (3.26). By the second inequality of The-
orem 3.3.3, Prx,y[x /∈ X¯y] ≤ ε, which, similarly to the previous argument,
implies
Hεmin(PXnY n |PY n) ≥ Hmin(PX¯nY¯ n |PY n) . (3.28)
Moreover, using Remark 3.1.4
Hmin(PX¯nY¯ n |PY n) = − log max
y∈supp(PY n)
max
x∈Xn
PX¯nY¯ n(x,y)
PY n(y)
= − log max
y∈supp(PY n)
max
x∈X¯y
PXnY n(x,y)
PY n(y)
≥ n(H(X|Y )− δ) ,
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where the inequality follows from the definition of the set X¯y. Combining
this with (3.28) proves the second inequality of the lemma.
Because the min-entropy Hmin(PXnY n |PY n) cannot be larger than the
max-entropy Hmax(PXnY n |PY n) (cf. Lemma 3.1.5), Theorem 3.3.4 implies
that
1
n
Hεmin(PXnY n |PY n) ≈
1
n
Hεmax(PXnY n |PY n) ≈
1
n
H(Xn|Y n) , (3.29)
where asymptotically, for increasing n, the approximation becomes an equal-
ity.
Remark 3.3.5. It is easy to see that Theorem 3.3.4 can be generalized
to probability distributions PXnY n which are the product of not necessar-
ily identical distributions PXiYi . That is, for any distribution of the form
PXnY n =
∏n
i=1 PXiYi , the approximation (3.29) still holds.
3.3.2 The quantum case
The following theorem and its corollary can be seen as a quantum version
of Theorem 3.3.4 for smooth min-entropy (where the Shannon entropy is
replaced by the von Neumann entropy). The proof essentially follows the
same line as the classical argument described above.7 A similar argument
shows that the statement also holds for smooth max-entropy.
Theorem 3.3.6. Let ρAB ∈ P(HA⊗HB), σB ∈ P(HB) be density operators,
and let n ∈ N. Then, for any ε ≥ 0,
1
n
Hεmin(ρ
⊗n
AB|σ⊗nB ) ≥ H(ρAB)−H(ρB)−D(ρB‖σB)− δ ,
where δ := 2 log
(
rank(ρA) + tr(ρ
2
AB(idA ⊗ σ−1B )) + 2
)√ log(1/ε)
n + 1.
Proof. Define H(ρAB |σB) := H(ρAB)−H(ρB)−D(ρB‖σB). We show that
there exists a density operator ρ¯AnBn ∈ Bε(ρ⊗nAB) such that
Hmin(ρ¯AnBn |σ⊗nB ) ≥ nH(ρAB|σB)− nδ . (3.30)
According to the definition of min-entropy, this is equivalent to saying that
the operator λ · (idA ⊗ σB)⊗n − ρ¯AnBn is nonnegative, for λ ≥ 0 such that
− log λ = nH(ρAB|σB)− nδ.
7An alternative method to prove the statement 1
n
Hεmin(ρ
⊗n
AB|ρ
⊗n
B ) ' H(ρAB)−H(ρB) is
to use a chain rule of the form Hεmin(ρ
⊗n
AB|ρ
⊗n
B ) ' H
ε
min(ρ
⊗n
AB)−H
ε
max(ρ
⊗n
B ). The entropies
on the right hand side of this inequality can be rewritten as the entropies of the classical
probability distributions defined by the eigenvalues of ρ⊗nAB and ρ
⊗n
B , respectively. The
desired bound then follows from the classical Theorem 3.3.4. However, the results obtained
with such an alternative method are less tight and less general than Theorem 3.3.6.
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Let
(idA ⊗ σB)⊗n =
∑
z∈Zn
qz|z〉〈z|
be a spectral decomposition of (idA ⊗ σB)⊗n. We can assume without loss
of generality that there exists an order relation on the values Zn such that
qz ≥ qz′ , for any z ≥ z′. For any z ∈ Z, let Bz be the projector defined by
Bz :=
∑
z′: z′≥z
|z′〉〈z′| .
Moreover, let βz, for z ∈ Zn, be nonnegative coefficients such that, for any
z′ ∈ Zn, ∑
z: z≤z′
βz = qz′ .
Note that the spectral decomposition above can then be rewritten as
(idA ⊗ σB)⊗n =
∑
z∈Zn
βzBz . (3.31)
Let
ρ⊗nAB =
∑
x∈Xn
px|x〉〈x|
be a spectral decomposition of ρ⊗nAB . In the following, we denote by ∞ an
element which is larger than any element of Zn. Moreover, let px,z, for
x ∈ X n and z ∈ Zn ∪ {∞}, be nonnegative coefficients such that, for any
z′ ∈ Zn, ∑
z: z≤z′
px,z = min(px, λqz′)
∑
z∈Zn∪{∞}
px,z = px .
We show that inequality (3.30) holds for the operator
ρ¯AnBn :=
∑
x∈Xn
∑
z∈Zn
px,zBz|x〉〈x|Bz .
Note first that, by the definition of px,z and βz, we have px,z ≤ λβz, for
any x ∈ X n and z ∈ Zn, that is, the operator∑
z∈Zn
λβzBzBz − ρ¯AnBn =
∑
z∈Zn
∑
x∈Xn
(λβz − px,z)Bz|x〉〈x|Bz
is nonnegative. Using (3.31) and the fact that the operators Bz are projec-
tors, we conclude that the operator
λ · (idA ⊗ σB)⊗n − ρ¯AnBn =
∑
z∈Zn
λβzBz − ρ¯AnBn
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is nonnegative, which implies (3.30). It thus remains to be proven that
ρ¯AnBn ∈ Bε(ρ⊗nAB).
Using the above definitions and the convention that B∞ is the zero ma-
trix, we have∥∥ρ⊗nAB − ρ¯AnBn∥∥1 = ∥∥ ∑
x∈Xn
∑
z∈Zn∪{∞}
px,z
(|x〉〈x| −Bz|x〉〈x|Bz)∥∥1
≤
∑
x∈Xn
∑
z∈Zn∪{∞}
px,z
∥∥|x〉〈x| −Bz|x〉〈x|Bz∥∥1 .
We can use Lemma A.2.8 to bound the trace distance on the right hand side
of this inequality, that is,∥∥|x〉〈x| −Bz|x〉〈x|Bz∥∥1 ≤ 2√1− tr(Bz|x〉〈x|Bz) .
Because ρAB is a density operator, the nonnegative coefficients px,z sum up
to one. We can thus apply Jensen’s inequality which gives∥∥ρ⊗nAB − ρ¯AnBn∥∥1 ≤ 2 ∑
x∈Xn
∑
z∈Zn∪{∞}
px,z
√
1− tr(Bz|x〉〈x|Bz)
≤ 2
√∑
x∈Xn
∑
z∈Zn∪{∞}
px,z(1− tr(Bz|x〉〈x|Bz))
= 2
√
1− tr(ρ¯AnBn) .
(3.32)
The trace in the square root can be rewritten as
tr(ρ¯AnBn) =
∑
z′∈Zn
〈z′|
( ∑
x∈Xn
∑
z∈Zn
px,zBz|x〉〈x|Bz
)
|z′〉
=
∑
z′∈Zn
∑
z: z≤z′
∑
x∈Xn
px,z|〈z′|x〉|2 .
Because the terms in the sum are all nonnegative, the sum can only be-
come smaller if we restrict the set of values x over which the sum is taken.
Consequently,
tr(ρ¯AnBn) ≥
∑
z′∈Zn
∑
x: px≤λqz′
|〈z′|x〉|2
∑
z: z≤z′
px,z .
By the definition of px,z, we have
∑
z: z≤z′ px,z = px, for any (x, z
′) such that
px ≤ λqz′ , and hence
tr(ρ¯AnBn) ≥
∑
(x,z′): px≤λqz′
px|〈z′|x〉|2 .
Because
∑
z,x px|〈z|x〉|2 = 1, this inequality can be rewritten as
1− tr(ρ¯AnBn) ≤
∑
(x,z): px>λqz
px|〈z|x〉|2
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Recall that we need to prove that ρ¯AnBn ∈ Bε(ρ⊗nAB). Hence, combin-
ing (3.32) with the above bound on tr(ρ¯AnBn), it remains to be shown that
∑
(x,z): px>λqz
px|〈z|x〉|2 ≤
(ε
2
)2
. (3.33)
Let
idA ⊗ σB =
∑
z¯∈Z¯
q¯z¯|z¯〉〈z¯|
and
ρAB =
∑
x¯∈X¯
p¯x¯|x¯〉〈x¯|
be spectral decompositions of idA⊗σB and ρAB , respectively. Moreover, let
PX¯Z¯ be the probability distribution defined by
PX¯Z¯(x¯, z¯) := p¯x¯|〈z¯|x¯〉|2 .
Note that |x〉 and px, as used above, can be defined as |x〉 :=
⊗n
i=1 |xi〉
and px = p(x1,...,xn) :=
∏n
i=1 p¯xi . Similarly, we can set |z〉 :=
⊗n
i=1 |zi〉
and qz = q(z1,...,zn) :=
∏n
i=1 q¯zi . Then, the left hand side of (3.33) can be
rewritten as∑
(x,z): px>λqz
px|〈z|x〉|2 = Pr
x,z
[px > λqz]
= Pr
x,z
[− log px + log qz < − log λ]
= Pr
x,z
[ n∑
i=1
− log p¯xi + log q¯zi < − log λ
] (3.34)
for (x, z) chosen according to the probability distribution (PX¯Z¯)
n.
By the definition of H(ρAB |σB), we have
H(ρAB |σB) = −tr(ρAB log ρAB) + tr(ρAB log idA ⊗ σB)
=
∑
x¯,z¯
p¯x¯|〈z¯|x¯〉|2
(
log
1
p¯x¯
− log 1
q¯z¯
)
= E
x¯,z¯
[− log p¯x¯ + log q¯z¯] ,
for (x¯, y¯) chosen according to PX¯Y¯ . According to Birkhoff’s theorem (cf.
Theorem B.2.2) there exist nonnegative coefficients µπ parameterized by the
bijections π from X to Z such that ∑π µπ = 1 and |〈z¯|x¯〉|2 =∑π µπδz¯,π(x¯).
The identity above can thus be rewritten as
H(ρAB|σB) =
∑
x¯,z¯
p¯x¯|〈z¯|x¯〉|2 log q¯z¯
p¯x¯
=
∑
π
µπ
∑
x¯
p¯x¯ log
q¯π(x¯)
p¯x¯
. (3.35)
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For (x¯, z¯) chosen according to PX¯Y¯ ,
E
x¯,z¯
[
2−t(log p¯x¯−log q¯z¯)
]
=
∑
x¯,z¯
p¯x¯|〈z¯|x¯〉|2
( p¯x¯
q¯z¯
)−t
=
∑
π
µπ
∑
x¯
p¯x¯
( p¯x¯
q¯π(x¯)
)−t
.
For any t ∈ R, let rt be the function defined by (3.23). The last term in the
sum above can then be bounded by( p¯x¯
q¯π(x¯)
)−t
= rt
( q¯π(x¯)
p¯x¯
)
+ t ln
q¯π(x¯)
p¯x¯
+ 1
≤ r|t|
( q¯π(x¯)
p¯x¯
+
p¯x¯
q¯π(x¯)
+ 2
)
+ t ln
q¯π(x¯)
p¯x¯
+ 1
where the inequality follows from the fact that, for all z > 0, rt(z) ≤
r|t|(z + 1z ) (Lemma B.6.2) and the fact that rt is monotonically increasing
(Lemma B.6.1) on the interval [1,∞). Because q¯pi(x¯)p¯x¯ +
p¯x¯
q¯pi(x¯)
+2 ∈ [4,∞) and
because rt is concave on this interval (Lemma B.6.3) we can apply Jensen’s
inequality, which gives
E
x¯,z¯
[2−t(log p¯x¯−log q¯z¯)] ≤ r|t|
(∑
π
µπ
∑
x¯
p¯x¯
( q¯π(x¯)
p¯x¯
+
p¯x¯
q¯π(x¯)
+ 2
))
+ t(ln 2)
∑
π
µπ
∑
x¯
p¯x¯ log
q¯π(x¯)
p¯x¯
+ 1 . (3.36)
Note that
∑
z¯ q¯z¯ = tr(idA⊗σB) = dim(HA). As we can assume without loss
of generality that HA is restricted to the support of ρA, we have∑
π
µπ
∑
x¯
q¯π(x¯) = rank(ρA) .
Moreover,
∑
π
µπ
∑
x¯
p¯2x¯
q¯π(x¯)
=
∑
x¯,z¯
|〈x¯|z¯〉|2p¯2x¯q¯−1z¯ = tr
(
ρ2AB(idA ⊗ σ−1B )
)
.
Hence, together with (3.35), the bound (3.36) can be rewritten as
E
x¯,z¯
[2−t(log p¯x¯−log q¯z¯)] ≤ r|t|(γ + 2) + t(ln 2)H(ρAB |σB) + 1 ,
where γ := rank(ρA)+tr
(
ρ2AB(idA⊗σ−1B )
)
. Furthermore, using the fact that
log a ≤ 1ln 2 (a− 1) we find
E
x¯,z¯
[2−t(log p¯x¯−log q¯z¯)] ≤ 2log
(
r|t|(γ+2)+t(ln 2)H(ρAB |σB)+1
)
≤ 2 1ln 2 r|t|(γ+2)+tH(ρAB |σB) .
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With Lemma B.6.4, we conclude
E
x¯,z¯
[2t(− log p¯x¯+log q¯z¯−H(ρAB |σB))] ≤ 2( 1ln 2−1)t2 log(γ+2)2 ≤ 2 12 t2 log(γ+2)2 . (3.37)
Let now w(x, z) :=
∑n
i=1(− log p¯xi + log q¯zi −H(ρAB |σB)). Because the
expectation of the product of independent values is equal to the product
of the expectation of these values, we have, for (x, z) chosen according to
(PX¯Z¯)
n,
E
x,z
[2tw(x,z)] = E
x¯,z¯
[2t(− log p¯x¯+log q¯z¯−H(ρAB |σB))]n .
Hence, by Markov’s inequality, for any t ≤ 0,
Pr
x,z
[w(x, z) ≤ −nδ] = Pr
x,z
[2tw(x,z) ≥ 2−tnδ]
≤ Ex,z[2
tw(x,z)]
2−tnδ
=
Ex¯,z¯[2
t(− log p¯x¯+log q¯z¯−H(ρAB |σB))]n
2−tnδ
and thus, using (3.37),
Pr
x,z
[w(x, z) ≤ −nδ] ≤ 2 12 t2n log(γ+2)2+tnδ .
Consequently, with t := − δ
log(γ+2)2
,
Pr
x,z
[ n∑
i=1
− log p¯xi + log q¯zi < nH(ρAB |σB)− nδ
]
≤ Pr
x,z
[
w(x, z) ≤ −nδ] ≤ 2− nδ22 log(γ+2)2 ≤ (ε
2
)2
.
Combining this with (3.34) implies (3.33) and thus concludes the proof.
The following corollary specializes Theorem 3.3.6 to the case where the
first part of the state ρAB = ρXB is classical and where σB = ρB .
Corollary 3.3.7. Let ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB) be a density operator which is
classical on HX . Then, for any ε ≥ 0,
1
n
Hεmin(ρ
⊗n
XB |ρ⊗nB ) ≥ H(ρXB)−H(ρB)− δ ,
where δ :=
(
2Hmax(ρX) + 3
)√ log(1/ε)
n + 1.
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Proof. Assume without loss of generality that ρB is invertible (the general
statement then follows by continuity). Because the operator
idX ⊗ ρB − ρXB =
∑
x∈X
idX ⊗ ρxB − |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB
is nonnegative, we can apply Lemma B.5.4 which gives
λmax
(
ρ
1/2
XB(idX ⊗ ρ−1B )ρ1/2XB
) ≤ 1 .
Hence, since ρXB is normalized,
tr
(
ρ2XB(idX ⊗ ρ−1B )
)
= tr
(
ρXBρ
1/2
XB(idX ⊗ ρ−1B )ρ1/2XB
) ≤ 1 .
Using the fact that, for any a ≥ 2, log(a+ 3) ≤ log a+ 32 , we thus have
log
(
rank(ρX) + tr
(
ρ2XB(idX ⊗ σ−1B )
)
+ 2
)
≤ log(rank(ρX) + 3)
≤ log rank(ρX) + 3
2
= Hmax(ρX) +
3
2
.
The assertion then follows directly from Theorem 3.3.6 with ρAB := ρXB
and σB := ρB.
Chapter 4
Symmetric States
The state of an n-partite quantum system is said to be symmetric or per-
mutation-invariant if it is unchanged under reordering of the subsystems.
Such states have nice properties which are actually very similar to those of
product states.
The chapter is organized as follows: We first review some basic properties
of symmetric subspaces of product spaces (Section 4.1) and show that any
permutation-invariant density operator has a purification in such a space
(Section 4.2). Next, we state our main result on the structure of symmet-
ric states, which generalizes the so-called de Finetti representation theorem
(Section 4.3). Based on this result, we derive expressions for the smooth
min-entropy (Section 4.4) and the measurement statistics (Section 4.5) of
symmetric states.
4.1 Definition and basic properties
4.1.1 Symmetric subspace of H⊗n
Let H be a Hilbert space and let Sn be the set of permutations on {1, . . . , n}.
For any π ∈ Sn, we denote by the same letter π the unitary operation on
H⊗n which permutes the n subsystems, that is,
π(|θ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |θn〉) := |θπ−1(1)〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |θπ−1(n)〉 ,
for any |θ1〉, . . . , |θn〉 ∈ H.
Definition 4.1.1. Let H be a Hilbert space and let n ≥ 0. The symmetric
subspace Sym(H⊗n) of H⊗n is the subspace of H⊗n spanned by all vectors
which are invariant under permutations of the subsystems, that is,
Sym(H⊗n) := {|Ψ〉 ∈ H⊗n : π|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉} .
Remark 4.1.2. For any n′, n′′ ≥ 0,
Sym(H⊗n′+n′′) ⊆ Sym(H⊗n′)⊗ Sym(H⊗n′′) .
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Lemma 4.1.3 below provides an alternative characterization of the sym-
metric subspace Sym(H⊗n).
Lemma 4.1.3. Let H be a Hilbert space and let n ≥ 0. Then
Sym(H⊗n) = span{|θ〉⊗n : |θ〉 ∈ H} .
Proof. For a proof of this statement, we refer to the standard literature on
symmetric functions or representation theory (see, e.g., [WG00]).
A basis of the symmetric subspace
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be an n-tuple of elements from X . The frequency
distribution λx of x is the probability distribution on X defined by the
relative number of occurrences of each symbol, that is,
λx(x) :=
1
n
∣∣{i : xi = x}∣∣ ,
for any x ∈ X . In the following, we denote by QXn the set of frequency
distributions of n-tuples on X , also called types with denominator n on X .
Moreover, for any type Q ∈ QXn , we denote by ΛQn the corresponding type
class, i.e., the set of all n-tuples x = (x1, . . . , xn) with frequency distribution
λx = Q.
Let {|x〉}x∈X be an orthonormal basis of H. For any Q ∈ QXn , we define
the vector |ΘQ〉 on Sym(H⊗n) by
|ΘQ〉 := 1√
|ΛQn |
∑
(x1,...,xn)∈ΛQn
|x1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉 , (4.1)
where, according to Lemma (B.1.2), |ΛQn | = n!∏
x(nQ(x))!
.
The vectors |ΘQ〉, for Q ∈ QXn , are mutually orthogonal and normalized.
We will see below (cf. Lemma 4.1.5) that the family {|ΘQ〉}Q∈QXn is a basis
of Sym(H⊗n). In particular, if H has dimension d, then dim(Sym(H⊗n)) =
|QXn | =
(
n+d−1
n
)
(cf. Lemma B.1.1).
4.1.2 Symmetric subspace along product states
Let H be a Hilbert space, let |θ〉 ∈ H be fixed, and let 0 ≤ m ≤ n. We
denote by V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) the set of vectors |Ψ〉 ∈ H⊗n which, after some
reordering of the subsystems, are of the form |θ〉⊗m ⊗ |Ψ˜〉, that is,
V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) := {π(|θ〉⊗m ⊗ |Ψ˜〉) : π ∈ Sn, |Ψ˜〉 ∈ H⊗n−m} . (4.2)
We will be interested in the subspace of Sym(H⊗n) which only consists
of linear combinations of vectors from V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m).
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Definition 4.1.4. Let H be a Hilbert space, let |θ〉 ∈ H, and let 0 ≤ m ≤ n.
The symmetric subspace Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) of H⊗n along |θ〉⊗m is
Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) := Sym(H⊗n) ∩ spanV(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) ,
where V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) denotes the subset of H⊗n defined by (4.2).
Note that Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) ⊆ Sym(H⊗n), where equality holds ifm = 0.
In Section 4.4 and 4.5, we shall see that, if r := n −m is small compared
to n, then the states in Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) have similar properties as product
states |θ〉⊗n.
Lemma 4.1.5. Let H be a Hilbert space with orthonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X ,
let |θ〉 := |x¯〉 for some x¯ ∈ X , and let 0 ≤ m ≤ n. Then the family
B := {|ΘQ〉}Q∈QXn :Q(x¯)≥mn
of vectors |ΘQ〉 defined by (4.1) is an orthonormal basis of Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m).
Note that, for m = 0, Lemma 4.1.5 implies that the family {|ΘQ〉}Q∈QXn
is an orthonormal basis of Sym(H⊗n).
Proof. For any Q ∈ QXn , the vector |ΘQ〉 is invariant under permutations of
the subsystems, that is, |ΘQ〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗n). Moreover, if Q(x¯) ≥ mn then the
sum on the right hand side of (4.1) only runs over n-tuples which contain
at least m symbols x¯, that is, each term of the sum is contained in the
set V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) defined by (4.2) and hence |ΘQ〉 ∈ spanV(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m).
This proves that all vectors |ΘQ〉 ∈ B are contained in Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m).
Moreover, the vectors |ΘQ〉 are mutually orthogonal and normalized.
It remains to be shown that Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) is spanned by the vectors
|ΘQ〉 ∈ B. Let thus |Ψ〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) be fixed. Since {|x〉}x∈X is a
basis of H, there exist coefficients αx, for x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n, such that
|Ψ〉 =
∑
x∈Xn
αx|x1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉 .
Because |Ψ〉 is invariant under permutations of the subsystems, the coeffi-
cients αx can only depend on the frequency distribution λx. This implies
that there exist coefficients βQ such that
|Ψ〉 =
∑
Q∈QXn
βQ|ΘQ〉 .
To conclude the proof, we need to verify that this sum can be restricted
to frequency distributions Q such that Q(x¯) ≥ mn . Observe that, for any
Q ∈ QXn with Q(x¯) < mn , the vector |ΘQ〉 is orthogonal to any vector
in V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) and thus also to any vector in Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m). The
corresponding coefficient βQ must thus be zero.
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Any vector |Ψ〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) can be written as a linear com-
bination of at most1 2nh(m/n) vectors from the set V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) defined
by (4.2).
Lemma 4.1.6. Let |Ψ〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m). Then there exists an or-
thonormal family {|Ψs〉}s∈S of vectors from V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) with cardinality
|S| ≤ 2nh(m/n) such that |Ψ〉 ∈ span{|Ψs〉}s∈S .
Proof. Let {|x〉}x∈X be an orthonormal basis of H such that |x¯〉 = |θ〉. For
any n-tuple x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n, we denote by |x〉 the vector |x1〉 ⊗
· · · ⊗ |xn〉. Because |Ψ〉 ∈ spanV(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m), there exist coefficients βx,
for x ∈ X n, such that
|Ψ〉 =
∑
x:λx(x¯)≥mn
βx|x〉 . (4.3)
Let S be the set of all subsets s ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of cardinality |s| = m.
Moreover, for any x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n with λx(x¯) ≥ mn , let s(x) ∈ S be a
set of m indices from {1, . . . , n} such that i ∈ s(x) =⇒ xi = x¯. Finally, for
any s ∈ S, let
|Ψs〉 :=
∑
x: s(x)=s
βx|x〉 . (4.4)
The sum in (4.3) can then be rewritten as |Ψ〉 =∑s∈S |Ψs〉, that is, |Ψ〉 ∈
span{|Ψs〉}s∈S . Moreover, Lemma B.1.3 implies |S| ≤ 2nh(m/n).
It remains to be shown that {|Ψs〉}s∈S is an orthonormal family of vectors
from V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m). Let thus s ∈ S be fixed and let π be a permutation
such that π(s) = {1, . . . ,m}. Hence, for any x with s(x) = s, the vector π|x〉
has the form |θ〉⊗m ⊗ |Ψ˜〉, for some |Ψ˜〉 ∈ H⊗n−m. By the definition (4.4),
the same holds for π|Ψs〉, i.e., |Ψs〉 ∈ V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m). Furthermore, because
for distinct s, s′ ∈ S, the sum in (4.4) runs over disjoint sets of n-tuples x,
and because the vectors |x〉 are mutually orthogonal, the states |Ψs〉 are also
mutually orthogonal. The assertion thus follows by normalizing the vectors
|Ψs〉.
4.2 Symmetric purification
An operator ρn on H⊗n is called permutation-invariant if πρnπ† = ρn, for
any permutation π ∈ Sn. For example, the pure state ρn = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, for
some vector |Ψ〉 of the symmetric subspace of H⊗n, is permutation-invariant.
More generally, any mixture of symmetric pure states is permutation-invar-
iant.
1h denotes the binary Shannon entropy function defined by h(p) := −p log(p) −
(1− p)log(1− p).
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The converse, however, is not always true. Consider for example the
fully mixed state ρ2 on H⊗2 where dim(H) = 2. Because this operator can
be written as ρ2 = σ
⊗2, it is invariant under permutations. However, ρ2
has rank 4, whereas the symmetric subspace of H⊗2 only has dimension 3.
Consequently, ρ2 is not a mixture of symmetric pure states.
Lemma 4.2.2 below establishes another connection between permutation-
invariant operators and symmetric pure states. We show that any permuta-
tion-invariant operator ρn on H⊗n has a purification on the symmetric sub-
space of (H ⊗H)⊗n.
To prove this result, we need a technical lemma which states that a fully
entangled state on two subsystems is unchanged when the same unitary
operation is applied to both subsystems.
Lemma 4.2.1. Let {|x〉}x∈X be an orthonormal family of vectors on a
Hilbert space H and define
|Ψ〉 :=
∑
x∈X
|x〉 ⊗ |x〉 ,
where, for any x ∈ X , |x〉 denotes the complex conjugate of |x〉 (with respect
to some basis of H). Let U be a unitary operation on the subspace spanned
by {|x〉}x∈X and let U be its complex conjugate. Then
(U ⊗ U)|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 .
Proof. A simple calculation shows that, for any x, x′ ∈ X ,(〈x| ⊗ 〈x′|)|Ψ〉 = δx,x′(〈x| ⊗ 〈x′|)(U ⊗ U)|Ψ〉 = δx,x′ .
The assertion follows because, obviously, {|x〉 ⊗ |x′〉}x,x′∈X is a basis of the
subspace of H⊗H that contains |Ψ〉.
Lemma 4.2.2. Let ρn ∈ P(H⊗n) be permutation-invariant. Then there
exists a purification of ρn on Sym((H⊗H)⊗n).
Proof. Let {|x〉}x∈X be an (orthonormal) eigenbasis of ρn and let Λ be the set
of eigenvalues of ρn. For any λ ∈ Λ, let Hλ be the corresponding eigenspace
of ρn, i.e., ρn|φ〉 = λ|φ〉, for any |φ〉 ∈ Hλ.
Because ρn is invariant under permutations, we have π
†ρnπ|φ〉 = λ|φ〉,
for any |φ〉 ∈ Hλ and π ∈ Sn. Applying the unitary operation π to both
sides of this equality gives ρnπ|φ〉 = λπ|φ〉, that is, π|φ〉 ∈ Hλ. This proves
that the eigenspaces Hλ of ρn are invariant under permutations.
For any |φ〉 ∈ H⊗n, we denote by |φ〉 the complex conjugate of |φ〉 with
respect to some product basis on H⊗n. Moreover, for any eigenvalue λ ∈ Λ,
let
|Ψλ〉 :=
∑
x∈Xλ
|x〉 ⊗ |x〉 ,
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where Xλ := {x ∈ X : |x〉 ∈ Hλ}, i.e., {|x〉}x∈Xλ is an orthonormal basis of
the eigenspace Hλ. Finally, we define the vector |Ψ〉 ∈ H⊗n ⊗H⊗n by
|Ψ〉 :=
∑
λ∈Λ
√
λ|Ψλ〉 .
It is easy to verify that the operator obtained by taking the partial trace of
|Ψ〉〈Ψ| satisfies
trH⊗n(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) =
∑
λ∈Λ
∑
x∈Xλ
λ|x〉〈x| = ρn ,
i.e., |Ψ〉〈Ψ| is a purification of ρn. It thus remains to be shown that |Ψ〉 is
symmetric.
Let π ∈ Sn be a fixed permutation. Note that its complex conjugate π
is equal to π. (Recall that we defined the complex conjugate with respect
to a product basis of H⊗n.) Moreover, because π is unitary on H⊗n and,
additionally, for any λ ∈ Λ, the subspace Hλ is invariant under π, the
restriction of π to Hλ is unitary as well. Hence, by Lemma 4.2.1,
(π ⊗ π)|Ψλ〉 = (π ⊗ π)|Ψλ〉 = |Ψλ〉
and thus, by linearity,
(π ⊗ π)|Ψ〉 =
∑
λ∈Λ
√
λ(π ⊗ π)|Ψλ〉 =
∑
λ∈Λ
√
λ|Ψλ〉 = |Ψ〉 .
Because this holds for any permutation π on H⊗n, we conclude |Ψ〉 ∈
Sym((H ⊗H)⊗n).
4.3 De Finetti representation
While any product state ρn = σ
⊗n on H⊗n is permutation-invariant, the
converse is not true in general. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the properties of
permutation-invariant states ρn are usually very similar to those of product
states.
The quantum de Finetti representation theorem makes this connection
explicit. In its basic version, it states that any density operator ρn on H⊗n
which is infinitely exchangeable, i.e., ρn is the partial state of a permutation-
invariant operator ρn+k on n + k subsystems, for all k ≥ 0, can be written
as a mixture of product states σ⊗n.
In this section, we generalize the quantum de Finetti representation to
the finite case, where ρn is only (n+ k)-exchangeable, i.e., ρn is the partial
state of a permutation-invariant operator ρn+k on n+k subsystems, for some
fixed k ≥ 0. Theorem 4.3.2 below states that any pure density operator ρn
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on H⊗n which is (n + k)-exchangeable is close to a mixture of states ρ¯|θ〉n
which have almost product form |θ〉⊗n, for |θ〉 ∈ H. More precisely, for any
|θ〉, ρ¯|θ〉n is a pure state of the symmetric subspace of H⊗n along |θ〉⊗n−r, for
some small r ≥ 0. Because of Lemma 4.2.2, this statement also holds for
mixed states ρn.
The proof of Theorem 4.3.2 is based on the following lemma which states
that the uniform mixture of product states (|θ〉〈θ|)⊗n, for all normalized
vectors |θ〉 ∈ S1(H) := {|θ〉 ∈ H : ‖|θ〉‖ = 1}, is equal to the fully mixed
state on the symmetric subspace of H⊗n.
Lemma 4.3.1. Let H be a d-dimensional Hilbert space and let n ≥ 0. Then∫
S1(H)
(|θ〉〈θ|)⊗nω(|θ〉) = (n+d−1n )−1 · idSym(H⊗n) ,
where ω denotes the uniform probability measure on the unit sphere S1(H).
Lemma 4.3.1 can be proven using techniques from representation theory,
in particular, Schur’s Lemma (see, e.g., [WG00]). In the following, however,
we propose an alternative proof.
Proof. Let
T :=
∫
S1(H)
(|θ〉〈θ|)⊗nω(|θ〉) .
We first show that T = c · idSym(H⊗n) for some constant c.
Because the space Sym(H⊗n) is spanned by vectors of the form |θ〉⊗n
(cf. Lemma 4.1.3), it is sufficient to show that, for any |u〉, |v〉 ∈ S1(H),
〈u|⊗nT |v〉⊗n = 〈u|⊗nc · idSym(H⊗n)|v〉⊗n . (4.5)
Let thus |u〉, |v〉 ∈ S1(H) be fixed and define α := 〈u|v〉 and |w〉 :=
|v〉 − α|u〉, i.e., 〈u|w〉 = 0. Then
〈u|⊗nT |v〉⊗n =
∫
S1(H)
〈u|θ〉n〈θ|v〉nω(|θ〉)
=
∫
S1(H)
〈u|θ〉n(α〈θ|u〉+ 〈θ|w〉)nω(|θ〉) . (4.6)
Note that, for any m ∈ {0, . . . , n},∫
S1(H)
〈u|θ〉n〈θ|u〉n−m〈θ|w〉mω(|θ〉) =
∫
S1(H)
|〈u|θ〉|2(n−m)〈u|θ〉m〈θ|w〉mω(|θ〉) .
Because, for any fixed value of 〈u|θ〉, the integral runs over all phases of
〈θ|w〉 (recall that |u〉 and |w〉 are orthogonal) and because the probability
measure ω is invariant under unitary operations, this expression equals zero
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for any m > 0. The integral on the right hand side of (4.6) can thus be
rewritten as
〈u|⊗nT |v〉⊗n =
∫
S1(H)
αn|〈u|θ〉|2nω(|θ〉)
= 〈u|v〉n
∫
S1(H)
|〈u|θ〉|2nω(|θ〉) .
(4.7)
Using again the fact that the probability measure ω is invariant under uni-
tary operations, we conclude that the integral on the right hand side cannot
depend on the vector |u〉, i.e., it is equal to a constant c. This implies (4.5)
and thus proves that T = c · idSym(H⊗n).
To determine the value of c,2 observe that
tr(T ) =
∫
S1(H)
tr
(
(|θ〉〈θ|)⊗n)ω(|θ〉) = ∫
S1(H)
ω(|θ〉) = 1 , (4.8)
where the last equality holds because ω is a probability measure on S1(H).
On the other hand, we have tr(T ) = c · dim(Sym(H⊗n)). Hence, c−1 =
dim(Sym(H⊗n)) = (n+d−1n ), which concludes the proof.
We are now ready to state and prove a de Finetti style representation
theorem. Note that Theorem 4.3.2 is restricted to pure symmetric states.
The statement for general permutation-invariant states then follows because
any such state has a symmetric purification (see Lemma 4.2.2).
Theorem 4.3.2. Let ρn+k be a pure density operator on Sym(H⊗n+k) and
let 0 ≤ r ≤ n. Then there exists a measure ν on S1(H) and, for each
|θ〉 ∈ S1(H), a pure density operator ρ¯|θ〉n on Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r) such that∥∥∥trk(ρn+k)−
∫
S1(H)
ρ¯|θ〉n ν(|θ〉)
∥∥∥
1
≤ 2e−
k(r+1)
2(n+k)
+ 1
2
dim(H) ln k
.
Proof. Because the density operator ρn+k is pure, we have ρn+k = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|
for some |Ψ〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗n+k). For any |θ〉 ∈ S1(H), let
|Ψ|θ〉〉 :=
√(k+d−1
k
) · (id⊗nH ⊗ 〈θ|⊗k) · |Ψ〉 ,
where d := dim(H). Because Sym(H⊗n+k) is a subspace of Sym(H⊗n) ⊗
Sym(H⊗k) (see Remark 4.1.2), |Ψ|θ〉〉 is contained in Sym(H⊗n). Let ρ|θ〉n :=
2Alternatively, the constant c can be computed by an explicit evaluation of the integral
on the right hand side of (4.7). Remarkably, this can be used to prove Lemma 4.1.3:
Observe first that, by the arguments given in the proof, c−1 must be equal to the dimension
of the space spanned by the vectors of the form |θ〉⊗n. On the other hand, the explicit
computation of c shows that c−1 equals
(
n+d−1
n
)
, which is the dimension of Sym(H⊗n).
Because the space spanned by the vectors |θ〉⊗n is a subspace of Sym(H⊗n), it follows
that these spaces are equal.
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|Ψ|θ〉〉〈Ψ|θ〉|, let P |θ〉 be the projector onto the subspace Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r),
and define
ρ¯|θ〉n :=
1
p(|θ〉)P
|θ〉ρ|θ〉n P
|θ〉 ,
where p(|θ〉) := tr(P |θ〉ρ|θ〉n P |θ〉), i.e., ρ¯|θ〉n is normalized and, because ρ|θ〉n has
rank one, it is also pure. Finally, let ν be the measure defined by ν := p · ω,
where ω is the uniform probability measure on S1(H). It then suffices to
show that
δ :=
∥∥∥trk(ρn+k)−
∫
S1(H)
P |θ〉ρ|θ〉n P
|θ〉 ω(|θ〉)
∥∥∥
1
≤ 2e−
k(r+1)
2(n+k)
+ 1
2
d lnk
. (4.9)
By the definition of ρ
|θ〉
n , we have
ρ|θ〉n = |Ψ|θ〉〉〈Ψ|θ〉| =
(k+d−1
k
) · trk(id⊗nH ⊗ (|θ〉〈θ|)⊗k · |Ψ〉〈Ψ|) , (4.10)
and thus, by Lemma 4.3.1,∫
S1(H)
ρ|θ〉n ω(|θ〉) =
(k+d−1
k
) · ∫
S1(H)
trk
(
id⊗nH ⊗ (|θ〉〈θ|)⊗k · |Ψ〉〈Ψ|
)
ω(|θ〉)
= trk
(
id⊗nH ⊗ idSym(H⊗k) · |Ψ〉〈Ψ|
)
.
Since Sym(H⊗n+k) is a subspace of H⊗n ⊗ Sym(H⊗k), the vector |Ψ〉 is
contained inH⊗n⊗Sym(H⊗k). The operation id⊗nH ⊗idSym(H⊗k) in the above
expression thus leaves |Ψ〉〈Ψ| unchanged. Because trk(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) = trk(ρn+k),
we conclude ∫
S1(H)
ρ|θ〉n ω(|θ〉) = trk(ρn+k) . (4.11)
Using this representation of trk(ρn+k) and the triangle inequality, the
distance δ defined by (4.9) can be bounded by
δ ≤
∫
S1(H)
∥∥ρ|θ〉n − P |θ〉ρ|θ〉n P |θ〉∥∥1 ω(|θ〉) .
Because the operators P |θ〉 are projectors, we can apply Lemma A.2.8 to
bound the distance between ρ
|θ〉
n and P |θ〉ρ
|θ〉
n P |θ〉, which gives
δ ≤ 2
∫
S1(H)
√
tr(ρ
|θ〉
n )
√
tr(ρ
|θ〉
n )− tr(P |θ〉ρ|θ〉n )ω(|θ〉) .
To bound the integral on the right hand side, we use the Cauchy-Schwartz in-
equality for the scalar product defined by 〈f |g〉 := ∫S1(H) f(|θ〉)g(|θ〉)ω(|θ〉),
i.e.,
δ ≤ 2
√∫
S1(H)
tr(ρ
|θ〉
n )ω(|θ〉)
√∫
S1(H)
(
tr(ρ
|θ〉
n )− tr(P |θ〉ρ|θ〉n )
)
ω(|θ〉) .
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Because of (4.11), the first integral on the right hand side equals tr(ρn+k) =
1, that is,
δ ≤ 2
√∫
S1(H)
(
tr(ρ
|θ〉
n )− tr(P |θ〉ρ|θ〉n )
)
ω(|θ〉) . (4.12)
Let P¯ |θ〉 be the projector orthogonal to P |θ〉, i.e., P¯ |θ〉 := idSym(H⊗n) − P |θ〉.
With (4.10), the term in the integral can be rewritten as
tr(ρ|θ〉n )− tr(P |θ〉ρ|θ〉n ) = tr(P¯ |θ〉ρ|θ〉n )
=
(k+d−1
k
) · tr(P¯ |θ〉 ⊗ (|θ〉〈θ|)⊗k · |Ψ〉〈Ψ|) . (4.13)
Let |θ〉 ∈ H be fixed and let {|x〉}x∈X be an orthonormal basis of H
with |x¯〉 = |θ〉, for some x¯ ∈ X . Moreover, for all frequency distributions
Q ∈ QXn and Q¯ ∈ QXn+k, let |ΘQn 〉 and |Θ¯Q¯n+k〉 be the vectors in Sym(H⊗n)
and Sym(H⊗n+k), respectively, defined by (4.1).
According to Lemma 4.1.5, the family of vectors |ΘQn 〉, for all Q ∈ QXn , is
an orthonormal basis of Sym(H⊗n). Moreover, the subfamily where Q(x¯) ≥
n−r
n is a basis of Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r). Consequently, the projector P¯ |θ〉 on
the space orthogonal to Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r) can be written as
P¯ |θ〉 =
∑
Q:Q(x¯)<n−r
n
|ΘQn 〉〈ΘQn | .
Identity (4.13) then reads
tr(ρ|θ〉n )− tr(P |θ〉ρ|θ〉n ) =
(k+d−1
k
) ∑
Q:Q(x¯)<n−r
n
∣∣∣(〈ΘQn | ⊗ 〈θ|⊗k) · |Ψ〉∣∣∣2 . (4.14)
Because the family of vectors |Θ¯Q¯n+k〉, for Q¯ ∈ QXn+k, is a basis of the
symmetric subspace Sym(H⊗n+k) (see again Lemma 4.1.5) there exist coef-
ficients αQ¯ such that
|Ψ〉 =
∑
Q¯
αQ¯|Θ¯Q¯n+k〉 , (4.15)
where the sum runs over all Q¯ ∈ QXn+k.
It is easy to verify that, for any Q ∈ QXn and Q¯ ∈ QXn+k, the scalar
product (〈ΘQn | ⊗ 〈θ|⊗k) · |Θ¯Q¯n+k〉 equals zero unless
(n+ k)Q¯(x) =
{
nQ(x) + k if x = x¯
nQ(x) otherwise
(4.16)
holds for all x ∈ X , in which case
(〈ΘQn | ⊗ 〈θ|⊗k) · |Θ¯Q¯n+k〉 =
√√√√√ n!∏x(nQ(x))!
(n+k)!∏
x((n+k)Q¯(x))!
=
√
n!(nQ(x¯) + k)!
(n+ k)!(nQ(x¯))!
. (4.17)
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Let Q ∈ QXn with Q(x¯) < n−rn and let Q¯ ∈ QXn+k such that (4.16) holds.
Then, from (4.15) and (4.17),∣∣∣(〈ΘQn | ⊗ 〈θ|⊗k) · |Ψ〉∣∣∣2 = |αQ¯|2 n!(nQ(x¯) + k)!(n+ k)!(nQ(x¯))! ≤ |αQ¯|2Dn,k,r
where Dn,k,r :=
n!(n+k−r−1)!
(n+k)!(n−r−1)! . Note that Q(x¯) <
n−r
n implies Q¯(x¯) <
n+k−r
n+k . Consequently, from (4.14),
tr(ρ|θ〉n )−tr(P |θ〉ρ|θ〉n ) ≤
(k+d−1
k
) ·Dn,k,r ∑
Q¯: Q¯(x¯)<n+k−r
n+k
|αQ¯|2 ≤
(k+d−1
k
)·Dn,k,r ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that
∑
Q¯ |αQ¯|2 = ‖|Ψ〉‖2 =
tr(ρn+k) = 1. The term Dn,k,r can be bounded by
Dn,k,r =
(n − r)(n− r + 1) · · · (n+ k − r − 1)
(n + 1)(n+ 2) · · · (n+ k)
≤
(
n+ k − r − 1
n+ k
)k
=
(
1− r + 1
n+ k
)k
.
Defining β := r+1n+k and using the fact that, for any β ∈ [0, 1], (1−β)1/β ≤ e−1,
we find
Dn,k,r ≤ (1− β)k =
(
(1− β)1/β
)βk
≤ e−βk .
Finally, because for any k ≥ 2 (note that, for k < 2, the assertion is trivial)(k+d−1
k
) ≤ kd, we have
tr(ρ|θ〉n )− tr(P |θ〉ρ|θ〉n ) ≤ kde−k
r+1
n+k .
Inserting this into (4.12), the bound (4.9) follows because ω(|θ〉) is a prob-
ability measure on S1(H).
If the symmetric state ρn+k on Sym(H⊗n+k) has some additional struc-
ture then the set of states that contribute to the mixture in the expression of
Theorem 4.3.2 can be restricted. Remark 4.3.3 below treats the case where
the subspaces H = HA ⊗ HB are bipartite systems and where the partial
state on H⊗n+kA has product form.
Remark 4.3.3. Let H := HA ⊗ HB be a bipartite Hilbert space, let
ρAn+kBn+k be a pure density operator on Sym(H⊗n) such that ρAn+k =
σ⊗n+kA , let 0 ≤ r ≤ n, and let ν be the measure defined by Theorem 4.3.2.
Then, for any δ ≥ 0, the set
Γδ :=
{|θ〉 ∈ S1(H) : ‖trB(|θ〉〈θ|)− σA‖1 > δ}
has at most weight ν(Γδ) ≤ e− 14kδ2+dim(H) lnk.
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Proof. Let |Ψ〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗n+k) and ρ|θ〉n ∈ P(Sym(H⊗n)) as defined in the
proof of Theorem 4.3.2. It then suffices to show that∫
Γδ
tr(ρ|θ〉n )ω(|θ〉) ≤ e−
1
4
kδ2+d lnk , (4.18)
where ω is the uniform probability measure on the unit sphere S1(H) and
d := dim(H).
Let |θ〉 ∈ Γδ be fixed, i.e., ‖trB(|θ〉〈θ|)− σA‖1 > δ. Then, by (4.10),
tr(ρ|θ〉n ) =
(k+d−1
k
) · tr(id⊗nH ⊗ (|θ〉〈θ|)⊗k · |Ψ〉〈Ψ|)
=
(k+d−1
k
) · tr((|θ〉〈θ|)⊗k · ρAkBk) ,
where ρAkBk := trn(ρAn+kBn+k) = trn(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|). Since the fidelity cannot
decrease when taking the partial trace (cf. Lemma A.1.5) we get
tr
(
(|θ〉〈θ|)⊗kρAkBk
)
= F
(
ρAkBk , (|θ〉〈θ|)⊗k
)2
≤ F (ρAk , trB(|θ〉〈θ|)⊗k)2
= F
(
σ⊗kA , trB(|θ〉〈θ|)⊗k
)2
= F
(
σA, trB(|θ〉〈θ|)
)2k
.
Because, by Lemma A.2.4,
F
(
σA, trB(|θ〉〈θ|)
)2 ≤ 1− 1
4
∥∥σA − trB(|θ〉〈θ|)∥∥21 < 1− δ24 ,
we conclude
tr(ρ|θ〉n ) ≤
(
k+d−1
k
) · (1− δ2
4
)k ≤ kdek ln(1− δ24 ) ≤ e− 14kδ2+d ln k ,
where we have used ln(1 − a) ≤ −a, for a ∈ [0, 1]. Inequality (4.18) then
follows because ω is a probability measure.
4.4 Smooth min-entropy of symmetric states
Let |θ〉 ∈ H, let E be a quantum operation from H to HX ⊗HB , and define
ρXnBn := E⊗n(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|), for |Ψ〉 := |θ〉⊗n. Obviously, ρXnBn has product
form, i.e., ρXnBn = σ
⊗n
XB, where σXB = E(|θ〉〈θ|). Hence, as demonstrated
in Section 3.3 (Corollary 3.3.7), the smooth min-entropy of such a product
state can be expressed in terms of the von Neumann entropy, that is,
1
n
Hmin(ρXnBn |Bn) ' H(σXB)−H(σB) . (4.19)
Theorem 4.4.1 below states that this still holds if the product state |Ψ〉 :=
|θ〉⊗n is replaced by a state in the symmetric subspace of H⊗n along |θ〉⊗n−r,
for some r ≪ n.
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Theorem 4.4.1. Let 0 ≤ r ≤ 12n, let |θ〉 ∈ H and |Ψ〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r)
be normalized, and let E be a trace-preserving CPM from H to HX ⊗ HB
which is classical on HX . Define ρXnBn := E⊗n(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) and σXB :=
E(|θ〉〈θ|). Then, for any ε ≥ 0,
1
n
Hεmin(ρXnBn |Bn) ≥ H(σXB)−H(σB)− δ ,
where δ :=
(
5
2Hmax(ρX) + 4
)√2 log(4/ε)
n + h(r/n).
Proof. According to Lemma 4.1.6, there exists a family {|Ψs〉}s∈S of or-
thonormal vectors from V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r) of size |S| ≤ 2nh(r/n) such that
|Ψ〉 =
∑
s∈S
γs|Ψs〉 , (4.20)
where γs are coefficients with
∑
s∈S |γs|2 = 1.
Let {Ew}w∈W be the family of operators from H to HX⊗HB defined by
the CPM E , i.e., E(σ) =∑w∈W EwσE†w, for any operator σ on H. Moreover,
let HW be a Hilbert space with orthonormal basis {|w〉}w∈W and let U be
the operator from H to HX ⊗HB ⊗HW defined by
U :=
∑
w∈W
Ew ⊗ |w〉 .
Because E is trace-preserving, i.e., ∑w E†wEw = idH, we have U †U = idH,
that is, U is unitary. Furthermore, for any operator σ on H,
trW (UσU
†) = E(σ) . (4.21)
Let |Φ〉 := U⊗n|Ψ〉 and, similarly, for any s ∈ S, let |Φs〉 := U⊗n|Ψs〉.
Then, using (4.20),
|Φ〉 =
∑
s∈S
γs|Φs〉 .
Because U is unitary and the vectors |Ψs〉 are orthonormal, the vectors |Φs〉
are orthonormal as well. Moreover, using (4.21),
ρXnBn = E⊗n(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) = trWn(U⊗n|Ψ〉〈Ψ|(U †)⊗n) = trWn(|Φ〉〈Φ|) .
Let ρ˜sXnBn := trWn(|Φs〉〈Φs|) and define the operator ρ˜XnBnS on H⊗nX ⊗
H⊗nB ⊗HS by
ρ˜XnBnS :=
∑
s∈S
|γs|2ρ˜sXnBn ⊗ |s〉〈s| ,
where HS is a Hilbert space with orthonormal basis {|s〉}s∈S . Lemma 3.2.11
then allows us to express the smooth min-entropy of ρXnBn in terms of the
smooth min-entropy of ρ˜XnBnS . Moreover, by Lemma 3.2.8, the smooth
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min-entropy of ρ˜XnBnS is lower bounded by the min-entropy of the operators
ρ˜sXnBn , that is,
Hεmin(ρXnBn |ρ˜Bn) ≥ H ε˜min(ρ˜XnBnS |ρ˜BnS)−Hmax(ρ˜S)
≥ min
s∈S
H ε˜min(ρ˜
s
XnBn |ρ˜sBn)−Hmax(ρ˜S) ,
where ε˜ = ε
2
6|S| . Using the fact that |S| ≤ 2nh(r/n), we find
Hεmin(ρXnBn |ρ˜Bn) ≥ min
s∈S
H ε˜min(ρ˜
s
XnBn |ρ˜sBn)− nh(r/n) (4.22)
and
log(1/ε˜) ≤ log(2/ε) + log 6 + nh(r/n) . (4.23)
Let us now compute the min-entropies of the operators ρ˜sXnBn , for s ∈
S. Since |Ψs〉 ∈ V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r), the vector |Ψs〉, after some appropriate
reordering of the subsystems, has the form |Ψs〉 = |θ〉⊗n−r ⊗ |Ψˆs〉, for some
|Ψˆs〉 ∈ H⊗r. Hence, the same holds for the vector |Φs〉, i.e.,
|Φs〉 = U⊗n|Ψs〉 = (U |θ〉)⊗n−r ⊗ U⊗r|Ψˆs〉 .
Consequently, from (4.21) and the definition of σXB,
ρ˜sXnBn =
(
trW (U |θ〉〈θ|U †)
)⊗n−r ⊗ trW r(U⊗r|Ψˆs〉〈Ψˆs|(U †)⊗r)
= σ⊗n−rXB ⊗ ρˆsXrBr ,
where ρˆsXrBr := E⊗r(|Ψˆs〉〈Ψˆs|). Because E is classical on HX , ρˆXrBr is
also classical on H⊗rX . Using the superadditivity of the smooth min-entropy
(Lemma 3.2.6) and the fact that the min-entropy of a classical subsystem
cannot be negative (Lemma 3.1.9) we find
H ε˜min(ρ˜
s
XnBn |ρ˜sBn) ≥ H ε˜min
(
σ⊗n−rXB
∣∣σ⊗n−rB )+Hmin(ρˆsXrBr |ρˆBr )
≥ H ε˜min
(
σ⊗n−rXB
∣∣σ⊗n−rB ) . (4.24)
Furthermore, because σXB is classical on HX , we can use Corollary 3.3.7
to bound the smooth min-entropy of the product state in terms of the von
Neumann entropy,
H ε˜min
(
σ⊗n−rXB
∣∣σ⊗n−rB ) ≥ (n− r)(H(σXB)−H(σB)− δ′)
≥ n(H(σXB)−H(σB))− rHmax(ρX)− (n− r)δ′
with δ′ :=
(
2Hmax(ρX)+ 3
)√ log(1/ε˜)+1
n−r . Together with (4.22) and (4.24) we
conclude
1
n
Hεmin(ρXnBn |ρ˜Bn) ≥ H(σXB)−H(σB)−h(r/n)−r/nHmax(ρX)−
n− r
n
·δ′ .
(4.25)
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Moreover, from (4.23),
√
n− r · δ′ ≤ (2Hmax(ρX) + 3)√log(2/ε) + nh(r/n) + log 6 + 1 ,
and hence, using the fact that c ≤ √c, for any c ≤ 1,
n− r
n
· δ′ ≤
√
n− r
n
· δ′ ≤ (2Hmax(ρX) + 3)
√
log(2/ε) + 4
n
+ h(r/n) .
Finally, because 2rn ≤ h(r/n) and h(r/n) ≤
√
h(r/n), we find
h(r/n) +
r
n
Hmax(ρX) +
n− r
n
· δ′
≤ (5
2
Hmax(ρX) + 4
)√2 log(2/ε) + 4
n
+ h(r/n) .
Inserting this into (4.25) concludes the proof.
4.5 Statistics of symmetric states
Let z1, . . . , zn be the outcomes of n independent measurements of a state
|θ〉 ∈ H with respect to a POVMM = {Mz}z∈Z . The law of large numbers
tells us that, for large n, the statistics λz of the n-tuple z = (z1, . . . , zn) is
close to the probability distribution PZ defined by PZ(z) := tr(Mz|θ〉〈θ|),
for z ∈ Z. Theorem 4.5.2 below states that the same is true if the n-tuple
z is the outcome of a product measurement M⊗n applied to a state |Ψ〉 of
the symmetric subspace of H⊗n along |θ〉⊗n−r, for some small r ≪ n.
For the proof of this result, we need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 4.5.1. Let |ψ〉 =∑x∈X |ψx〉 and let ρ ∈ P(H). Then
〈ψ|ρ|ψ〉 ≤ |X |
∑
x∈X
〈ψx|ρ|ψx〉 .
Proof. Let ρ =
∑
y∈Y py|y〉〈y| be a spectral decomposition of ρ. For any
y ∈ Y,
|〈y|ψ〉|2 = ∣∣∑
x∈X
〈y|ψx〉∣∣2 ≤ (∑
x∈X
|〈y|ψx〉|)2 ≤ |X |∑
x∈X
|〈y|ψx〉|2 ,
where we have used the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality in the last step. Con-
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sequently,
〈ψ|ρ|ψ〉 =
∑
y∈Y
py|〈y|ψ〉|2
≤ |X |
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
py|〈y|ψx〉|2
= |X |
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
py〈ψx|y〉〈y|ψx〉
= |X |
∑
x∈X
〈ψx|ρ|ψx〉 .
Theorem 4.5.2. Let 0 ≤ r ≤ 12n, let |θ〉 ∈ H and |Ψ〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r)
be normalized, let M = {Mz}z∈Z be a POVM on H, and let PZ be the
probability distribution of the outcomes of the measurement M applied to
|θ〉〈θ|. Then
Pr
z
[
‖λz − PZ‖1 > 2
√
log(1/ε)
n
+ h(r/n) +
|Z|
n
log(
n
2
+ 1)
]
≤ ε ,
where the probability is taken over the outcomes z = (z1, . . . , zn) of the
product measurement M⊗n applied to |Ψ〉〈Ψ|.
Proof. According to Lemma 4.1.6, the vector |Ψ〉 can be written as a super-
position of orthonormal vectors |Ψs〉 ∈ V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r), that is,
|Ψ〉 =
∑
s∈S
γs|Ψs〉 , (4.26)
where S is a set of size |S| ≤ 2nh( rn ) and where γs are coefficients such that∑
s∈S |γs|2 = 1.
Let now s ∈ S be fixed. Because |Ψs〉 ∈ V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r), there exists
a permutation π which maps |Ψs〉 to a vector which, on the first n − r
subsystems, has the form |θ〉⊗n−r. We can thus assume without loss of
generality that |Ψs〉 = |θ〉⊗n−r ⊗ |Ψˆ〉, for some |Ψˆ〉 ∈ H⊗r.
Let z = (z1, . . . , zn) be the outcome of the measurementM⊗n applied to
|Ψs〉〈Ψs| and define z′ := (z1, . . . , zn−r) and z′′ := (zn−r+1, . . . , zn). Clearly,
z′ is distributed according to the product distribution Pn−rZ . Hence, with
high probability, z′ is a typical sequence, that is, by Corollary B.3.3,
Pr
z′
[
‖λz′ − PZ‖1 >
√
2(ln 2)
(
δ +
|Z| log(n− r + 1)
n− r
)] ≤ 2−(n−r)δ , (4.27)
for any δ ≥ 0. Moreover, because λz = n−rn λz′ + rnλz′′ , we can apply the
triangle inequality which gives
∥∥λz − PZ∥∥1 ≤ n− rn
∥∥λz′ − PZ∥∥1 + rn
∥∥λz′′ − PZ∥∥1 ≤ ∥∥λz′ − PZ∥∥1 + rn .
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Using this inequality and the assumption r ≤ 12n, (4.27) implies that
Pr
z←|Ψs〉
[z ∈ Wδ] ≤ 2−
nδ
2 , (4.28)
where we write z ← |Ψs〉 to indicate that z is distributed according to the
outcomes of the measurement applied to |Ψs〉 and where Wδ is the subset
of Zn defined by
Wδ :=
{
z ∈ Zn : ‖λz − PZ‖1 >
√
2(ln 2)
(
δ +
2|Z|
n
log(
n
2
+ 1)
)
+
r
n
}
.
Let Mz := Mz1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Mzn , for z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Zn, be the linear
operators defined by the POVM M⊗n. Then, using Lemma 4.5.1, (4.26),
and (4.28) we get
Pr
z←|Ψ〉
[z ∈ Wδ] =
∑
z∈Wδ
〈Ψ|Mz|Ψ〉
≤
∑
z∈Wδ
|S|
∑
s∈S
|γs|2〈Ψs|Mz|Ψs〉
= |S|
∑
s∈S
|γs|2 Pr
z←|Ψs〉
[z ∈ Wδ]
≤ 2nh(r/n)2−nδ2
= 2−n(
δ
2
−h(r/n)) .
Hence, with δ := 2 log(1/ε)n + 2h(r/n),
Pr
z
[
‖λz − PZ‖1 >
√
4(ln 2)
( log(1/ε)
n
+ h(r/n) +
|Z|
n
log(
n
2
+ 1)
)
+
r
n
]
≤ ε .
The assertion then follows from the fact that
√
c + rn ≤
√
c+ 2rn , for any
c ≥ 0 with c+ 2rn ≤ 1, and from 2rn ≤ h(r/n).
Chapter 5
Privacy Amplification
A fundamental problem in cryptography is to distill a secret key from only
partially secret data, on which an adversary might have information encoded
into the state of a quantum system. In this chapter, we propose a general
solution to this problem, which is called privacy amplification: We show that
the key computed as the output of a hash function (chosen at random from
a two-universal1 family of functions) is secure under the sole condition that
its length is smaller than the adversary’s uncertainty on the input, measured
in terms of (smooth) min-entropy.
We start with the derivation of various technical results (Sections 5.1–
5.4). These are used for the proof of the main statement, which is first
formulated in terms of min-entropy (Section 5.5) and then generalized to
smooth min-entropy (Section 5.6).
5.1 Bounding the norm of hermitian operators
In this section, we derive an upper bound on the trace norm for hermitian
operators (Lemma 5.1.3). The bound only involves matrix multiplications,
which makes it easy to evaluate.
Lemma 5.1.1. Let S and T be hermitian operators on H. Then
tr(ST ) ≤
√
tr(S2)tr(T 2) .
Proof. Let S =
∑
y∈Y βy|y〉〈y| and T =
∑
z∈Z γz|z〉〈z| be spectral decom-
positions of S and T , respectively. With the definition ay,z := |〈y|z〉|2, we
have
tr(ST ) =
∑
y,z
βyγztr
(|y〉〈y| · |z〉〈z|) =∑
y,z
βyγzay,z .
1See Section 5.4 for a definition.
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On the other hand, tr(S2) =
∑
y β
2
y and tr(T
2) =
∑
z γ
2
z . It thus suffices to
show that ∑
y,z
βyγzay,z ≤
√(∑
y
β2y
)(∑
z
γ2z
)
. (5.1)
It is easy to verify that (ay,z)y∈Y ,z∈Z is a bistochastic matrix. Hence,
according to Birkhoff’s theorem (cf. Theorem B.2.2) there exist nonnegative
coefficients µπ parameterized by the bijections π from Z to Y such that∑
π µπ = 1 and, for any y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z, ay,z =
∑
π µπδy,π(z). We thus have∑
y,z
βyγzay,z =
∑
π
µπ
∑
y,z
βyγzδy,π(z) . (5.2)
Furthermore, by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, for any fixed bijec-
tion π, ∑
z
βπ(z)γz ≤
√(∑
z
β2π(z)
)(∑
z
γ2z
)
.
This can be rewritten as∑
y,z
βyγzδy,π(z) ≤
√(∑
y
β2y
)(∑
z
γ2z
)
.
Inserting this into (5.2) implies (5.1) and thus concludes the proof.
Lemma 5.1.2. Let S be a hermitian operator on H and let σ be a nonneg-
ative operator on H. Then
tr|√σS√σ| ≤
√
tr(S2)tr(σ2) .
Proof. Let {|v〉}v∈V be an eigenbasis of
√
σS
√
σ and let S =
∑
x∈X αx|x〉〈x|
be a spectral decomposition of S. Then
tr|√σS√σ| =
∑
v
∣∣〈v|√σS√σ|v〉∣∣
=
∑
v
∣∣∑
x
αx〈v|
√
σ|x〉〈x|√σ|v〉∣∣
≤
∑
v
∑
x
|αx|〈v|
√
σ|x〉〈x|√σ|v〉
=
∑
v
〈v|√σ|S|√σ|v〉
= tr(
√
σ|S|√σ) .
Furthermore, by Lemma 5.1.1,
tr(
√
σ|S|√σ) = tr(|S|σ) ≤
√
tr(|S|2)tr(σ2) =
√
tr(S2)tr(σ2) ,
which concludes the proof.
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Lemma 5.1.3. Let S be a hermitian operator on H and let σ be a nonneg-
ative operator on H. Then
‖S‖1 ≤
√
tr(σ)tr(Sσ−1/2Sσ−1/2) .
Proof. The assertion follows directly from Lemma 5.1.2 with σ¯ :=
√
σ and
S¯ := σ¯−1/2Sσ¯−1/2, that is, σ = σ¯2 and S =
√
σ¯S¯
√
σ¯.
5.2 Distance from uniform
According to the discussion on universal security in Section 2.2.2, the se-
curity of a key is defined with respect to its L1-distance from a perfect
key which is uniformly distributed and independent of the adversary’s state
(see (2.6)). This motivates the following definition.
Definition 5.2.1. Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB). Then the L1-distance from
uniform of ρAB given B is
d(ρAB |B) :=
∥∥ρAB − ρU ⊗ ρB∥∥1 ,
where ρU :=
1
dim(HA) idA is the fully mixed state on HA.
For an operator ρXZ defined by a classical probability distribution PXZ ,
d(ρXZ |Z) is the expectation (over z chosen according to PZ) of the L1-
distance between the conditional distribution PX|Z=z and the uniform dis-
tribution. This property is generalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2.2. Let ρABZ be classical with respect to an orthonormal ba-
sis {|z〉}z∈Z of HZ and let ρzAB, for z ∈ Z, be the corresponding (non-
normalized) conditional operators. Then
d(ρABZ |BZ) =
∑
z∈Z
d(ρzAB |B) .
Proof. Let ρU be the fully mixed state on HA. Then, by Lemma A.2.2,
d(ρABZ |BZ) = ‖ρABZ − ρU ⊗ ρBZ‖1
=
∑
z∈Z
‖ρzAB − ρU ⊗ ρzB‖1
=
∑
z∈X
d(ρzAB |B) .
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To derive our result on the security of privacy amplification, it is con-
venient to consider an alternative measure for the distance from uniform.
Let ρAB ∈ P(HAB) and σB ∈ P(HB). The (conditional) L2-distance from
uniform of ρAB relative to σB is defined by
d2(ρAB |σB) := tr
((
(ρAB − ρU ⊗ ρB)(idA ⊗ σ−1/2B )
)2)
,
where ρU is the fully mixed state on HA. Note that d2(ρAB |σB) can equiv-
alently be written as
d2(ρAB |σB) = tr
((
(idA ⊗ σ−1/4B )(ρAB − ρU ⊗ ρB)(idA ⊗ σ−1/4B )
)2)
, (5.3)
which proves that d2(ρAB |σB) cannot be negative.
The L2-distance from uniform can be used to bound the L1-distance
from uniform.
Lemma 5.2.3. Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB). Then, for any σB ∈ P(HB),
d(ρAB |B) ≤
√
dim(HA)tr(σB)d2(ρAB |σB) .
Proof. The assertion follows directly from Lemma 5.1.3 with S := ρAB −
ρU ⊗ ρB and σ := idA ⊗ σB , where ρU is the fully mixed state on HA.
The following lemma provides an expression for the L2-distance from
uniform for the case where the first subsystem is classical.
Lemma 5.2.4. Let ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB) be classical with respect to an
orthonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X of HX , let ρxB, for x ∈ X , be the corresponding
(non-normalized) conditional operators, and let σ ∈ P(HB). Then
d2(ρXB |σB) =
∑
x
tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρ
x
Bσ
−1/4
B )
2
)− 1|X |tr((σ−1/4B ρBσ−1/4B )2) .
Proof. Let ρU be the fully mixed state on HX . Because ρXB is classical on
HX , we have
ρXB − ρU ⊗ ρB =
∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗ (ρxB −
1
|X |ρB) ,
and thus
(idX ⊗ σ−1/4B )(ρXB − ρU ⊗ ρB)(idX ⊗ σ−1/4B )
=
∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗
(
σ
−1/4
B ρ
x
Bσ
−1/4
B −
1
|X |σ
−1/4
B ρBσ
−1/4
B
)
.
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Hence, since {|x〉}x∈X is an orthonormal basis,
tr
((
(idX ⊗ σ−1/4B )(ρXB − ρU ⊗ ρB)(idX ⊗ σ−1/4B )
)2)
=
∑
x
tr
((
σ
−1/4
B ρ
x
Bσ
−1/4
B −
1
|X |σ
−1/4
B ρBσ
−1/4
B
)2)
=
∑
x
tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρ
x
Bσ
−1/4
B )
2
)− 1|X | tr((σ−1/4B ρBσ−1/4B )2) ,
where the second equality holds because
∑
x ρ
x
B = ρB. The assertion then
follows from (5.3).
5.3 Collision entropy
Definition 5.3.1 below can be seen as a generalization of the well-known
classical (conditional) collision entropy to quantum states.
Definition 5.3.1. Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB) and σB ∈ P(HB). Then the
collision entropy of ρAB relative to σB is
H2(ρAB |σB) := − log 1
tr(ρAB)
tr
((
ρAB(idA ⊗ σ−1/2B )
)2)
.
Remark 5.3.2. It follows immediately from Lemma B.5.3 that
Hmin(ρAB |σB) ≤ H2(ρAB |σB) .
Remark 5.3.3. If ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB) is classical with respect to an or-
thonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X of HX such that the (non-normalized) conditional
operators ρxB on HB, for x ∈ X , are orthogonal then
2−H2(ρXB |σB) =
1
tr(ρXB)
∑
x
tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρ
x
Bσ
−1/4
B )
2
)
.
5.4 Two-universal hashing
Definition 5.4.1. Let F be a family of functions from X to Z and let PF be
a probability distribution on F . The pair (F , PF ) is called two-universal if
Prf [f(x) = f(x
′)] ≤ 1|Z| , for any distinct x, x′ ∈ X and f chosen at random
from F according to the distribution PF .
In accordance with the standard literature on two-universal hashing,
we will, for simplicity, assume that PF is the uniform distribution on F .
In particular, the family F is said to be two-universal if (F , PF ), for PF
uniform, is two-universal. It is, however, easy to see that all statements
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proven below also hold with respect to the general definition where PF is
arbitrary.
We will use the following lemma on the existence of two-universal func-
tion families.
Lemma 5.4.2. Let 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ n. Then there exists a two-universal family of
hash functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ.
Proof. For the proof of this statement we refer to [CW79] or [WC81], where
explicit constructions of hash function families are given.
Consider an operator ρXB which is classical with respect to an orthonor-
mal basis {|x〉}x∈X of HX and assume that f is a function from X to Z.
The density operator describing the classical function output together with
the quantum system HB is then given by
ρf(X)B :=
∑
z∈Z
|z〉〈z| ⊗ ρzB for ρzB :=
∑
x∈f−1(z)
ρxB , (5.4)
where {|z〉}z∈Z is an orthonormal basis of HZ .
Assume now that the function f is randomly chosen from a family of
functions F according to a probability distribution PF . The function output
f(x), the state of the quantum system, and the choice of the function f is
then described by the operator
ρF (X)BF :=
∑
f∈F
PF (f)ρf(X)B ⊗ |f〉〈f | (5.5)
on HZ ⊗ HB ⊗ HF , where HF is a Hilbert space with orthonormal basis
{|f〉}f∈F .
The following lemma provides an upper bound on the expected L2-
distance from uniform of a key computed by two-universal hashing.
Lemma 5.4.3. Let ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB) be classical on HX , let σB ∈
P(HB), and let F be a two-universal family of hash functions from X to Z.
Then
E
f
[
d2(ρf(X)B |σB)
]
≤ tr(ρXB)2−H2(ρXB |σB),
for ρf(X)B ∈ P(HZ ⊗HB) defined by (5.4) and f chosen uniformly from F .
Proof. Since ρf(X)B is classical on HZ , we have, according to Lemma 5.2.4,
d2(ρf(X)B |σB) =
∑
z
tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρ
z
Bσ
−1/4
B )
2
)− 1|Z| tr((σ−1/4B ρBσ−1/4B )2) ,
(5.6)
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where ρzB , for z ∈ Z, are the conditional operators defined by (5.4). The
first term on the right hand side of (5.6) can be rewritten as
∑
z
tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρ
z
Bσ
−1/4
B )
2
)
=
∑
z
∑
x∈f−1(z)
x′∈f−1(z)
tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρ
x
Bσ
−1/4
B )(σ
−1/4
B ρ
x′
Bσ
−1/4
B )
)
=
∑
x,x′
δf(x),f(x′)tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρ
x
Bσ
−1/4
B )(σ
−1/4
B ρ
x′
Bσ
−1/4
B )
)
.
Similarly, for the second term of (5.6) we find
1
|Z| tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρBσ
−1/4
B )
2
)
=
∑
x,x′
1
|Z| tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρ
x
Bσ
−1/4
B )(σ
−1/4
B ρ
x′
Bσ
−1/4
B )
)
.
Hence,
E
f
[
d2(ρf(X)B |σB)
]
=
∑
x,x′
E
f
[
δf(x),f(x′) −
1
|Z|
] · tr((σ−1/4B ρxBσ−1/4B )(σ−1/4B ρx′Bσ−1/4B )) . (5.7)
Because f is chosen at random from a two-universal family of hash functions
from X to Z, we have, for any x 6= x′,
E
f
[
δf(x),f(x′) −
1
|Z|
]
= Pr
f
[f(x) = f(x′)]− 1|Z| ≤ 0 ,
Since the trace tr(σσ′) of two nonnegative operators σ, σ′ ∈ P(H) cannot be
negative (cf. Lemma B.5.2) the trace on the right hand side of (5.7) cannot
be negative, for any x, x′ ∈ X . Consequently, when omitting all terms with
x 6= x′, the sum can only get larger, that is,
E
f
[
d2(ρf(X)B |σB)
]
≤
∑
x
tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρ
x
Bσ
−1/4
B )
2
)
.
The assertion then follows from Remark 5.3.3.
5.5 Security of privacy amplification
We are now ready to state our main result on privacy amplification in the
context of quantum adversaries. Let X be a string and assume that an
adversary controls a quantum system HB whose state is correlated with X.
Theorem 5.5.1 provides a bound on the security of a key f(X) computed
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from X by two-universal hashing. The bound only depends on the un-
certainty of the adversary on X, measured in terms of collision entropy,
min-entropy (cf. Corollary 5.5.2), or smooth min-entropy (Corollary 5.6.1),
where the latter is (nearly) optimal (see Section 5.6).
Theorem 5.5.1. Let ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB) be classical with respect to an
orthonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X of HX , let σB ∈ P(HB), and let F be a two-
universal family of hash function from X to {0, 1}ℓ. Then
d(ρF (X)BF |BF ) ≤
√
tr(ρXB) · tr(σB) · 2−
1
2
(H2(ρXB |σB)−ℓ) ,
for ρF (X)BF ∈ P(HZ ⊗HB ⊗HF ) defined by (5.5).
Proof. We use Lemma 5.2.2 to write the L1-distance from uniform as an
expectation value,
d(ρF (X)BF |BF ) =
∑
f∈F
PF (f) · d(ρf(X)B |B) = E
f
[
d(ρf(X)B |B)
]
.
With Lemma 5.2.3, the term in the expectation can be bounded in terms of
the L2-distance from uniform, that is, for any σB ∈ P(HB),
d(ρF (X)BF |BF ) ≤
√
2ℓ tr(σB)E
f
[√
d2(ρf(X)B |σB)
]
≤
√
2ℓ tr(σB)
√
E
f
[
d2(ρf(X)B |σB)
]
,
where we have used Jensen’s inequality. Finally, we apply Lemma 5.4.3 to
bound the L2-distance from uniform in terms of the collision entropy, which
gives
d(ρF (X)BF |BF ) ≤
√
2ℓ tr(σB)
√
tr(ρXB)2−H2(ρXB |σB) .
Corollary 5.5.2. Let ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB) be classical with respect to an
orthonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X of HX and let F be a two-universal family of
hash functions from X to {0, 1}ℓ. Then
d(ρF (X)BF |BF ) ≤
√
tr(ρXB) · 2− 12 (Hmin(ρXB |B)−ℓ) ,
for ρF (X)BF ∈ P(HZ ⊗HB ⊗HF ) defined by (5.5).
Proof. The assertion follows directly from Theorem 5.5.1 and Remark 5.3.2.
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5.6 Characterization using smooth min-entropy
The characterization of privacy amplification in terms of the collision en-
tropy or min-entropy is not optimal.2 Because of Remark 5.3.2, the same
problem arises if we replace the collision entropy by the min-entropy (as in
Corollary 5.5.2). However, as we shall see, the statement of Theorem 5.5.1
still holds if the uncertainty is measured in terms of smooth min-entropy.
That is, the key generated from X by two-universal hashing is secure if its
length is slightly smaller than roughly Hεmin(ρXB |B), where ρXB is the joint
state of the initial string X and the adversary’s knowledge. This is essen-
tially optimal, i.e., Hεmin(ρXB |B) is also an upper bound on the maximum
number of key bits that can be generated from X.3
Corollary 5.6.1. Let ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB) be a density operator which is
classical with respect to an orthonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X of HX , let F be a
two-universal family of hash functions from X to {0, 1}ℓ, and let ε ≥ 0.
Then
d(ρF (X)BF |BF ) ≤ 2ε+ 2−
1
2
(Hεmin(ρXB |B)−ℓ) ,
for ρF (X)BF ∈ P(HZ ⊗HB ⊗HF ) defined by (5.5).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary operator ρ¯XB ∈ Bε(ρXB) and let ρ¯F (X)BF ∈
P(HZ ⊗HB⊗HF ) be the corresponding operator defined by (5.5). Because
the L1-distance cannot increase when applying a trace-preserving quantum
operation (cf. Lemma A.2.1), we have ρ¯F (X)BF ∈ Bε(ρF (X)BF ). Hence, by
the triangle inequality,
d(ρF (Z)BF |BF ) =
∥∥ρF (X)BF − ρU ⊗ ρBF∥∥1
≤ ∥∥ρF (X)BF − ρ¯F (X)BF ∥∥1 + ∥∥ρ¯F (X)BF − ρU ⊗ ρ¯BF∥∥1 + ∥∥ρ¯BF − ρBF∥∥1
≤ 2ε+ ∥∥ρ¯F (X)BF − ρU ⊗ ρ¯BF∥∥1 = 2ε+ d(ρ¯F (Z)BF |BF ) ,
where ρU is the fully mixed state on HZ . Corollary 5.5.2, applied to ρ¯XB,
gives
d(ρF (X)BF |BF ) ≤ 2ε+
√
tr(ρ¯XB) · 2−
1
2
(Hmin(ρ¯XB |B)−ℓ) .
Because this holds for any ρ¯XB ∈ Bε(ρ¯XB), the assertion follows by the
definition of smooth min-entropy.
2This also holds for the classical result, as observed in [BBCM95]. In fact, depending
on the probability distribution PX of the initial string X, it might be possible to extract
a key whose length exceeds the collision entropy of PX .
3To see this, let F be an arbitrary hash function. It follows from Lemma 3.1.9 that the
smooth min-entropy cannot increase when applying a function on X, i.e., Hεmin(ρXB|B) ≥
Hεmin(ρF (X)BF |BF ). Moreover, it is easy to verify that the smooth min-entropy of a secret
key given the adversary’s information is roughly equal to its length. Hence, if F (X) is a
secret key of length ℓ, we have Hεmin(ρF (X)BF |BF ) ≥ ℓ. Combining this with the above
gives Hεmin(ρXB|B) ≥ ℓ.
Chapter 6
Security of QKD
In this chapter, we use the techniques developed in Chapters 3–5 to prove
the security of QKD.1 (The reader is referred to Section 1.6 for a high-level
description of the material presented in the following, including a sketch
of the security proof.) Typically, a QKD protocol is built from several
subprotocols, e.g., for parameter estimation, information reconciliation, or
privacy amplification. We first describe and analyze these subprotocols (Sec-
tions 6.2–6.4) and then put the parts together to get a general security cri-
terion for quantum key distillation (Section 6.5), which directly implies the
security of quantum key distribution (QKD) (Section 6.6).
6.1 Preliminaries
6.1.1 Two-party protocols
A protocol P between two parties, Alice and Bob, is specified by a sequence
of operations, called (protocol) steps, to be performed by each of the parties.
In the first protocol step, Alice and Bob might take (classical or quantum)
inputs A and B, respectively (e.g., some correlated data). In each of the
following steps, Alice and Bob either perform local computations or ex-
change messages (using a classical or a quantum communication channel).
Finally, in the last protocol step, Alice and Bob generate outputs A′ and B′,
respectively (e.g., a pair of secret keys).
We will mostly (except for Section 6.6) be concerned with the analysis
of protocols P that only use communication over a classical and authentic
channel. In this case, Alice and Bob’s outputs as well as the transcript of the
communication do not depend on the attack of a potential adversary. Let
ρAB and ρA′B′C be the density operators describing Alice and Bob’s inputs
A and B as well as their outputs A′ and B′ together with the communication
1As discussed in Chapter 1, we actually consider quantum key distillation, which is
somewhat more general than quantum key distribution (QKD).
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transcript C, respectively. The mapping that brings ρAB to ρA′B′C , in the
following denoted by EPA′B′C←AB, is then uniquely defined by the protocol
P. Moreover, because it must be physically realizable, EPA′B′C←AB is a CPM
(see Section 2.1.1).
To analyze the security of a protocol P, we need to include Eve’s infor-
mation in our description. Let ρABE be the state of Alice and Bob’s inputs
as well as Eve’s initial information. Similarly, let ρA′B′E′ be the state of
Alice and Bob’s outputs together with Eve’s information after the protocol
execution. As Eve might get a transcript C of the messages sent over the
classical channel, the CPM that maps ρABE to ρA′B′E′ is given by
EPA′B′E′←ABE := EPA′B′C←AB ⊗ idE ,
where HE′ := HC ⊗HE.
6.1.2 Robustness of protocols
Depending on its input, a protocol might be unable to produce the desired
output. For example, if a key distillation protocol starts with uncorrelated
randomness, it cannot generate a pair of secret keys. In this case, the best
we can hope for is that the protocol recognizes this situation and aborts2
(instead of generating an insecure result).
Clearly, one is interested in designing protocols that are successful on
certain inputs. This requirement is captured by the notion of robustness.
Definition 6.1.1. Let P be a two-party protocol and let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗
HB). We say that P is ε-robust on ρAB if, for inputs defined by ρAB , the
probability that the protocol aborts is at most ε.
Mathematically, we represent the state that describes the situation after
an abortion of the protocol as a zero operator. The CPM EPA′B′C←AB (as
defined in Section 6.1.1) is then a projection onto the space that represents
the outputs of successful protocol executions (i.e., where it did not abort).
The probability that the protocol is successful when starting with an initial
state ρAB is thus equal to the trace tr(ρA′B′E) of the operator ρA′B′E =
EPA′B′C←AB(ρAB). In particular, if P is ε-robust on a density operator ρAB
then tr(ρA′B′E) ≥ 1− ε.
6.1.3 Security definition for key distillation
A (quantum) key distillation protocol KD is a two-party protocol with clas-
sical communication where Alice and Bob take inputs from HA and HB,
respectively, and either output classical keys sA, sB ∈ S, where S is called
the key space of KD, or abort the protocol.
2Technically, the protocol might output a certain predefined symbol which indicates
that it is unable to accomplish the task.
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Definition 6.1.2. Let KD be a key distillation protocol and let ρABE ∈
P(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE). We say that KD is ε-secure on ρABE if ρSASBE′ :=
EKDSASBE′←ABE(ρABE) satisfies
1
2
∥∥ρSASBE′ − ρUU ⊗ ρE′∥∥1 ≤ ε ,
where ρUU :=
∑
s∈S
1
|S| |s〉〈s|⊗|s〉〈s|, for some family {|s〉}s∈S of orthonormal
vectors representing the values of the key space S.
Moreover, we say that KD is ε-fully secure if it is ε-secure on all density
operators ρABE ∈ P(HA ⊗HB ⊗HE).
According to the discussion on universal security in Section 2.2.2,3 this
definition has a very intuitive interpretation: If the protocol is ε-fully secure
then, for any arbitrary input, the probability of the event that Alice and
Bob do not abort and the adversary gets information on the key pair4 is at
most ε.5 In other words, except with probability ε, Alice and Bob either
abort or generate a pair of keys which are identical to a perfect key.
Remark 6.1.3. The above security definition for key distillation protocols
KD can be subdivided into two parts:
• ε′-correctness: Pr[sA 6= sB] ≤ ε′,6 for sA and sB chosen according to
the distribution defined by ρSASB .
• ε′′-secrecy of Alice’s key: 12d(ρSACE |CE) ≤ ε′′.7
In particular, if KD is ε′-correct and ε′′-secret on ρXY E then it is (ε′ + ε′′)-
secure on ρXYE .
6.2 Parameter estimation
The purpose of a parameter estimation is to decide whether the input given
to the protocol can be used for a certain task, e.g. to distill a secret key.
Technically, a parameter estimation protocol PE is simply a two-party pro-
tocol where Alice and Bob take inputs from HA and HB, respectively, and
either output “accept” or abort the protocol.
3If a key S is ε-secure, one could define a perfectly secure (independent and uniformly
distributed) key U such that Pr[s 6= u] ≤ ε (see also Proposition 2.1.1).
4According to Footnote 3, one could say that the adversary gets information on a key
S whenever the value of S is not equal to the value of a perfect key U .
5Note that the adversary’s information on the key, conditioned on the event that Al-
ice and Bob generate a key, is not necessarily small. In fact, if, for a certain input,
the probability that Alice and Bob generate a key is very small (e.g., smaller than ε)
then—conditioned on this rare event—the key might be insecure (see also the discussion
in [BBB+05]).
6Pr[sA 6= sB] is the probability of the event that Alice and Bob do not abort and the
generated keys sA and sB are different.
7See Definition 5.2.1.
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Fig. 6.1 Parameter estimation protocol PEM,Q.
Parameters:
M: bipartite POVM {Mw}w∈W on HA ⊗HB
Q: set of frequency distributions on W
Alice Bob
input space: H⊗nA input space: H⊗nB
H⊗nA ff
meas. M⊗n
- H⊗nA
→ w = (w1, . . . , wn)
if λw /∈ Q
then abort
else output “acc.”
Definition 6.2.1. Let PE be a parameter estimation protocol and let ρAB ∈
P(HA ⊗ HB). We say that PE ε-securely filters ρAB if, on input ρAB, the
protocol aborts except with probability ε.
A typical and generic example for parameter estimation is the protocol
PEM,Q depicted in Fig. 6.1. Alice and Bob take inputs from an n-fold
product space. Then they measure each of the n subspaces according to a
POVM M = {Mw}w∈W .8 Finally, they output “accept” if the frequency
distribution λw of the measurement outcomes w = (w1, . . . , wn) is contained
in a certain set Q.
For the analysis of this protocol, it is convenient to consider the set
Γ≤µM,Q of density operators σAB for which the measurement M leads to a
distribution which has distance at most µ to the set Q. Formally,
Γ≤µM,Q :=
{
σAB : min
Q∈Q
‖P σABW −Q‖1 ≤ µ
}
, (6.1)
where P σABW denotes the probability distribution of the outcomes when mea-
suring σAB according to M, i.e., PW (w) = tr(MwσAB), for any w ∈ W.
Assume that the protocol PEM,Q takes as input a product state ρAnBn =
σ⊗nAB. Then, by the law of large numbers, the measurement statistics λw
must be close to M(σAB). In particular, if the protocol accepts with non-
negligible probability (i.e., λw is contained in Q) then σAB is likely to be
contained in Γ≤µM,Q, for some small µ > 0. In other words, the protocol
8M might be an arbitrary measurement that can be performed by two distant parties
connected by a classical channel.
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aborts with high probability if σAB is not an element of the set Γ
≤µ
M,Q. The
following lemma generalizes this statement to permutation-invariant inputs.
Lemma 6.2.2. LetM := {Mw}w∈W be a POVM on HA⊗HB, let Q be a set
of frequency distributions on W, let 0 ≤ r ≤ 12n, and let ε ≥ 0. Moreover,
let |θ〉 ∈ HABE := HA⊗HB ⊗HE and let ρAnBnEn be a density operator on
Sym(H⊗nABE , |θ〉⊗n−r). If trE(|θ〉〈θ|) is not contained in the set Γ≤µM,Q defined
by (6.1), for
µ := 2
√
log(1/ε)
n
+ h(r/n) +
|W|
n
log(
n
2
+ 1) ,
then the protocol PEM,Q defined by Fig. 6.1 ε-securely filters ρAnBn .
Proof. The assertion follows directly from Theorem 4.5.2.
Similarly to (6.1), we can define a set Γ
≥µ
M,Q containing all density oper-
ators σAB for which the measurement M leads to a distribution which has
distance at least µ to the complement of Q. Formally,
Γ
≥µ
M,Q :=
{
σAB : min
Q/∈Q
‖P σABW −Q‖1 ≥ µ
}
. (6.2)
Analogously to the above argument, one can show that the protocol
PEM,Q defined by Fig. 6.1 is ε-robust on product operators σ⊗nAB, for any
σAB ∈ Γ≥µM,Q.
6.3 Information reconciliation
Assume that Alice and Bob hold weakly correlated classical values x and
y, respectively. The purpose of an information reconciliation protocol is to
transform x and y into a pair of fully correlated strings, while leaking only
a minimum amount of information (on the final strings) to an eavesdropper
(see, e.g., [BS94]).
6.3.1 Definition
We focus on information reconciliation schemes where Alice keeps her input
value x and where Bob outputs a guess xˆ for x. Hence, technically, an
information reconciliation protocol IR is a two-party protocol where Alice
and Bob take classical inputs x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, respectively, and where Bob
outputs a classical value xˆ ∈ X or aborts.
Definition 6.3.1. Let PXY ∈ P(X × Y) and let ε ≥ 0. We say that an
information reconciliation protocol IR is ε-secure on PXY if, for inputs x
CHAPTER 6. SECURITY OF QKD 94
and y chosen according to PXY , the probability that Bob’s output xˆ differs
from Alice’s input x is at most ε, i.e., Pr[xˆ 6= x] ≤ ε.9
Moreover, we say that IR is ε-fully secure if it is ε-secure on all probability
distributions PXY ∈ P(X × Y).
The communication transcript of an information reconciliation scheme
IR generally contains useful information on Alice and Bob’s values. If the
communication channel is insecure, this information might be leaked to Eve.
Clearly, in the context of key agreement, one is interested in information
reconciliation schemes for which this leakage is minimal.
Definition 6.3.2. Let IR be an information reconciliation protocol where
Alice and Bob take inputs from X and Y, respectively. Let C be the set of all
possible communication transcripts c and let PC|X=x,Y=y be the distribution
of the transcripts c ∈ C conditioned on inputs (x, y) ∈ X × Y. Then the
leakage of IR is
leakIR := log |C| − inf
x,y
Hmin(PC|X=x,Y=y) ,
where the infimum ranges over all (x, y) ∈ X × Y.
Note that the leakage is independent of the actual distribution PXY of
Alice and Bob’s values.
6.3.2 Information reconciliation with minimum leakage
A typical information reconciliation protocol is the protocol IRXˆ ,F defined
by Fig. 6.2. It is a so-called one-way protocol where only Alice sends mes-
sages to Bob. We show that the leakage of this protocol, for appropriately
chosen parameters, is roughly bounded by the max-entropy of X given Y
(Lemma 6.3.3). This statement can be extended to smooth max-entropy
(Lemma 6.3.4), which turns out to be optimal, i.e., the minimum leakage of
an information reconciliation protocol for PXY is exactly characterized by
Hεmax(X|Y ). In particular, for the special case where the input is chosen ac-
cording to a product distribution, we get an asymptotic expression in terms
of Shannon entropy (Corollary 6.3.5), which corresponds to the Shannon
coding theorem.
Lemma 6.3.3. Let PXY ∈ P(X × Y) and let ε > 0. Then the information
reconciliation protocol IRXˆ ,F defined by Fig. 6.2, for an appropriate choice
of the parameters Xˆ and F , is 0-robust on PXY , ε-fully secure, and has
leakage
leakIR
Xˆ ,F
≤ Hmax(PXY |Y ) + log(2/ε) .
9We denote by Pr[xˆ 6= x] the probability of the event that the protocol does not abort
and xˆ is different from x.
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Fig. 6.2 Information reconciliation protocol IRXˆ ,F .
Parameters:
Xˆ : family of sets Xˆy ⊆ X parameterized by y ∈ Y.
F : family of hash functions from X to Z.
Alice Bob
input: x ∈ X input: y ∈ Y
f ∈R F
z := f(x) -
f, z Dˆ :=
{xˆ ∈ Xˆy : f(xˆ) = z}
if Dˆ 6= ∅
then xˆ ∈R Dˆ
else abort
output xˆ
Proof. Let k := ⌈Hmax(PXY |Y ) + log(1/ε)⌉ and let F be a two-universal
family of hash functions from X to Z := {0, 1}k (which exists according to
Lemma 5.4.2). Furthermore, let Xˆ = {Xˆy}y∈Y be the family of sets defined
by Xˆy := supp(P yX), where supp(P yX) denotes the support of the function
P yX : x 7→ PXY (x, y).
For any pair of inputs x and y and for any communication (f, z) =
(f, f(x)) computed by Alice, Bob can only output a wrong value if the set
Xˆy = supp(P yX) contains an element xˆ 6= x such that f(xˆ) = z. Because f is
chosen uniformly at random from the family of two-universal hash functions
F , we have Prf
[
f(xˆ) = f(x)
] ≤ 1|Z| = 2−k, for any xˆ 6= x. Hence, by the
union bound, for any fixed (x, y) ∈ X × Y,
Pr[xˆ 6= x] ≤ Pr
f
[∃xˆ ∈ supp(P yX) : xˆ 6= x ∧ f(xˆ) = f(x)]
≤ ∣∣supp(P yX)∣∣ · 2−k .
Because, by Remark 3.1.4, maxy′ | supp(P y
′
X )| = 2Hmax(PXY |Y ), we conclude
Pr[xˆ 6= x] ≤ 2Hmax(PXY |Y )−⌈Hmax(PXY |Y )+log(1/ε)⌉ ≤ ε ,
that is, IRXˆ ,F is ε-secure on any probability distribution.
Moreover, if (x, y) is chosen according to the distribution PXY , then,
clearly, x is always contained in Xˆy = supp(P yX), that is, Bob never aborts.
This proves that the protocol is 0-robust.
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Since f is chosen uniformly at random and independently of x from
the family of hash-functions F , all nonzero probabilities of the distribution
PC|X=x are equal to 1|F| . Hence, using the fact that C = F × Z,
leakIR
Xˆ ,F
= log |C| − inf
x∈X
Hmin(PC|X=x)
= log |F × Z| − log |F| ≤ log |Z| = k .
The claimed bound on the leakage then follows by the definition of k.
Lemma 6.3.4. Let PXY ∈ P(X×Y) and let ε, ε′ ≥ 0. Then the information
reconciliation protocol IRXˆ ,F defined by Fig. 6.2, for an appropriate choice
of the parameters Xˆ and F , is ε′-robust on PXY , ε-fully secure, and has
leakage
leakIR
Xˆ ,F
≤ Hε′max(PXY |Y ) + log(2/ε) .
Proof. For any ν > 0 there exists P¯XY ∈ P(HX ⊗HY ) such that∥∥PXY − P¯XY ∥∥1 ≤ ε′ (6.3)
and
Hmax(P¯XY |Y ) ≤ Hε′max(PXY |Y ) + ν . (6.4)
According to Lemma 6.3.3, there exists Xˆ and F such that IRXˆ ,F is ε-fully
secure, 0-robust on P¯XY , and has leakage
leakIRXˆ ,F ≤ Hmax(P¯XY |Y ) + log(2/ε) .
The stated bound on the leakage follows immediately from this inequality
and (6.4). Moreover, the bound on the robustness is a direct consequence
of the bound (6.3) and the fact that the protocol is 0-robust on P¯XY .
Corollary 6.3.5. Let PXY ∈ P(X ×Y) be a probability distribution, let n ≥
0, and let ε ≥ 0. Then there exists an information reconciliation protocol
IR which is ε-fully secure, ε-robust on the product distribution PXnY n :=
(PXY )
n, and has leakage
1
n
leakIR ≤ H(X|Y ) +
√
3 log(2/ε)
n
log(|X |+ 3) .
Proof. Using Lemma 6.3.4 (with ε = ε′) and Theorem 3.3.4, we find
1
n
leakIR ≤ H(X|Y ) + log(2/ε)
n
+
√
2 log(1/ε)
n
log(|X | + 3) .
Let a := log(2/ε)n and b := log(|X |+3). The last two terms on the right hand
side of this inequality are then upper bounded by a+
√
2ab ≤ (a2 +
√
2a)b,
which holds because b ≥ 2. We can assume without loss of generality that
3a ≤ 1 (otherwise, the statement is trivial). Then a2 +
√
2a ≤ √3a. The
last two terms in the above inequality are thus bounded by
√
3ab, which
concludes the proof.
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Fig. 6.3 Classical post-processing protocol PPIR,F .
Parameters:
IR: information reconciliation protocol.
F : family of hash functions from X to {0, 1}ℓ.
Alice Bob
input: x ∈ X input: y ∈ Y
x ff
IR
- y → xˆ
f ∈R F -f
output sA := f(x) output sB := f(xˆ)
For practical applications, we are interested in protocols where Alice and
Bob’s computations can be done efficiently (e.g., in time that only depends
polynomially on the length of their inputs). This is, however, not neces-
sarily the case for the information reconciliation protocol IRXˆ ,F described
above. While Alice’s task, i.e., the evaluation of the hash function, can be
done in polynomial time,10 no efficient algorithm is known for the decod-
ing operation of Bob. Nevertheless, based on a specific encoding scheme,
one can show that there exist information reconciliation protocols which
only require polynomial-time computations and for which the statement of
Corollary 6.3.5 (asymptotically) still holds (see Appendix C).
6.4 Classical post-processing
Classical post-processing is used to transform an only partially secure11 pair
of raw keys x and y held by Alice and Bob, respectively, into a fully se-
cure key pair. A classical post-processing protocol is thus actually a key
distillation protocol that starts with classical randomness.
In this section, we analyze the security of the generic post-processing
protocol depicted in Fig. 6.3. It consists of an information reconciliation
subprotocol (see Section 6.3) followed by privacy amplification (see Chap-
ter 5).
10Recall that Alice only has to evaluate a function which is randomly chosen from a
two-universal family of functions. For most known constructions of such families (see, e.g.,
[CW79, WC81]), this can be done efficiently.
11That is, x and y are only weakly correlated and partially secret strings.
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Lemma 6.4.1. Let IR be an information reconciliation protocol and let F
be a two-universal family of hash functions from X to {0, 1}ℓ. Additionally,
let ρXYE ∈ P(HX ⊗ HY ⊗ HE) be a density operator which is classical on
HX ⊗HY and let ε′, ε′′ ≥ 0. If IR is ε′-secure on the distribution defined by
ρXY and if
ℓ ≤ Hεmin(ρXE |E) − leakIR − 2 log(1/ε) ,
for ε := 23ε
′′, then the key distillation protocol PPIR,F defined by Fig. 6.3 is
(ε′ + ε′′)-secure on ρXY E.
Proof. For simplicity, we assume in the following that the protocol IR is one-
way. It is straightforward to generalize this argument to arbitrary protocols.
Note first that the keys sA and sB generated by Alice and Bob can only
differ if xˆ 6= x. Hence, because the information reconciliation protocol IR is
ε′-secure on the distribution defined by ρXY , the classical post-processing
protocol PPIR,F is ε′-correct on ρXY E. According to Remark 6.1.3, it thus
remains to show that Alice’s key is ε′′-secret.
For this, we use the result on the security of privacy amplification by
two-universal hashing presented in Chapter 5. Because f is chosen from a
two-universal family of hash functions, Corollary 5.6.1 implies that the key
computed by Alice is ε′′-secret if
Hεmin(ρXC′E|C ′E) ≥ 2 log(1/ε) + ℓ , (6.5)
where ρXXˆC′E := (E IR⊗ idE)(ρXY E) is the operator describing the situation
after the execution of the information reconciliation protocol IR (where C ′
is the transcript of IR). It thus suffices to verify that the bound on the
entropy (6.5) holds.
Using the chain rule (cf. (3.21) of Theorem 3.2.12), the left hand side
of (6.5) can be bounded by
Hεmin(ρXC′E |C ′E) ≥ Hεmin(ρXC′E |E)−Hmax(ρC′) .
Moreover, because the communication c′ is computed only from x, the con-
ditional operators ρxC′E have product form and thus (cf. (3.22) of Theo-
rem 3.2.12)
Hεmin(ρXC′E |C ′E) ≥ Hεmin(ρXE |E) +Hmin(ρC′X |ρX)−Hmax(ρC′) . (6.6)
Using the fact that Hmax(ρC′) = log rank(ρC′) and Lemma 3.1.8, the last
two terms in the above expression can be bounded by
Hmax(ρC′)−Hmin(ρC′X |ρX) ≤ log rank(ρC′)− inf
x∈X
Hmin(ρ¯
x
C′) ,
where, for any x ∈ X , ρ¯xC′ is the normalized conditional operator defined by
ρC′X . Hence, by the definition of leakage,
Hmax(ρC′)−Hmin(ρC′X |ρX) ≤ leakIR .
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Combining this with (6.6), we find
Hεmin(ρXC′E|C ′E) ≥ Hεmin(ρXE |E)− leakIR ,
which, by the assumption on the length of the final key ℓ, implies (6.5) and
thus concludes the proof.
6.5 Quantum key distillation
We are now ready to describe and analyze a general quantum key distillation
protocol, which uses parameter estimation and classical post-processing as
discussed above. (For a high-level description of the content of this section,
we refer to Section 1.6.)
6.5.1 Description of the protocol
Consider the quantum key distillation protocol QKDPE,Bl,PP depicted in
Fig. 6.4. Alice and Bob take inputs from product spaces H⊗NA and H⊗NB ,
respectively. Then, they subsequently run the following subprotocols (see
also Table 6.1):
• Random permutation of the subsystems: Alice and Bob reorder their
subsystems according to a commonly chosen random permutation π.
• Parameter estimation (PE): Alice and Bob sacrifice m subsystems to
perform some statistical checks. We assume that they do this using a
protocol of the form PEM,Q (see Fig. 6.1), which is characterized by a
POVM M = {Mw}w∈W on HA ⊗HB and a set Q of valid frequency
distributions on W.
• Block-wise measurement and processing (Bl⊗n): In order to obtain
classical data, Alice and Bob apply a measurement to the remaining
b · n subsystems, possibly followed by some further processing (e.g.,
advantage distillation). We assume here that Alice and Bob group
their b · n subsystems in n blocks of size b and then process each of
these blocks independently, according to some subprotocol, denoted
Bl. Each application of Bl to a block H⊗bA ⊗ H⊗bB results in a pair of
classical outputs xi and yi.
• Classical post-processing (PP): Alice and Bob transform their classical
strings (x1, . . . , xn) and (y1, . . . , yn) into a pair of secret keys. For
this, they invoke a post-processing subprotocol of the form PPIR,F (see
Fig. 6.3), for some (arbitrary) information reconciliation scheme IR and
a two-universal family of hash functions F for privacy amplification.
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Fig. 6.4 Quantum key distillation protocol QKDPE,Bl,PP.
Parameters:
PE: parameter estimation protocol on H⊗mA ⊗H⊗mB .
Bl: subprotocol on H⊗bA ⊗H⊗bB with classical output in X × Y.
PP: classical post-processing protocol on X n × Yn.
N : Number of input systems (N ≥ bn+m)
Alice Bob
input space: H⊗NA input space: H⊗NB
π ∈R SN -π
permute subsyst. permute subsyst.
H⊗mA ff
PE
- H⊗mB
→ acc./abort
(H⊗bA )⊗n
→ (x1, . . . , xn)
ff
Bl⊗n
- (H⊗bB )⊗n
→ (y1, . . . , yn)
(x1, . . . , xn)→ sA ff PP - (y1, . . . , yn)→ sB
output sA output sB
Table 6.1 Subprotocols used for QKDPE,Bl,PP (cf. Fig. 6.4).
PE := PEM,Q prot. on H⊗mA ⊗H⊗mB defined by Fig. 6.1
M = {Mw}w∈W POVM on HA ⊗HB
Q set of freq. dist. on W
Bl prot. on H⊗bA ⊗H⊗bB with cl. output in X × Y
PP := PPIR,F prot. on X n ×Yn defined by Fig. 6.3
IR inf. rec. prot. on X n × Yn
F two-univ. fam. of hash func. from X n to {0, 1}ℓ
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Table 6.2 Security parameters for QKDPE,Bl,PP (cf. Fig. 6.4).
N bn+m+ k
r Nk
(
2 log(9/ε) + dim(HA ⊗HB)2 ln k
)
δ′ (52 log |X |+ 4)
√
h(r/n) + 2n log(18/ε)
µ 2
√
h(r/m) + 1m
(
log(9/2ε) + |W| log(m2 + 1)
)
δ δ′ + 2(m+k)n log dim(HA ⊗HB) + 2n log(3/2ε)
6.5.2 Robustness
The usefulness of a key distillation protocol depends on the set of inputs for
which it is robust, i.e., from which it can successfully distill secret keys. Ob-
viously, the described protocol QKDPE,Bl,PP is robust on all inputs for which
none of its subprotocols PE, Bl, or PP aborts. Note that the post-processing
PP = PPIR,F only aborts if the underlying information reconciliation scheme
IR aborts.
Typically, the subprotocols Bl and IR are chosen in such a way that they
are robust on any of the input states accepted by PE. In this case, the
key distillation protocol QKDPE,Bl,PP is successful whenever it starts with an
input for which PE is robust. According to the discussion in Section 6.2, the
protocol PE = PEM,Q is robust on product states σ⊗mAB if σAB is contained
in the set Γ
≥µ
M,Q defined by (6.2). Consequently, QKDPE,Bl,PP is robust on
all inputs of the form σ⊗NAB , for σAB ∈ Γ
≥µ
M,Q.
6.5.3 Security
The following is a generic criterion for the security of QKD.
Theorem 6.5.1. Let QKDPE,Bl,PP be the quantum key distillation protocol
defined by Fig. 6.4 and Table 6.1, let ε, ε′ ≥ 0, let δ, µ be defined by Table 6.2,
and let Γ≤µM,Q be defined by (6.1). Then QKDPE,Bl,PP is (ε + ε
′)-fully secure
if the underlying information reconciliation protocol IR is ε′-fully secure and
if
ℓ ≤ n min
σAB∈Γ≤µM,Q
H(X|E¯)− leakIR − nδ ,
where the entropy in the minimum is evaluated on
σXY E¯ = EBlXY E¯←AbBbEb(σ⊗bABE) ,
for a purification σABE of σAB.
Proof. Let ρANBN be any state held by Alice and Bob after they have applied
the random permutation π (averaged over all possible choices of π). Because,
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obviously, ρANBN is permutation-invariant, Lemma 4.2.2 implies that there
exists a purification ρANBNEN of ρANBN on the symmetric subspace of (HA⊗
HB⊗HE)⊗N . We show that the remaining part of the protocol is secure on
ρANBNEN . This is sufficient because any density operator ρANBN E˜ which
has the property that taking the partial trace over HE˜ gives ρANBN can be
obtained from the pure state ρANBNEN by a trace-preserving CPM which
only acts on Eve’s space.
Let ρAbn+mBbn+mEbn+m be the operator obtained by taking the partial
trace (over k subsystems HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE) of ρANBNEN . It describes the
joint state on the m subsystems used for parameter estimation and the b ·n
subsystems which are given as input to Bl⊗n. According to the de Finetti
representation theorem (Theorem 4.3.2) this density operator is approxi-
mated by a convex combination of density operators, where each of them
is on the symmetric subspace along vectors |θ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE. More
precisely, with ε¯ := 2ε9 ,∥∥∥ρAbn+mBbn+mEbn+m −
∫
S1
ρ
|θ〉
Abn+mBbn+mEbn+m
ν(|θ〉)
∥∥∥
1
≤ ε¯ , (6.7)
where the integral runs over the set S1 := S1(HA⊗HB⊗HE) of normalized
vectors in HA ⊗HB ⊗HE and where, for any |θ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB ⊗HE,
ρ
|θ〉
Abn+mBbn+mEbn+m
∈ P(Sym((HA⊗HB ⊗HE)⊗bn+m, |θ〉⊗bn+m−r)) . (6.8)
We first analyze the situation after the parameter estimation is com-
pleted. Let EPEAmBm be the CPM which maps all density operators on
(HA ⊗ HB)⊗m either to the scalar 0 or 1, depending on whether the pa-
rameter estimation protocol PEM,Q accepts or aborts. Moreover, define
ρPEAbnBbnEN := (idAbnBbn ⊗ EPEAmBm ⊗ idEN )(ρAbn+mBbn+mEN )
ρ
|θ〉,PE
AbnBbnEbn
:= (idAbnBbn ⊗ EPEAmBm ⊗ idEbn)(ρ|θ〉Abn+mBbn+mEbn) .
Because of (6.8), we have
ρ
|θ〉,PE
AbnBbnEbn
∈ P(Sym((HA ⊗HB ⊗HE)⊗bn, |θ〉⊗bn−r)) , (6.9)
for any |θ〉 ∈ HA⊗HB⊗HE. Moreover, from (6.7) and the fact that the L1-
distance cannot increase when applying a quantum operation (Lemma A.2.1)
we have ∥∥∥ρPEAbnBbnEbn −
∫
S1
ρ
|θ〉,PE
AbnBbnEbn
ν(|θ〉)
∥∥∥
1
≤ ε¯ . (6.10)
According to Lemma 6.2.2, the parameter estimation PEM,Q ε¯-securely fil-
ters all states ρ
|θ〉,PE
AbnBbnEbn
for which |θ〉 is not contained in the set
Vµ := {|θ〉 ∈ S1 : trE(|θ〉〈θ|) ∈ Γ≤µM,Q} .
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We can thus restrict the integral in (6.10) to the set Vµ, thereby only losing
terms with total weight at most ε¯, i.e.,∥∥∥ρPEAbnBbnEbn −
∫
Vµ
ρ
|θ〉,PE
AbnBbnEbn
ν(|θ〉)
∥∥∥
1
≤ 2ε¯ . (6.11)
To describe the situation after the measurement and blockwise processing
Bl⊗n, we define
ρXnY nE¯nEm+k :=
(
(EBlXY E¯←AbBbEb)⊗n ⊗ idEm+k
)
(ρPEAbnBbnEbn+m+k)
ρ
|θ〉
XnY nE¯n
:= (EBlXY E¯←AbBbEb)⊗n(ρ
|θ〉,PE
AbnBbnEbn
) .
Using once again the fact that the L1-distance cannot decrease under quan-
tum operations (Lemma A.2.1), we conclude from (6.11) that∥∥∥ρXnY nE¯n −
∫
Vµ
ρ
|θ〉
XnY nE¯n
ν(|θ〉)
∥∥∥
1
≤ 2ε¯ . (6.12)
According to (6.9), the density operator ρ
|θ〉,PE
AbnBbnEbn
lies in the symmetric
subspace of the (b ·n)-fold product space (HA⊗HB⊗HE)⊗bn along |θ〉bn−r,
i.e., it has product form except on r subsystems. Equivalently, we can
view ρ
|θ〉,PE
AbnBbnEbn
as a density operator on the n-fold product of subsystems
HAbBbEb := H⊗bA ⊗H⊗bB ⊗H⊗bE . It then has product form an all but (at most)
r of these subsystems. That is, ρ
|θ〉,PE
AbnBbnEbn
is contained in the symmetric
subspace of H⊗n
AbBbEb
along |θb〉⊗n−r, where |θb〉 := |θ〉⊗b ∈ HAbBbEb . This
allows us to apply Theorem 4.4.1 in order to bound the entropy of the
symmetric states ρ
|θ〉
XnY nE¯n
. With the definition
σ
|θ〉
XY E¯
:= EBlXY E¯←AbBbEb(σ⊗bABE) ,
where σABE := |θ〉〈θ|, we obtain
H ε¯min(ρ
|θ〉
XnE¯n
|E¯n) ≥ n(H(σ|θ〉
XE¯
)−H(σ|θ〉
E¯
)− δ′) .
Consequently, using (6.12) together with the inequalities (3.19) and (3.20)
of Theorem 3.2.12,
H3ε¯min(ρXnE¯n |E¯n) ≥ n min|θ〉∈Vµ
(
H(σ
|θ〉
XE¯
)−H(σ|θ〉
E¯
)− δ′) .
Moreover, by the chain rule for smooth min-entropy (cf. (3.21) of Theo-
rem 3.2.12)
H3ε¯min(ρXnE¯nEm+k |E¯nEm+k)
≥ n min
|θ〉∈Vµ
(
H(σ
|θ〉
XE¯
)−H(σ|θ〉
E¯
)− δ′)− 2Hmax(ρEm+k) .
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Finally, we use Lemma 6.4.1 which provides a criterion on the maxi-
mum length ℓ such that the secret key computed by the post-processing
subprotocol PP is (ε+ ε′)-secure,
ℓ ≤ n min
|θ〉∈Vµ
(
H(σ
|θ〉
XE¯
)−H(σ|θ〉
E¯
)− δ′)−2Hmax(ρEm+k)− leakIR−2 log(3/2ε) .
The assertion then follows from
Hmax(ρEm+k) ≤ (m+ k) log dim(HA ⊗HB) ,
the fact that |θ〉 ∈ Vµ if and only if the trace σAB of σABE := |θ〉〈θ| is
contained in the set Γ≤µM,Q, and the definition of δ (cf. Table 6.2).
Note that the protocol QKDPE,Bl,PP takes as input N subsystems and
generates a key of a certain fixed length ℓ. In order to make asymptotic
statements, we need to consider a family {QKDN
PE,Bl,PP}N∈N of such pro-
tocols, where, for any N ∈ N, the corresponding protocol takes N input
systems and generates a key of length ℓ(N). The rate of the protocol family
is then defined by
rate := lim
N→∞
ℓ(N)
N
.
Corollary 6.5.2. Let δ, µ > 0, a protocol Bl acting on blocks of length b, a
POVM M = {Mw}w∈W , and a set Q of probability distributions on W be
fixed, and let Γ≤µM,Q be the set defined by (6.1). Then there exist γ > 0 and
parameters n = n(N),m = m(N), ℓ = ℓ(N) such that the class of protocols
QKDN
PE,Bl,PP (parameterized by N ∈ N) defined by Fig. 6.4 and Table 6.1 has
rate
rate =
1
b
min
σAB∈Γ≤µM,Q
H(X|E¯)−H(X|Y )− δ ,
where the entropies in the minimum are evaluated on
σXY E¯ = EBlXY E¯←AbBbEb(σ⊗bABE) ,
for a purification σABE of σAB. Moreover, for any N ≥ 0, the protocol
QKDN
PE,Bl,PP is e
−γN -fully secure.
Proof. The statement follows directly from Theorem 6.5.1 combined with
Corollary 6.3.5.
6.6 Quantum key distribution
As described in Section 1.2, one can think of a quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocol as a two-step process where Alice and Bob first use the
quantum channel to distribute entanglement and then apply a quantum key
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distillation scheme to generate the final key pair. To prove security of a
QKD protocol, it thus suffices to verify that the underlying key distilla-
tion protocol is secure on any input. Hence, the security results for key
distillation protocols derived in the previous section (Theorem 6.5.1 and
Corollary 6.5.2) directly apply to QKD protocols.
We can, however, further improve these results by taking into account
that the way Alice and Bob use the quantum channel in the first step im-
poses some additional restrictions on the possible inputs to the distillation
protocol. For example, if Alice locally prepares entangled states and then
sends parts of them to Bob (note that this is actually the case for most QKD
protocols, viewed as entanglement-based schemes), it is impossible for the
adversary to tamper with the part belonging to Alice. Formally, this means
that the partial state on Alice’s subsystem is independent of Eve’s attack.
Using this observation, we can restrict the set Γ≤µM,Q of states σAB (as
defined by (6.1)) over which the minimum is taken in the criterion of Theo-
rem 6.5.1 and Corollary 6.5.2. In fact, it follows directly from Remark 4.3.3
that it suffices to consider states σAB such that σA = trB(σAB) is fixed.
Chapter 7
Examples
To illustrate the general results of the previous chapter, we analyze cer-
tain concrete QKD protocols. We first specialize the formula for the rate
(cf. Corollary 6.5.2) to protocols based on two-level quantum systems (Sec-
tion 7.1). Then, as an example, we analyze different variants of the six-state
protocol and compute explicit values for their rates (Section 7.2).
7.1 Protocols based on two-level systems
A large class of QKD protocols, including the well-known BB84 protocol or
the six-state protocol, are based on an encoding of binary classical values
using the state of a two-level quantum system, such as the the spin of a
photon. For the corresponding key distillation protocol (see Fig. 6.4), this
means that Alice and Bob take inputs from (products of) two-dimensional
Hilbert spaces on which they apply binary measurements. In the following,
we analyze different variants of such protocols.
7.1.1 One-way protocols
We start with a basic key distillation protocol which only uses informa-
tion reconciliation and privacy amplification (as described in Section 6.4) to
transform the raw key pair into a pair of secret keys. More precisely, after
the measurement of their subsystems, Alice and Bob immediately invoke
an information reconciliation protocol (e.g., the protocol IRXˆ ,F depicted in
Fig. 6.2) such that Bob can compute a guess of Alice’s values; the final key is
then obtained by two-universal hashing. Because this post-processing only
requires communication from Alice to Bob, such protocols are also called
one-way key distillation protocols.1
1Note, however, that bidirectional communication is always needed for the parameter
estimation step.
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Clearly, the one-way key distillation protocol described above is a special
case of the general protocol QKDPE,Bl,PP depicted in Fig 6.4, where Bl :=
Meas is the subprotocol describing the measurement operation of Alice and
Bob. Additionally, assume that the parameter estimation subprotocol PE
is the protocol PEM,Q depicted in Fig. 6.1, where M is a POVM and Q is
the set of statistics for which the protocol does not abort. We can then use
Corollary 6.5.2 to compute the rate of the protocol, that is,
rate = min
σAB∈Γ
H(X|E) −H(X|Y ) . (7.1)
Here, the minimum ranges over the set
Γ :=
{
σAB : P
σAB
W ∈ Q
}
(7.2)
of all density operators σAB on the 2×2-dimensional Hilbert space HA⊗HB
such that the measurement with respect to M gives a probability distribu-
tion P σABW which is contained in the set Q. Moreover, the von Neumann (or
Shannon) entropies H(X|E) and H(X|Y ) are evaluated for the operators
σXY E := (EMeasXY←AB ⊗ idE)(σABE) ,
where σABE is a purification of σAB.
Let {|0〉A, |1〉A} and {|0〉B , |1〉B} be the bases that Alice and Bob use
for the measurement Meas.2 Lemma 7.1.1 below provides an explicit lower
bound on the entropy difference on the right hand side of (7.1) as a function
of σABE . The bound only depends on the diagonal values of σAB with
respect to the Bell basis, which is defined by the vectors
|Φ0〉 := 1√
2
|0, 0〉 + 1√
2
|1, 1〉
|Φ1〉 := 1√
2
|0, 0〉 − 1√
2
|1, 1〉
|Φ2〉 := 1√
2
|0, 1〉 + 1√
2
|1, 0〉
|Φ3〉 := 1√
2
|0, 1〉 − 1√
2
|1, 0〉 ,
where |x, y〉 := |x〉A ⊗ |y〉B .
Lemma 7.1.1. Let both HA and HB be two-dimensional Hilbert spaces, let
σABE ∈ P(HA⊗HB ⊗HE) be a density operator, and let σXYE be obtained
2
Meas describes the measurement that generates the data used for the computation of
the final key. It might be different from the measurement M which is used for parameter
estimation.
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from σABE by applying orthonormal measurements on HA and HB. Then
H(X|E) −H(X|Y )
≥ 1− (λ0 + λ1)h
( λ0
λ0 + λ1
)− (λ2 + λ3)h( λ2
λ2 + λ3
)− h(λ0 + λ1) ,
where λi := 〈Φi|σAB |Φi〉 are the diagonal values of σAB with respect to the
Bell basis (defined relative to the measurement basis).
Proof. Let D be the CPM defined by
D(σAB) := 1
4
∑
τ∈{id,σx,σy,σz}
τ⊗2 σAB τ⊗2 ,
where σx, σy, σz are the Pauli operators
σx :=
(
0 1
1 0
)
σy :=
(
0 −i
i 0
)
σz :=
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, (7.3)
and let σ˜ABE be a purification of σ˜AB := D(σAB). Moreover, let σ˜ABE be
an arbitrary purification of σ˜AB with auxiliary system HE and define
σ˜XY E := (EMeasXY←AB ⊗ idE)(σ˜ABE) .
A straightforward calculation shows that the operator σ˜AB has the form
σ˜AB =
3∑
i=0
λi|Φi〉〈Φi| ,
i.e., it is diagonal with respect to the Bell basis. Moreover, because D com-
mutes with the measurement operation on HA ⊗ HB , it is easy to verify
that the entropy H(X|Y ) evaluated for σXY is upper bounded by the corre-
sponding entropy for σ˜XY . Similarly, because σ˜ABE is a purification of σ˜AB,
the entropy H(X|E) evaluated for σXE is lower bounded by the entropy of
σ˜XE . It thus suffices to show that the inequality of the lemma holds for the
operator σ˜XYE , which is obtained from the diagonal operator σ˜AB .
Let |ei〉i be an orthonormal basis of a 4-dimensional Hilbert space HE.
Then the operator σ˜ABE := |Ψ〉〈Ψ| ∈ P(HA ⊗HB ⊗HE) defined by
|Ψ〉 :=
∑
i
√
λi|Φi〉AB ⊗ |ei〉E
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is a purification of σ˜AB. With the definition
|f0,0〉 :=
√
λ0
2
|e0〉+
√
λ1
2
|e1〉
|f1,1〉 :=
√
λ0
2
|e0〉 −
√
λ1
2
|e1〉
|f0,1〉 :=
√
λ2
2
|e2〉+
√
λ3
2
|e3〉
|f1,0〉 :=
√
λ2
2
|e2〉 −
√
λ3
2
|e3〉 ,
the state |Ψ〉 can be rewritten as
|Ψ〉 =
∑
x,y
|x, y〉 ⊗ |fx,y〉 .
Because the operator σ˜XYE is obtained from σ˜ABE by orthonormal mea-
surements on HA and HB, we conclude
σ˜XYE =
∑
x,y
|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ σ˜x,yE
where σ˜x,yE := |fx,y〉〈fx,y|.
Using this representation of the operator σ˜XY E, it is is easy to see that
H(σ˜XE) = 1 + h(λ0 + λ1)
H(σ˜E) = h(λ0 + λ1) + (λ0 + λ1)h
( λ0
λ0 + λ1
)
+ (λ2 + λ3)h
( λ2
λ2 + λ3
)
H(X|Y ) = h(λ0 + λ1) ,
from which the assertion follows.
Using Lemma 7.1.1, we conclude that the above described one-way pro-
tocol can generate secret-key bits at rate
rate ≥ min
(λ0,...,λ3)∈diag(Γ)
1− (λ0 + λ1)h
( λ0
λ0 + λ1
)
− (λ2 + λ3)h
( λ2
λ2 + λ3
)− h(λ0 + λ1) , (7.4)
where diag(Γ) denotes the 4-tuples of diagonal entries (relative to the Bell
basis) of the operators σAB ∈ Γ, for Γ defined by (7.2).
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7.1.2 One-way protocols with noisy preprocessing
The efficiency of the basic QKD protocol described in Section 7.1.1 can
be increased in different ways. We consider an extension of the protocol
where, before starting with information reconciliation, Alice applies some
local preprocessing operation to her raw key. A very simple—but surpris-
ingly useful—variant of preprocessing is to add noise, i.e., Alice flips each
of her bits independently with some probability q. In the following, we call
this noisy preprocessing .
To compute the rate of the one-way protocol enhanced with this type of
preprocessing, we need a generalization of Lemma 7.1.1.
Lemma 7.1.2. Let both HA and HB be two-dimensional Hilbert spaces,
let σABE ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE) be a density operator, and let σXY E be
obtained from σABE by applying orthonormal measurements on HA and HB
where, additionally, the outcome of the measurement on HA is flipped with
probability q ∈ [0, 1]. Then
H(X|E) −H(X|Y )
≥ 1− (λ0 + λ1)
(
h(α) − h¯(α, q)) − (λ2 + λ3)(h(β) − h¯(β, q))
− h((λ0 + λ1)q + (λ2 + λ3)(1− q)) ,
where λi := 〈Φi|σAB |Φi〉, α := λ0λ0+λ1 , β := λ2λ2+λ3 , and
h¯(p, q) := h
(1
2
± 1
2
√
1− 16p(1− p)q(1− q)) .
Proof. The statement follows by a straightforward extension of the proof of
Lemma 7.1.1.
Similarly to formula (7.4), the rate of the one-way protocol with noisy
preprocessing—where Alice additionally flips her bits with probability q—is
given by the expression provided by Lemma 7.1.2, minimized over all 4-
tuples (λ0, . . . , λ3) ∈ diag(Γ). It turns out that this rate is generally larger
than the rate of the corresponding one-way protocol without preprocessing
(see Section 7.2 below).
7.1.3 Protocols with advantage distillation
To further increase the efficiency of the key distillation protocol described
above, one might insert an additional advantage distillation step after the
measurement Meas, i.e., before the classical one-way post-processing.3 Its
purpose is to identify subsets of highly correlated bit pairs such as to separate
these from only weakly correlated information.
3The concept of advantage distillation has first been introduced in a purely classical
context [Mau93], where a secret key is generated from some predistributed correlated data.
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Fig. 7.1 Advantage distillation protocol ADb.
Parameters:
b: block length
Alice Bob
input: (x1, . . . , xb) input: (y1, . . . , yb)
r ∈R {0, 1}
(c1, . . . , cb) :=
(x1 ⊕ r, . . . , xb ⊕ r) -(c1, . . . , cb) if (y1 ⊕ c1, . . . , yb ⊕ cb)
∈ {0,1}
then acc := true
ff
acc
if acc
then output x1
else output ∆
if acc
then output y1
else output ∆
A typical advantage distillation protocol is depicted in Fig. 7.1: Alice
and Bob split their bitstrings into blocks (x1, . . . , xb) and (y1, . . . , yb) of size
b. Then, depending on a randomly chosen binary value r, Alice announces
to Bob either (x1, . . . , xb) or (x1⊕1, . . . , xb⊕1) (where ⊕ denotes the bitwise
xor). Bob compares this information with his block (y1, . . . , yb) and accepts
if it either differs in none or in all positions, i.e., if the difference equals
either 0 := (0, . . . , 0) or 1 := (1, . . . , 1). In this case, Alice and Bob both
keep the first bit of their initial string. Otherwise, they output some dummy
symbol ∆.4 Obviously, if the error probability per bit (i.e., the error rate
of the channel) is e then the probability psucc that advantage distillation
on a block of length b is successful (i.e., Alice and Bob keep their bit) is
psucc = e
b + (1− e)b.
Let us now consider the general protocol QKDPE,Bl,PP where the subpro-
tocol Bl consists of b binary measurements Meas of Alice and Bob followed
by the advantage distillation protocol ADb described in Fig. 7.1, i.e.,
EBlXY E¯←AbBbEb = EADXY E¯←XbY bEb ◦ (EMeasXY←AB ⊗ idE)⊗b (7.5)
4As suggested in [Mau93], the efficiency of this advantage distillation protocol is further
increased if Alice and Bob, instead of acting on large blocks at once, iteratively repeat the
described protocol step on very small blocks (consisting of only 2 or 3 bits).
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It is easy to see that the subprotocol ADb commutes with the measurement
Meas, that is, (7.5) can be rewritten as
EBlXY E¯←AbBbEb = ((EMeasXY←AB)⊗b ⊗ idE¯) ◦ EADABE¯←AbBbEb .
Moreover, a straightforward computation5 shows that, if σAB has diagonal
entries λ0, . . . , λ3 with respect to the Bell basis then, with probability
psucc := (λ0 + λ1)
b + (λ2 + λ3)
b ,
the advantage distillation ADb is successful and the operation EADAB←AbBb
induced by ADb (conditioned on the event that it is successful) maps σ
⊗b
AB
to an operator σ˜AB with diagonal entries
λ˜0 =
(λ0 + λ1)
b + (λ0 − λ1)b
2psucc
λ˜1 =
(λ0 + λ1)
b − (λ0 − λ1)b
2psucc
λ˜2 =
(λ2 + λ3)
b + (λ2 − λ3)b
2psucc
λ˜3 =
(λ2 + λ3)
b − (λ2 − λ3)b
2psucc
.
Inserting these coefficients into the expressions provided by Lemma 7.1.1
gives a bound on the entropy difference which can be inserted into the for-
mula for the rate (7.1).6 We conclude that the key distillation protocol
enhanced with advantage distillation on blocks of length b can generate key
bits at rate
rate ≥ 1
b
min
(λ0,...,λ3)∈diag(Γ)
psucc ·
(
1− (λ˜0 + λ˜1)h
( λ˜0
λ˜0 + λ˜1
)
− (λ˜2 + λ˜3)h
( λ˜2
λ˜2 + λ˜3
)− h(λ˜0 + λ˜1)) , (7.6)
where Γ is the set defined by (7.2). Note that, in the special case where the
block size b equals 1, the advantage distillation is trivial, that is, λ˜i = λi,
and (7.6) reduces to (7.4).
Similarly to the discussion in Section 7.1.2, one might enhance the pro-
tocol with noisy preprocessing on Alice’s side, i.e., Alice flips her bits with
some probability q after the advantage distillation step. The rate is then
given by a formula similar to (7.6), where the expression in the minimum is
5For this computation, it is convenient to use the mapping D defined above, which
allows to restrict the argument to the special case where σAB is Bell diagonal.
6Note that, conditioned on the event that ADb is not successful (i.e., Alice and Bob’s
outputs are ∆), the entropy difference is zero.
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replaced by the bound on the entropy difference provided by Lemma 7.1.2,
evaluated for the coefficients λ˜i.
Note that, as the block size b increases, the coefficients λ˜2 and λ˜3 ap-
proach zero, while λ˜0 and λ˜1 both tend to
1
2 . To get an approximation, it is
thus sufficient to evaluate the expression of Lemma 7.1.2 up to small orders
in λ2 and λ3.
Lemma 7.1.3. Let λ0, · · · λ3 and σXY E¯ be defined as in Lemma 7.1.2, where
λ0 = (1− δ)1+ε2 , λ1 = (1− δ)1−ε2 , λ2 = λ3 = δ2 for some δ, ε ≥ 0. Then
H(X|E¯)−H(X|Y )
≥ 4
ln 8
(1− δ)(ε2 − 6δ)(1
2
− q)2 +O(δ3 + ε3 + (1
2
− q)3) .
In particular, this quantity is positive if ε2 ≥ 6δ.
Proof. The assertion follows immediately from a series expansion of the
bound provided by Lemma 7.1.2 about ε = 0 and δ = 0.
Lemma 7.1.3 can be used to compute a bound on the rate of the protocol
described above (advantage distillation followed by noisy preprocessing).
Under the assumption that the coefficients λ˜0, . . . , λ˜3 are of the form
λ˜0 = (1− δ)1 + ε
2
λ˜1 = (1− δ)1 − ε
2
λ˜2 = λ˜3 =
δ
2
,
for some small δ, ε ≥ 0, we get, analogously to (7.6),
rate ≥ 1
b
min
(λ0,...,λ3)∈diag(Γ)
psucc ·
( 4
ln 8
(1− δ)(ε2 − 6δ)(1
2
− q)2
+O
(
δ3 + ε3 + (
1
2
− q)3)) . (7.7)
7.2 The six-state protocol
To illustrate the results of Section 7.1, we apply them to different variants
of the six-state QKD protocol, for which we explicitly compute the rate and
the maximum tolerated channel noise. The six-state protocol is one of the
most efficient QKD schemes based on two-level systems, that is, the rate
at which secret key bits can be generated per channel use is relatively close
to the theoretical maximum. On the other hand, it is not very suitable for
practical implementations, as it requires devices for preparing and measuring
two-level quantum systems with respect to six different states.
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7.2.1 Description
Instead of describing the actual six-state QKD protocol, we specify the un-
derlying key distillation scheme: Alice and Bob take as input entangled
two-level systems and measure each of them using at random one of three
mutually unbiased bases, which results in a pair of raw keys.7 Usually, these
are the rectilinear or z-basis {|0〉z , |1〉z}, the diagonal or x-basis {|0〉x, |1〉x},
and the circular or y-basis {|0〉y , |1〉y}), which are related by
|0〉x = 1√2(|0〉z + |1〉z) |0〉y =
1√
2
(|0〉z + i|1〉z)
|1〉x = 1√2(|0〉z − |1〉z) |1〉y =
1√
2
(|0〉z − i|1〉z) .
Next, in a sifting step, Alice and Bob compare their choices of bases and
discard all outcomes for which these do not agree. Note that, if Alice and
Bob choose one of the bases with probability almost one, they only have to
discard a small fraction of their raw keys (see discussion in Section 1.2).
In the parameter estimation step, Alice and Bob compare the bit values
of their raw keys for a small fraction of randomly chosen positions. They
abort if the error rate e—i.e., the fraction of positions for which their bits
differ—is larger than some threshold. For the following analysis, we as-
sume that Alice and Bob additionally check whether the error e is equally
distributed among the different choices of the measurement bases and sym-
metric under bitflips.
Finally, Alice and Bob use the remaining part of their raw key to generate
a pair of secret keys. For this, they might invoke different variants of ad-
vantage distillation and one-way post-processing subprotocols, as described
in Section 7.1.
7.2.2 Analysis
To compute the rate of the six-state protocol (for different variants of the
post-processing) we use the formulas derived in Section 7.1. The set Γ, as
defined by (7.2), depends on the error rate e. For any fixed e, we get six
conditions on the operators σAB contained in Γ, namely
(〈b|u ⊗ 〈b′|u)σAB(|b〉u ⊗ |b′〉u) = e
2
, (7.8)
for any u ∈ {x, y, z} and b, b′ ∈ {0, 1} with b 6= b′. It is easy to verify that
the only density operator that satisfies these equalities is Bell-diagonal and
has eigenvalues λ0 = 1 − 3e2 , λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = e2 . Γ is thus the set of all
7Because each of the three bases consists of two orthonormal vectors, the information
is encoded into six different states, which explains the name of the protocol.
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density operators of the form (with respect to the Bell basis)
σAB =


1− 3e2 0 0 0
0 e2 0 0
0 0 e2 0
0 0 0 e2

 ,
for any e ≥ 0 below some threshold.
One-way six-state protocol
In a basic version of the six-state QKD protocol, Alice and Bob apply post-
processing (i.e., information reconciliation followed by privacy amplification)
directly to their measured data, as described in Section 7.1.1. The rate of
this protocol can be computed using (7.4) where, according to the above
discussion, λ0 = 1− 3e2 and λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = e2 . Plot 7.1 shows the result of a
numerical evaluation of this formula. In particular, the maximum tolerated
channel noise for which the key rate is nonzero is 12.6%.
Next, we consider the one-way six-state protocol enhanced with addi-
tional noisy preprocessing as described in Section 7.1.2. That is, before
the information reconciliation step, Alice applies random bitflips with prob-
ability q to her measurement outcomes. The rate of this protocol can be
computed with Lemma 7.1.2. A little bit surprisingly, it turns out that noisy
preprocessing increases its performance (see Plot 7.2). As shown in Plot 7.3,
the optimal value of the bit-flip probability q depends on the error rate of
the channel e. The protocol can tolerate errors up to 14.1% and thus beats
the basic version (without noisy preprocessing) described above. Note that
this result also improves on the previously best known lower bound for the
maximum error tolerance of the six-state protocol with one-way processing,
which was 12.7% [Lo00]. (Similarly, the same preprocessing can be applied
to the BB84 protocol, in which case we get an error tolerance of 12.4%,
compared to the best known value of 11.0% [SP00].)
Six-state protocol with advantage distillation
The performance of the six-state protocol is increased if Alice and Bob addi-
tionally use advantage distillation as described in Section 7.1.3. For example,
Alice and Bob might invoke the protocol ADb depicted in Fig. 7.1 to pro-
cess their measurement outcomes before the information reconciliation and
privacy amplification step. The rate of the protocol is then given by (7.6).
Because λ0 = 1− 3e2 and λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = e2 , the coefficients λ˜i occurring in
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Plot 7.1 Rate of the basic one-way six-state protocol (without noisy pre-
processing) as a function of the error rate e.
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Plot 7.2 Rate of the one-way six-state protocol with noisy preprocessing
(where Alice flips her bits with probability q as depicted in Plot 7.3).
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Plot 7.3 Optimal value of the bit-flip probability q for the noisy prepro-
cessing used in the one-way six-state protocol.
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Plot 7.4 Rate of the six-state protocol with advantage distillation on blocks
of length 4.
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
e
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
rate
this formula are
λ˜0 =
(1− e)b + (1− 2e)b
2psucc
λ˜1 =
(1− e)b − (1− 2e)b
2psucc
λ˜2 =
eb
2psucc
λ˜3 =
eb
2psucc
,
where psucc = (1 − e)b + eb. Plot 7.4 shows the result of this computation
for a block size of b = 4.
Finally, we have a look at an extended protocol which combines ad-
vantage distillation and noisy preprocessing. That is, after the advantage
distillation ADb, Alice flips her bits with probability q (see Plot 7.5). For
large block sizes b, the rate of the protocol is given by (7.7), for
δ =
eb
(1− e)b + eb
ε =
(1− 2e
1− e
)b
.
In particular, for b approaching infinity, the secret-key rate is positive if (see
Lemma 7.1.3) (1− 2e
1− e
)2b ≥ 6 eb
(1− e)b + eb .
Some simple analysis shows that this inequality is satisfied (for large b) if
e ≤ 12 −
√
5
10 ≈ 0.276. We conclude that the protocol can tolerate errors up
to 27.6%.
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Plot 7.5 Rate of the six-state protocol with advantage distillation (on blocks
of optimal length) followed by (optimal) random bit-flips on Alice’s side.
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Note that this value coincides with the corresponding error tolerance of
another variant of the six-state protocol due to Chau [Cha02] and is actually
optimal for this class of protocols (cf. [ABB+04]). However, compared to
Chau’s protocol, the above described variant of the six-state protocol is
simpler8 and has a higher key rate.
8Instead of adding noise, Chau’s protocol uses xor operations between different bits of
the raw key.
Appendix A
Distance measures
A.1 Fidelity
The fidelity between two (not necessarily normalized) states ρ, ρ′ ∈ P(H) is
defined by
F (ρ, ρ′) := tr
√
ρ1/2ρ′ρ1/2 .
In particular, if ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| and ρ′ = |ψ′〉〈ψ′| are pure states,
F (ρ, ρ′) = |〈ψ|ψ′〉| .
Remark A.1.1. For any α, β ∈ R+,
F (αρ, βρ′) =
√
αβF (ρ, ρ′) .
Fidelity of purifications
Uhlmann’s theorem states that the fidelity between two operators is equal
to the maximum fidelity of their purifications.
Theorem A.1.2 (Uhlmann). Let ρ, ρ′ ∈ P(H) and let |ψ〉〈ψ| be a purifi-
cation of ρ. Then
F (ρ, ρ′) = max
|ψ′〉〈ψ′|
F (|ψ〉〈ψ|, |ψ′〉〈ψ′|)
where the maximum is taken over all purifications |ψ′〉〈ψ′| of ρ′.
Proof. The assertion follows directly from the corresponding statement for
normalized density operators (see, e.g., Theorem 9.4 in [NC00]) and Re-
mark A.1.1.
Remark A.1.3. Because the fidelity F (|ψ〉〈ψ|, |ψ′〉〈ψ′|) does not depend
on the phase of the vectors, the vector |ψ′〉 which maximizes the expres-
sion of Theorem A.1.2 can always be chosen such that 〈ψ|ψ′〉 is real and
nonnegative.
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Fidelity and quantum operations
The fidelity between two density operators is equal to the minimum fidelity
between the distributions of the outcomes resulting from a measurement.
Lemma A.1.4. Let ρ, ρ′ ∈ P(H). Then
F (ρ, ρ′) = min
{Mz}z
F (PZ , P
′
Z)
where the minimum ranges over all POVMs {Mz}z∈Z on H and where
PZ , P
′
Z ∈ P(Z) are defined by PZ(z) = tr(ρMz) and P ′Z(z) = tr(ρ′Mz),
respectively.
Proof. The statement follows directly from the corresponding statement
for normalized density operators (cf. formula (9.74) in [NC00]) and Re-
mark A.1.1.
The fidelity between two operators cannot decrease when applying the
same quantum operation to both of them.
Lemma A.1.5. Let ρ, ρ′ ∈ P(H) and let E be a trace-preserving CPM on H.
Then
F (E(ρ), E(ρ′)) ≥ F (ρ, ρ′) .
Proof. See Theorem 9.6 of [NC00] and Remark A.1.1.
A.2 L1-distance
L1-distance and quantum operations
The L1-distance between two density operators cannot increase when ap-
plying the same (trace-preserving) quantum operation to both of them.
Lemma A.2.1. Let ρ, ρ′ ∈ P(H) and let E be a CPM such that tr(E(σ)) ≤
tr(σ) for any σ ∈ P(H). Then
‖E(ρ) − E(ρ′)‖1 ≤ ‖ρ− ρ′‖1 .
Proof. It suffices to show that ‖E(T )‖1 ≤ ‖T‖1, for any hermitian operator
T . The assertion then follows with T := ρ− ρ′ because E is linear.
For any hermitian operator S, let ‖S‖∞ := sup|φ〉∈H: ‖|φ〉‖≤1 ‖S|φ〉‖ be
the L∞-operator norm. Note that the L∞-operator norm can equivalently
be written as
‖S‖∞ = sup
σ∈P(H): tr(σ)≤1
tr(Sσ) .
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Moreover, it is easy to see that for any hermitian operator T
‖T‖1 = sup
S: ‖S‖∞≤1
|tr(ST )| . (A.1)
Let {Ek}k be the family of linear operators from H to H′ defined by the
CPM E , i.e., E(σ) = EkσE†k, for any σ ∈ P(H). Moreover, let E† be the
CPM defined by E†(S′) := ∑k E†kS′Ek, for any hermitian operator S′ on
H′. We then have the identity
tr(E†(S′)σ) = tr(S′E(σ)) .
Hence
‖E†(S′)‖∞ = sup
σ∈P(H): tr(σ)≤1
tr(E†(S′)σ)
= sup
σ∈P(H): tr(σ)≤1
tr(S′E(σ))
≤ ‖S′‖∞ ,
(A.2)
where the inequality holds because E(σ) ∈ P(H′) and tr(E(σ)) ≤ tr(σ) = 1,
for any σ ∈ P(H). Using (A.1), this implies that
‖E(T )‖1 = sup
S′: ‖S′‖∞≤1
|tr(E(T )S′)|
= sup
S′: ‖S′‖∞≤1
|tr(TE†(S′))|
≤ sup
S: ‖S‖∞≤1
tr(TS)
= ‖T‖1 ,
where the inequality follows from (A.2).
L1-distance of mixtures
Lemma A.2.2. Let ρAZ and ρ¯AZ be classical with respect to an orthonormal
basis {|z〉}z∈Z of HZ and let {ρzA}z∈Z and {ρ¯zA}z∈Z be the corresponding
conditional operators. Then∥∥ρAZ − ρ¯AZ∥∥1 =∑
z∈Z
∥∥ρzA − ρ¯zA∥∥1 .
Proof. For any z ∈ Z, let {|φzx〉}x∈X be an eigenbasis of ρzA− ρ¯zA. Then, the
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family {|φzx〉 ⊗ |z〉}(x,z)∈X×Z is an eigenbasis of ρAZ − ρ¯AZ . Hence,∥∥ρAZ − ρ¯AZ∥∥1 = ∑
z′∈Z
∑
x∈X
∣∣(〈φz′x | ⊗ 〈z′|)(∑
z∈Z
(ρzA − ρ¯zA)⊗ |z〉〈z|
)
(|φz′x 〉 ⊗ |z′〉)
∣∣
=
∑
z∈Z
∑
x∈X
∣∣〈φzx|ρzA − ρ¯zA|φzx〉∣∣
=
∑
z∈Z
∥∥ρzA − ρ¯zA∥∥1 .
L1-distance of pure operators in terms of vector distance
The scalar product of a Hilbert spaceH induces a canonical norm, defined by
‖|φ〉‖ :=√〈φ|φ〉, for any |φ〉 ∈ H. In particular, the norm of the difference
between two vectors |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉, ‖|ψ〉 − |ψ′〉‖, is a metric on H.
The following lemma relates the L1-distance between two pure states
|ψ〉〈ψ| and |ψ′〉〈ψ′| to the vector distance ‖|ψ〉 − |ψ′〉‖.
Lemma A.2.3. Let |ψ〉, |ψ′〉 ∈ H such that 〈ψ|ψ′〉 is real. Then∥∥|ψ〉〈ψ| − |ψ′〉〈ψ′|∥∥
1
=
∥∥|ψ〉 − |ψ′〉∥∥ · ∥∥|ψ〉+ |ψ′〉∥∥ .
Proof. Define |α〉 := |ψ〉 + |ψ′〉, |β〉 := |ψ〉 − |ψ′〉 and let a := ‖|α〉‖, b :=
‖|β〉‖. We then have
∥∥|ψ〉〈ψ| − |ψ′〉〈ψ′|∥∥
1
= tr
∣∣|ψ〉〈ψ| − |ψ′〉〈ψ′|∣∣ = 1
2
tr
∣∣|α〉〈β| + |β〉〈α|∣∣ .
Moreover, because 〈ψ|ψ′〉 is real, the scalar product 〈α|β〉 = 〈ψ|ψ〉 − 〈ψ′|ψ′〉
is real as well. Using this, it is easy to verify that b|α〉+a|β〉 and b|α〉−a|β〉
are eigenvectors of |α〉〈β|+ |β〉〈α| with eigenvalues 〈α|β〉+ab and 〈α|β〉−ab,
respectively. Hence,
tr
∣∣|α〉〈β| + |β〉〈α|∣∣ = ∣∣〈α|β〉 + ab∣∣+ ∣∣〈α|β〉 − ab∣∣ = 2ab ,
where the last equality holds because the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality im-
plies |〈α|β〉| ≤ ab.
Upper bound on L1-distance in terms of fidelity
Lemma A.2.4. Let ρ, ρ ∈ P(H). Then
‖ρ− ρ′‖1 ≤
√(
tr(ρ) + tr(ρ′)
)2 − 4F (ρ, ρ′)2 .
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Proof. It follows from Uhlmann’s theorem (see Theorem A.1.2 and remark
thereafter) that there exist purifications |ψ〉〈ψ| and |ψ′〉〈ψ′| of ρ and ρ′, re-
spectively, such that 〈ψ|ψ′〉 is nonnegative and F (ρ, ρ′) = F (|ψ〉〈ψ|, |ψ′〉〈ψ′|).
Using Lemma A.2.3, a simple calculation leads to∥∥|ψ〉〈ψ| − |ψ′〉〈ψ′|∥∥ =√(〈ψ|ψ〉 + 〈ψ′|ψ′〉)2 − 4〈ψ|ψ′〉2 .
Since 〈ψ|ψ〉 = tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = tr(ρ), 〈ψ′|ψ′〉 = tr(ρ′), and F (|ψ〉〈ψ|, |ψ′〉〈ψ′|) =
〈ψ|ψ′〉, this identity can be rewritten as
∥∥|ψ〉〈ψ| − |ψ′〉〈ψ′|∥∥ =√(tr(ρ) + tr(ρ′))2 − 4F (ρ, ρ′)2 .
The assertion then follows from the fact that the L1-distance can only de-
crease when taking the partial trace (cf. Lemma A.2.1).
Upper bound on L1-distance in terms of vector distance
The following lemma is a generalization of one direction of Lemma A.2.3 to
mixed states.
Lemma A.2.5. Let ρ, ρ′ ∈ P(H) and let |ψ〉〈ψ| and |ψ′〉〈ψ′| be purifications
of ρ and ρ′, respectively. Then
‖ρ− ρ′‖1 ≤
(√
tr(ρ) +
√
tr(ρ′)
) · ∥∥|ψ〉 − |ψ′〉∥∥ .
Proof. Let ν ∈ [0, 2π] such that eiν〈ψ|ψ′〉 is nonnegative and define |ψ˜′〉 :=
eiν |ψ′〉. Then, from Lemma A.2.3,∥∥|ψ〉〈ψ| − |ψ˜′〉〈ψ˜′|∥∥
1
=
∥∥|ψ〉 − |ψ˜′〉∥∥ · ∥∥|ψ〉 + |ψ˜′〉∥∥
≤ ∥∥|ψ〉 − |ψ˜′〉∥∥ · (∥∥|ψ〉∥∥ + ∥∥|ψ′〉∥∥) (A.3)
where the inequality follows from the triangle inequality for the norm ‖ · ‖
and
∥∥|ψ˜′〉∥∥ = ∥∥|ψ′〉∥∥. Moreover, since 〈ψ|ψ˜′〉 is nonnegative, it cannot be
smaller than the real value of the scalar product 〈ψ|ψ′〉, that is, ℜ(〈ψ|ψ˜′〉) =
|〈ψ|ψ˜′〉| = |〈ψ|ψ′〉| ≥ ℜ(〈ψ|ψ′〉), and thus
∥∥|ψ〉 − |ψ˜′〉∥∥ =√〈ψ|ψ〉 + 〈ψ˜′|ψ˜′〉 − 2ℜ(〈ψ|ψ˜′〉)
≤
√
〈ψ|ψ〉 + 〈ψ′|ψ′〉 − 2ℜ(〈ψ|ψ′〉)
=
∥∥|ψ〉 − |ψ′〉∥∥ .
Combining this with (A.3) gives∥∥|ψ〉〈ψ| − |ψ′〉〈ψ′|∥∥ = ∥∥|ψ〉〈ψ| − |ψ˜′〉〈ψ˜′|∥∥
≤ (∥∥|ψ〉∥∥ + ∥∥|ψ′〉∥∥) · ∥∥|ψ〉 − |ψ′〉∥∥ .
The assertion follows from the fact that the L1-distance cannot increase
when taking the partial trace (cf. Lemma A.2.1).
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Lower bound on L1-distance in terms of fidelity
The following statement is the converse of Lemma A.2.4.
Lemma A.2.6. Let ρ, ρ′ ∈ P(H). Then
tr(ρ) + tr(ρ′)− 2F (ρ, ρ′) ≤ ‖ρ− ρ′‖1 .
The proof is a direct generalization of an argument given in [NC00] (see
formula (9.109) of [NC00]).
Proof. According to Lemma A.1.4, there exists a POVM M = {Mz}z∈Z
such that
F (ρ, ρ′) = F (PZ , P ′Z) ,
for PZ and P
′
Z defined by PZ(z) = tr(ρMz) and P
′
Z(z) = tr(ρ
′Mz). Using
the abbreviation pz := PZ(z) and p
′
z := PZ′ , we observe that∑
z∈Z
(√
pz −
√
p′z
)2
=
∑
z∈Z
(
pz + p
′
z − 2
√
pzp′z
)
= tr(ρ) + tr(ρ′)− 2F (ρ, ρ′) .
(A.4)
Moreover, because
∣∣√pz −√p′z∣∣ ≤ √pz +√p′z,∑
z∈Z
(√
pz −
√
p′z
)2 ≤∑
z∈Z
∣∣√pz −√p′z∣∣ · (√pz +√p′z)
=
∑
z∈Z
∣∣pz − p′z∣∣
≤ ‖ρ− ρ′‖1 ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the trace distance cannot
increase when applying a POVM (cf. Lemma A.2.1). The assertion then
follows by combining this with (A.4).
Lower bound on L1-distance in terms of vector distance
The following statement can be seen as the converse of Lemma A.2.5.
Lemma A.2.7. Let ρ, ρ′ ∈ P(H) and let |ψ〉〈ψ| be a purification of ρ. Then
there exists a purification |ψ′〉〈ψ′| of ρ′ such that∥∥|ψ〉 − |ψ′〉∥∥ ≤√‖ρ− ρ′‖1 .
Proof. Uhlmann’s theorem (see Theorem A.1.2 and remark thereafter) im-
plies that there exists a purification |ψ′〉〈ψ′| of ρ′ such that F (ρ, ρ′) = 〈ψ|ψ′〉.
Hence, ∥∥|ψ〉 − |ψ′〉∥∥ =√〈ψ|ψ〉 + 〈ψ′|ψ′〉 − 〈ψ|ψ′〉 − 〈ψ′|ψ〉
=
√
tr(ρ) + tr(ρ′)− 2F (ρ, ρ′) .
The assertion then follows from Lemma A.2.6.
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L1-distance and trace
A slightly different variant of the following statement is known as the Gentle
Measurement Lemma [Win99].
Lemma A.2.8. Let ρ, ρ¯ ∈ P(H) such that ρ¯ = PρP for some projector P
on H. Then,
‖ρ− ρ¯‖1 ≤ 2
√
tr(ρ)
(
tr(ρ)− tr(ρ¯)) .
Proof. We first show that the assertion holds if ρ is normalized (i.e., tr(ρ) =
1) and pure, that is, ρ = |φ〉〈φ| for some normalized vector |φ〉. Since
P is a projector, the vector |φ〉 can be written as a weighted sum of two
orthonormal vectors |a〉 and |b〉, |φ〉 = α|a〉 + β|b〉, for α, β ≥ 0, such that
P |a〉 = |a〉 and P |b〉 = 0. In particular, ρ¯ = α2|a〉〈a|. A straightforward
calculation then shows that
‖ρ− ρ¯‖1 =
∣∣(α|a〉 + β|b〉)(α〈a| + β〈b|) − α2|a〉〈a|∥∥
1
≤ 2β = 2
√
1− tr(ρ¯)
which concludes the proof for normalized pure states ρ.
To show that the assertion holds for general operators ρ ∈ P(H), let ρ =∑
x∈X px|x〉〈x| be a spectral decomposition of ρ. In particular,
∑
x∈X px =
tr(ρ). Define ρx := |x〉〈x| and ρ¯x := PρxP . By linearity, we have
ρ¯ = PρP =
∑
x∈X
pxρ¯x .
Hence, using the triangle inequality and the fact that the assertion holds for
the normalized pure states ρx, we find
‖ρ− ρ¯‖1 ≤
∑
x∈X
px‖ρx − ρ¯x‖1 ≤ 2
∑
x∈X
px
√
1− tr(ρ¯x) .
Moreover, with Jensen’s inequality we find∑
x∈X
px
√
1− tr(ρ¯x) = tr(ρ)
∑
x∈X
px
tr(ρ)
√
1− tr(ρ¯x)
≤ tr(ρ)
√∑
x∈X
px
tr(ρ)
(
1− tr(ρ¯x)
)
=
√
tr(ρ)
(
tr(ρ)− tr(ρ¯)) ,
which concludes the proof.
Appendix B
Various Technical Results
B.1 Combinatorics
For proofs of the following statements, we refer to the standard literature
on combinatorics.
Lemma B.1.1. The set QXn of types with denominator n on a set X has
cardinality
|QXn | =
(
n+ |X | − 1
n
)
.
Lemma B.1.2. Let Q ∈ QXn be a type with denominator n on a set X .
Then the type class ΛQn has cardinality
|ΛQn | =
n!∏
x∈X (nQ(x))!
.
Lemma B.1.3. A set of cardinality n has at most 2nh(r/n) subsets of car-
dinality r.
Proof. A set of cardinality n has exactly
(n
r
)
subsets of cardinality r. The
assertion thus follows from the inequality1
(n
r
) ≤ 2nh(r/n).
B.2 Birkhoff’s Theorem
Definition B.2.1. A matrix (ax,y)x∈X ,y∈Y is bistochastic if ax,y ≥ 0, for
any x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, and ∑y∈Y ax,y =∑x∈X ax,y = 1.
It is easy to see that a matrix (ax,y)x∈X ,y∈Y can only be bistochastic if
|X | = |Y|. The following theorem due to Birkhoff [Bir46] states that any
bistochastic matrix can be written as a mixture of permutation matrices.
(See, e.g., [HJ85] for a proof.)
1See, e.g., [CT91], Formula (12.40).
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Theorem B.2.2 (Birkhoff’s theorem). Let (ax,y)x∈X ,y∈Y be a bistochas-
tic matrix. Then there exist nonnegative coefficients µπ, parameterized by
the bijections π from Y to X , such that ∑π µπ = 1 and, for any x ∈ X ,
y ∈ Y,2
ax,y =
∑
π
µπδx,π(y) .
It follows immediately from Birkhoff’s theorem that any sum of the form
S =
∑
x,y
ax,ySx,y
can be rewritten as
S =
∑
x,y
∑
π
µπδx,π(y)Sx,y =
∑
π
µπ
∑
y
Sπ(y),y .
B.3 Typical sequences
Let x be an n-tuple chosen according to an n-fold product distribution
(PX)
n. Then, with probability almost one, x is a typical sequence, i.e., its
frequency distribution λx is close to the distribution PX .
Theorem B.3.1. Let PX be a probability distribution on X and let x be
chosen according to the n-fold product distribution (PX)
n. Then, for any
δ ≥ 0,
Pr
x
[
D(λx‖PX) > δ
] ≤ 2−n(δ−|X | log(n+1)n ) .
Proof. See Theorem 12.2.1 of [CT91].
Theorem B.3.1 quantifies the distance between λx and PX with respect
to the relative entropy. To obtain a statement in terms of the L1-distance,
we need the following lemma.
Lemma B.3.2. Let P and Q be probability distributions. Then
‖P −Q‖1 ≤
√
2(ln 2)D(P‖Q) .
Proof. See Lemma 12.6.1 of [CT91].
Corollary B.3.3. Let PX be a probability distribution on X and let x be
chosen according to the n-fold product distribution (PX)
n. Then, for any
δ ≥ 0,
Pr
x
[‖λx − PX‖1 > δ] ≤ 2−n( δ22 ln 2−|X | log(n+1)n ) .
Proof. The assertion follows directly from Theorem B.3.1 combined with
Lemma B.3.2.
2δx,pi(y) denotes the Kronecker symbol which equals one if x = π(y) and zero otherwise.
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B.4 Product spaces
Lemma B.4.1. Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB). Then
supp(ρAB) ⊆ supp(ρA)⊗ supp(ρB) .
Proof. Assume first that ρAB is pure, i.e., ρAB = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|. Let |Ψ〉 =∑
z∈Z αz|φz〉 ⊗ |ψz〉 be a Schmidt decomposition of |Ψ〉, i.e., {|φz〉}z∈Z and
{|ψz〉}z∈Z are families of orthonormal vectors in HA and HB, respectively.
Then
supp(ρAB) = {|Ψ〉} ⊆ span{|φz〉}z∈Z ⊗ span{|ψz〉}z∈Z .
Because span{|φz〉}z∈Z = supp(ρA) and span{|ψz〉}z∈Z = supp(ρB) the
assertion follows.
To show that the statement also holds for mixed states, let ρAB =∑
x∈X ρ
x
AB be a decomposition of ρAB into pure states ρ
x
AB , for x ∈ X .
Then, because the lemma holds for the states ρxAB,
supp(ρAB) = span
⋃
x∈X
supp(ρxAB)
⊆ span
⋃
x∈X
supp(ρxA)⊗ supp(ρxB)
⊆
(
span
⋃
x∈X
supp(ρxA)
)
⊗
(
span
⋃
x∈X
supp(ρxB)
)
= supp(ρA)⊗ supp(ρB) .
Lemma B.4.2. Let ρAB, ρ¯AB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB) such that supp(ρ¯AB) ⊆
supp(ρAB). Then supp(ρ¯A) ⊆ supp(ρA).
Proof. Assume first that ρ¯AB is pure, i.e., ρ¯AB = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|. Let |Ψ〉 =∑
z∈Z αz|φz〉 ⊗ |ψz〉 be a Schmidt decomposition of |Ψ〉, i.e., {|φz〉}z∈Z and
{|ψz〉}z∈Z are families of orthonormal vectors in HA and HB, respectively.
Then supp(ρ¯AB) = {|Ψ〉}. Moreover, by Lemma B.4.1,
supp(ρ¯AB) ⊆ supp(ρAB) ⊆ supp(ρA)⊗ supp(ρB) ,
i.e., |Ψ〉 ∈ supp(ρA) ⊗ supp(ρB). This implies |φz〉 ∈ supp(ρA), for any
z ∈ Z, and thus span{|φz〉}z∈Z ⊆ supp(ρA). The assertion then follows
because span{|φz〉}z∈Z = supp(ρ¯A).
To show that the statement holds for mixed states, let ρ¯AB =
∑
x∈X ρ¯
x
AB
be a decomposition of ρ¯AB into pure states ρ¯
x
AB, for x ∈ X . We then have
supp(ρ¯xAB) ⊆ supp(ρAB), for any x ∈ X , and thus, because the lemma holds
for pure states, supp(ρ¯xA) ⊆ supp(ρA). Consequently,
supp(ρ¯A) = span
⋃
x∈X
supp(ρ¯xA) ⊆ supp(ρA) .
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B.5 Nonnegative operators
Lemma B.5.1. Let ρ ∈ P(H) and let S be a hermitian operator on H.
Then SρS is nonnegative.
Proof. Let ρ =
∑
x∈X px|x〉〈x| be a spectral decomposition of ρ. Then, for
any vector |θ〉 ∈ H,
〈θ|SρS|θ〉 =
∑
x∈X
px〈θ|S|x〉〈x|S|θ〉 =
∑
x∈X
px|〈θ|S|x〉|2 ≥ 0 .
The assertion then follows because SρS is hermitian.
Lemma B.5.2. Let ρ, σ ∈ P(H). Then tr(ρσ) ≥ 0.
Proof. The assertion is an immediate consequence of the fact that tr(ρσ) =
tr(σ1/2ρσ1/2) and Lemma B.5.1.
Lemma B.5.3. Let ρ, σ ∈ P(H) such that σ is invertible. Then the operator
λ · σ − ρ is nonnegative if and only if
λmax(σ
−1/2ρσ−1/2) ≤ λ .
Proof. With D := λ · id − σ−1/2ρσ−1/2, we have λ · σ − ρ = σ1/2Dσ1/2.
Because of Lemma B.5.1, this operator is nonnegative if and only if D is
nonnegative, which is equivalent to say that all eigenvalues of σ−1/2ρσ−1/2
are upper bounded by λ.
Lemma B.5.4. Let ρ, σ ∈ P(H) such that λ · σ− ρ is nonnegative and σ is
invertible. Then
λmax(ρ
1/2σ−1ρ1/2) ≤ λ .
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that ρ is invertible (otherwise,
the statement follows by continuity). Because the operator λ · σ − ρ is
nonnegative, the same holds for ρ−1/2(λ · σ− ρ)ρ−1/2 = λ · ρ−1/2σρ−1/2 − id
(cf. Lemma B.5.1). Hence, all eigenvalues of ρ−1/2σρ−1/2 are at least λ−1.
Consequently, the eigenvalues of the inverse ρ1/2σ−1ρ1/2 cannot be larger
than λ.
B.6 Properties of the function rt
The class of functions rt : z 7→ zt− t ln z−1, for t ∈ R, is used in Section 3.3
for the proof of a Chernoff style bound. In the following, we list some of its
properties.
Lemma B.6.1. For any t ∈ R, the function rt is monotonically increasing
on the interval [1,∞).
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Proof. The first derivative of rt is given by
d
dz
rt(z) = tz
t−1 − t
z
=
t
z
(zt − 1) .
The assertion follows because the term on the right hand side is nonnegative
for any z ∈ [1,∞).
Lemma B.6.2. For any t ∈ R and z ∈ (0,∞),
rt(z) ≤ r|t|(z +
1
z
) .
Proof. Observe first that rt(z) = r−t(1z ). It thus suffices to show that the
statement holds for t ≥ 0. If z ≥ 1, the assertion follows directly from
Lemma B.6.1. For the case where t ≥ 0 and z < 1, let v := −t ln z. Then
rt(
1
z ) = e
v − v − 1 and rt(z) = e−v + v − 1. Because v ≥ 0, we have
ev− e−v ≥ 2v, which implies rt(z) ≤ rt(1z ). The assertion then follows again
from Lemma B.6.1.
Lemma B.6.3. For any t ∈ [−12 , 12 ], the function rt is concave on the
interval [4,∞].
Proof. We show that d
2
dz2
rt(z) ≤ 0 for any z ≥ 4. Because d2dz2 rt(z) =
t(t− 1)zt−2+ t
z2
, this is equivalent to t(1− t)zt ≥ t. It thus suffices to verify
that
z ≥
(
1
1− t
) 1
t
,
for any z ≥ 4. Using some simple analysis, it is easy to see that the term on
the right hand side is monotonically increasing in t on the interval [−12 , 12 ]
and thus takes its maximum at t = 12 , in which case it equals 4.
Lemma B.6.4. For any z ∈ [1,∞) and t ∈ [− 1log z , 1log z ],
rt(z) ≤
(
1− ln 2)(log z)2t2 .
Proof. Let v := t ln z. Then
rt(z)
t2
=
et ln z − t ln z − 1
t2
=
ev − v − 1
v2
(ln z)2 . (B.1)
We first show that the term on the right hand side of (B.1) is monotonically
increasing in v, that is,
d
dv
ev − v − 1
v2
=
ev − 1
v2
− 2e
v − v − 1
v3
≥ 0 .
A simple calculation shows that this inequality can be rewritten as
1 ≥ 2
v
ev/2 − e−v/2
ev/2 + e−v/2
,
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which holds because, for any v ∈ R,
∣∣∣ev/2 − e−v/2
ev/2 + e−v/2
∣∣∣ = ∣∣tanh v
2
∣∣ ≤ |v|
2
.
Hence, in order to find an upper bound on (B.1), it is sufficient to evalu-
ate the right hand side of (B.1) for the maximum value of v. By assumption,
we have v ≤ ln 2, i.e.,
ev − v − 1
v2
(ln z)2 ≤ (1− ln 2)(log z)2 ,
which concludes the proof.
Appendix C
Computationally Efficient
Information Reconciliation
In Section 6.3, we have proposed a general one-way information reconcilia-
tion scheme which is optimal with respect to its information leakage. The
scheme, however, requires the receiver of the error-correcting information to
perform some decoding operation for which no efficient algorithm is known.
In the following, we propose an alternative information reconciliation scheme
based on error-correcting codes where all computations can be done effi-
ciently.
C.1 Preliminaries
To describe and analyze the protocol, we need some terminology and basic
results from the theory of channel coding. Let C be a discrete memoryless
channel which takes inputs from a set U and gives outputs from a set V.1
An encoding scheme for C is a family of pairs (Cn,decn) parameterized by
n ∈ N where Cn is a code on U of length n, i.e., a set of n-tuples u ∈ Un,
called codewords, and decn is a decoding function, i.e., a mapping from Vn
to Cn. The rate of the code Cn is defined by rate(Cn) := 1n log |Cn|. Moreover,
the maximum error probability of (Cn,decn) is defined by
εmax(Cn,decn) := max
u∈Cn
Pr
v
[u 6= dec(v)] ,
where, for any u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Cn, the probability is over all outputs
v = (v1, . . . , vn) of n parallel invocations of C on input u.
We will use the following fundamental theorem for channel coding (cf.,
e.g., [CT91], Section 8.7).
1A discrete memoryless channel C from U to V is defined by the conditional probability
distributions PV |U=u on V, for any u ∈ U .
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Proposition C.1.1. Let C be a discrete memoryless channel from U to V
and let δ > 0. Then there exists an encoding scheme {(Cn,decn)}n∈N for C
such that the following holds:
• rate(Cn) ≥ maxPU H(U) − H(U |V ) − δ, for any n ∈ N. (The en-
tropies in the maximum are computed for the distribution PUV of an
input/output pair (u, v) of C, where u is chosen according to PU .)
• limn→∞ εmax(Cn,decn) = 0.
C.2 Information reconciliation based on codes
Let us now consider an information reconciliation protocol based on chan-
nel coding. For this, we assume that Alice’s and Bob’s inputs are strings
x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn), respectively. Our protocol shall be
secure if the inputs x,y are distributed according to a product distribution
PXnY n = (PXY )
n.
Let C be the channel which maps any u ∈ X to v := (x ⊕ u, y), where
the pair (x, y) is chosen according to the probability distribution PXY and
where ⊕ is a group operation on X . For any n ∈ N, let IRCn,decn be the
information reconciliation protocol specified by Fig. C.1, where Cn is the
code and decn the decoding function defined by Proposition C.1.1.
It is easy to see that xˆ = x holds whenever decn decodes to the correct
value uˆ = u. Hence, the information reconciliation protocol IRCn,decn is
εn-secure, for εn := εmax(Cn,decn). Because, by Proposition C.1.1, the
maximum error probability εmax(Cn,decn) of (Cn,decn) goes to zero, for n
approaching infinity, the protocol IRCn,decn is asymptotically secure.
Moreover, by Proposition C.1.1,
rate(Cn) ≥ max
PU
H(U)−H(U |X ⊕ U, Y )− δ .
Using the fact that the input u is chosen independently of the randomness of
the channel (x, y), a simple information-theoretic computation shows that
the entropy difference in the maximum can be rewritten as H(X ⊕ U |Y )−
H(X|Y ). Hence, because maxPU H(X ⊕ U |Y ) = Hmax(PU ) = log |X |, we
find
1
n
log |Cn| = rate(Cn) ≥ log |X | −H(X|Y )− δ . (C.1)
The communication c of the protocol is contained in the set X n. Further-
more, because u is chosen uniformly at random from Cn, the distribution
PC|Xn=x of the communication c, conditioned on any input x ∈ X n, is
uniform over a set of size |Cn|. The leakage of IRCn,decn is thus given by
leakIRCn,decn = log |X n| −minx Hmin(PC|Xn=x) = n log |X | − log |Cn| .
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Fig. C.1 Information reconciliation protocol IRCn,decn .
Parameters:
Cn: set of codewords from X n
decn: decoding function from X n × Yn to Cn
⊕: group operation on X (with inverse ⊖).
Alice Bob
input: x ∈ X n input: y ∈ Yn
u ∈R Cn
c := x⊕ u -c uˆ := decn(c,y)
if decoding not succ.
then abort
output xˆ := c⊖ uˆ
Combining this with (C.1) we conclude
1
n
leakIRCn,decn ≤ H(X|Y ) + δ .
Because Proposition C.1.1 also holds for efficient2 encoding schemes (see,
e.g., [Dum98]), Corollary 6.3.5 is asymptotically still true if we restrict to
computationally efficient protocols (see also [HR05]). More precisely, this
result can be formulated as follows.
Proposition C.2.1. Let PXY ∈ P(X ×Y) be a probability distribution and
let δ > 0. Then there exists a family of computationally efficient information
reconciliation protocols IRCn,decn (parameterized by n ∈ N) which are εn-
fully secure, εn-robust on the product distribution (PXY )
n, and have leakage
1
n leakIRCn,decn ≤ H(X|Y ) + δ, for any n ∈ N, where limn→∞ εn = 0.
2An encoding scheme {(Cn,decn)}n∈N is said to be efficient if there exist polynomial-
time algorithms (in n) for sampling a codeword from the set Cn and for evaluating the
decoding function decn.
Appendix D
Notation
General
log binary logarithm
ln natural logarithm
δx,y Kronecker symbol: δx,y ∈ {0, 1}, δx,y = 1 iff x = y
c complex conjugate of c
ℜ(c) real value of c
P(X ) set of nonnegative functions on the set X
Sn set of permutations on the set {1, . . . , n}
Ex[f(x)] expectation of f(x) over random choices of x
supp(f) support of the function f
[a, b] set of real numbers r such that a ≤ r ≤ b
[a, b) set of real numbers r such that a ≤ r < b
Frequency distributions and types
λx frequency distribution of the n-tuple x
QXn set of types with denominator n on the set X
ΛQn type class of the type Q with denominator n
Vectors
spanV space spanned by the set of vectors V
〈φ|ψ〉 scalar product of the vectors |φ〉 and |ψ〉
‖|φ〉‖ norm of the vector |φ〉
|φ〉〈φ| projector onto the vector |φ〉
S1(H) set of normalized vectors on H
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Operators
P(H) set of nonnegative operators on H
id identity
tr(S) trace of the hermitian operator S
supp(S) support of the hermitian operator S
rank(S) rank of the hermitian operator S
λmax(S) maximum eigenvalue of the hermitian operator S
‖S‖1 trace norm of the hermitian operator S
Distance measures for operators
‖ρ− ρ′‖1 L1-distance between ρ and ρ′
F (ρ, ρ′) fidelity between ρ and ρ′.
d(ρAB |B) L1-distance from uniform of ρAB given B
d2(ρAB |σB) L2-distance from uniform of ρAB relative to σB
Entropies
H(PX) Shannon entropy of the probability distribution PX
h(p) binary Shannon entropy with bias p
H(ρA) von Neumann entropy of the density operator ρA
H(A|B) conditional entropy H(ρAB)−H(ρB)
D(ρ‖σ) relative entropy of ρ to σ
Hmin(ρAB |σB) min-entropy of ρAB relative to σB
Hmax(ρAB |σB) max-entropy of ρAB relative to σB
Hεmin(ρAB |σB) ε-smooth min-entropy of ρAB relative to σB
Hεmax(ρAB |σB) ε-smooth max-entropy of ρAB relative to σB
Hεmin(ρAB |B) ε-smooth min-entropy of ρAB given HB
Hεmax(ρAB |B) ε-smooth max-entropy of ρAB given HB
Hεmin(A|B) abbreviation for Hεmin(ρAB |B)
Hεmax(A|B) abbreviation for Hεmax(ρAB |B)
H2(ρAB |σB) collision entropy of ρAB relative to σB
Symmetric spaces
Sym(H⊗n) Symmetric subspace of H⊗n
Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) Symmetric subspace of H⊗n along |θ〉⊗m
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